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Chapter 1
In tro d u ctio n
1.1 Context and Outline
More than ten years after the opening of the Berlin wall in November 1989 and the subsequent 
unification of the two German states in October 1990, the economic situation in East Germany 
continues to be a topic for controversial debates. In particular questions about the potential 
individual benefits and losses and about the likely ‘winners’ and ‘ losers’ o f the transition process 
remain at the center of these debates.
Both survey results on self-reported gains and losses experienced by East Germans through­
out transition and results from empirical studies on the distribution and evolution of income 
and income changes in the transition process show an ambiguous picture: while a large major­
ity of Eastern Germans seems to have benefited from the transition to a market economy, a 
substantial - and recently increasing - share of around one fifth of the East Germans seems to 
have experienced income losses or a deterioration o f their economic situation throughout the 
transition process.1
Other - indeed numerous - studies have contributed to this picture by showing how the 
returns to individual characteristics have changed during transition. These studies helped to 
disentangle those individuals who seemed to benefit most from the transition - the highly 
educated and the young - from those who had difficulties in adapting to the needs of a rapidly
lCf. e.g. Beblo et al. (2001a,b).
11
changing economic, political and social environment.2
While these studies provide a picture of the overall evolution and further allow in some cases 
a characterisation o f the groups experiencing income gains or losses throughout transition, th ey  
do generally not relate these results to individual behaviour but only to individual endowments 
and the job  and individual characteristics in 1990. The fact that certain groups have experienced 
income gains or losses throughout transition, however, does not entail any causality between 
individual behaviour, on the one hand, and well-being, income or employment status, on th e  
other.
As regards job  mobility, there seems to be a general understanding in the economics liter­
ature that there are positive individual returns to job changes, both in the short and in the 
long run.3 In his analysis of short- and long-run wage changes in job changes, Mincer (1986) 
e.g. shows that job  movers generally experience positive wage gains and that these gains are 
higher after quits than after layoffs.4 Surprisingly, many analysts seem tempted to apply such 
“stylised facts” in a relatively straightforward way to the particular case of job mobility in the 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy. These analysts seem to disregard 
that even in market economies that are not subject to dramatic structural changes there is in 
general a large dispersion of wage gains experienced by job  movers. As also mentioned in Min­
cer (1986), “significant numbers of movers incur losses” and in particular experienced movers, 
“despite average gains in moving, do not catch up with wage levels of stayers.” This applies in 
particular to older workers and to workers who were laid off. Like Bartel and Borjas (1981), 
Mincer (1986) provides evidence that even quits might result in wage losses, in particular quits 
which are either due to exogenous reasons such as family or health reasons or which represent 
trade-offs of wages for other working conditions. Given this heterogeneity o f wage responses to  
job mobility even in the case o f a “stationary” economic environment, it seems largely unclear
2Cf. e.g. Bird et al. (1994), Franz and Steiner (1999), Hunt (1997,1999a,b), Krueger and Pischke (1995) 
and Steiner and Puhani (1997), in the case of Germany, and Brainerd (1998), Chase (1998), Flanagan (1990), 
Munich et al. (2000), Orazem and Vodopivec (1995,1998), Rutkowski (1994a,b,1996,1997), Sveijnar (1998) and 
Vecernik (1995), in the case of other Central and Eastern European transition economies.
'^ Similarly, ‘macroeconomic’ effects of labour mobility throughout transition in terms of employment and 
the speed of convergence in wages and living standards are often shown theoretically to be positive. Such 
‘macroeconomic’ effects, however, are not subject of this thesis and will not be discussed any further.
4Mincer (1986) defines “short-run wage changes” as the difference between the starting wage on the new job 
and the last wage on the old job and “long-run wage changes” as the difference in wages between the two jobs 
at the same tenure levels net of experience.
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whether, under what conditions and for which groups on the labour market job  mobility pays 
off in a “nonstationary" transitional labour market. In both cases it is further questionable 
* whether the above wage responses can be interpreted as causal effects of job  mobility on wages.
This dissertation contributes to the analysis and evaluation of individual behaviour in an 
uncertain transitional environment, both from a methodological and empirical point o f view. 
It addresses in particular two problems: first, the underlying economic problem of optimal 
individual job mobility decision making in an uncertain environment, and second, the identi­
fication and estimation of the causal effects of job mobility early in transition on employment 
and income. To this aim, a new quasi-experimental approach to the analysis o f (individual) 
‘gains’ and ‘losses’ following job  mobility during transition is proposed. While drawing on the 
statistical literature on causal effects and its adaptations to socioeconomic problems,5 this ap­
proach takes into account the particularity o f individual decision making and self-selection in 
a transitional environment. In this latter, the driving forces o f self-selection into job  mobil­
ity are indeed less obvious than in a non-transitional framework. While individuals in both 
self-select into mobility on the basis o f their expected gains, as described in the so-called Roy 
(1951) model, the relatively high uncertainty at the beginning of transition led to particular 
uncertainties regarding the potential benefits of either changing job immediately or waiting at 
least for a partial resolution of uncertainty. In this context, the role of unobservable individual 
characteristics such as ability and access to either old or new networks is particularly difficult 
to predict.
Before developing a theoretical model of individual job mobility decision making which clar­
ifies both the endogeneity of job  mobility and the need for appropriate empirical approaches 
for the analysis o f returns to job  mobility in chapter 2, the following sections, first, provide the 
necessary overview of job mobility during transition in the context of the overall labour mar­
ket evolution, and, second, disc uss the theoretical predictions and empirical results o f returns 
to job mobility in an uncertain transitional environment. After reviewing the identification 
and estimation o f causal effects in a quasi-experimental framework and introducing the main 
notation in chapter 3, chapter 4 - the central chapter of this thesis - provides an empirical 
evaluation of the causal effects of early job  mobility in transition. Chapter 5 applies the same
JCf. chapter 3 and the references cited therein.
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identification and estimation methods to the estimation o f  the returns to education in W est 
Germany. Chapter 6 concludes.
1.2 Incidence and timing of job mobility during transition
The substantial reallocation o f  labour is among the most pervasive features o f any transition 
economy and has attracted considerable attention in economic research, both theoretical and 
empirical. The incidence of both job  endings and job  mobility in the East German transition 
process was dramatic:0 More than 70% (West: 43%) of the individuals had ended their 1990 
employment relationship by 1996, and more than 40% (West: 14%) had been displaced at some 
point since 1990. Two thirds (West: 34%) of the sample population, moreover, had a job  change 
at least once between 1990 and 1996, and more than 40% (West: 21%) performed at least one 
job-to-job shift in the same period. Less than 20% (West: 50%) of the sample actually stayed 
with their 1990 jo b  throughout the full period 1990-96. The massive job loss especially at the 
beginning of the transition period, when displacement rates in the East exceeded those in the 
West by a factor o f 5 to 10, was thus accompanied by a considerable reallocation of labour 
through job  mobility, with job  mobility rates in the East generally doubling those in the West 
(cf. table 1.1)
As to the time pattern o f jo b  mobility during transition, while starting from high levels in 
1990, the rates o f  both job endings and job  changes peaked in 1991 and declined considerably 
afterwards. Throughout the first, three years of transition, 1990-92, 52% of the individuals 
employed in 1990 had ended their 1990 employment relationship, more than half o f them due 
to displacement. In the same time, more than 26% of the sample had changed employer. 
Whereas job  mobility rates have come close to Western levels by 1996, displacement rates in 
1996 were still considerably higher in the East.
As a result, employment rates in East Germany have dropped by 10 percentage points in
fiThe evidence presented here is based on data from the East and West German subsamples of the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1990-97 (waves 7-14). “Full sample” denotes the balanced sample 
of all individuals with observations for the first eight years of the transition process. “Restricted sample” denotes 
the subsample of all those individuals who were employed in 1990. Tables in this section are ba$ed on the 
"restricted sample". For reasons of completeness, tables for the "full sample” are contained in the appendix. For 
a detailed description of the database and the sample definition, cf. chapter 4.
Table 1.1: Incidence of job mobility 1990-96 in East and West Germany
East
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
job ending 
yearly 17.9 22.43 21.50 15.34 12.31 15.11 12.62
cumulative 17.9 38.01 52.18 58.72 62.85 67.68 70.79
displacement
yearly 8.4 13.4 10.3 7.4 5.5 6.7 5.4
cumulative 8.4 20.6 29.2 34.1 37.7 41.0 43.7
quits
yearly 5.9 5.0 3.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.6
cumulative 5.9 10.8 13.7 15.6 17.1 19.1 19.8
job change 
yearly 17.5 24.9 17.3 14.1 12.9 10.8 10.4
cumulative 17.5 38.9 49.9 56.6 61.1 64.3 67.0
job-to-job shift 
yearly 8.3 12.2 7.9 8.0 7.9 6.8 5.8
cumulative 8.3 20.2 26.2 31.5 36.1 39.6 42.1
West
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
job ending 
yearly 9.5 7.8 8.0 8.19 9.31 8.75 9.54
c umiliati ve 9.5 16.2 21.9 27.08 32.82 37.41 42.92
displacement
yearly 1.3 1.2 1.9 3.6 2.8 2.5 2.7
cumulative 1-3 2.5 4.3 7.6 9.9 11.7 13.6
quits
yearly 4.4 3.8 3.4 1.9 2.4 2.1 1.7
cumulative 4.4 8.0 10.5 12.0 13.9 15.3 16.3
job change 
yearly 8.8 8.8 8.1 5.1 6.3 6.3 6.3
cumulative 8.8 16.3 22.1 25.4 28.7 32.2 34.4
job-to-job shift 
yearly 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.2
cumulative 4.6 9.0 12.5 14.8 17.0 19.1 20.7
NOTES: Yearly rates show the fraction of individuals who haw experienced the form of job mobility in 
the calendar year. Cumulative rates show the fraction of individuals who have experienced the form of 
job mobility since 1990; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsamples A and B (West Germany, N=2160)
and subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
“ m u a .
Table 1.2: Labour market status 1990-97: East Germany (restricted sample)
LM status 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
employed
total 100.0 92.2 85.1 79.1 77.8 77.4 74.0 73.6
full-time 88.2 83.9 78.9 72.6 70.5 69.3 65.2 65.1
part-time 11.8 7.8 5.7 5.4 6.2 7.1 7.6 7.2
(re)training 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.7
marginally 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6
not employed 
total 7.8 14.9 20.9 22.2 22.6 26.0 26.4
unemployed 5.1 10.3 14.0 14.5 14.2 15.8 15.0
out of the LF 2.7 4.6 6.9 7.7 8.4 10.2 11.5
NOTES: in % of restricted sample (N=1284); labour market status as of time of survey for all 
categories with the exception o f the calendar information which reports the percentage of individuals 
who were in the respective labour market state for at least one month up to the respective year and 
which is based on monthly calendar information; SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, waves 7-14, 
subsample C, all individuals employed at the time of the 1990 survey
1990/91 alone, and by almost 25 percentage points between 1990 and 1997 - according to Hunt 
(1997) “possibly the worst [fall in employment rates] o f  any European transition economy.”  
Levels o f employment rates in East Germany have roughly converged to West German levels 
since 1992, although remaining slightly higher than in West Germany. The share of the em ­
ployed in East Germany in full-time jobs also remains higher than in the West, while the share 
of individuals in part-time jobs remains almost 4 percentage points below that in the West. A t  
the same time, both participation rates and unemployment rates remain considerably higher 
in East Germany, with unemployment rates in 1997 more than twice as high as in the W est 
and participation rates more than 10 percentage points above those in the West. O f all those 
employed in 1990, more than one quarter -were in non-employment in East Germany in 1997, 
compared to one fifth in West Germany. In East Germany almost two thirds o f those not em­
ployed anymore in 1997 were in unemployment compared to only one third in West Germany 
(cf. tables 1.2 and 1.3 and tables 1.7 and 1.8 in the appendix).
Furthermore, by the end of 1996, more than 40% of all East Germans employed in 1990 
had been unemployed and almost one quarter had left the labour force at least temporarily for 
some time. More than half o f those experiencing unemployment did so during the first three
16
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Table 1.3: Labour market status 1990-97: West Germany (restricted sample)
LM status 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
employed
total 100.0 95.8 94.2 91.7 88.1 85.7 83.3 80.3
full-time 84.6 81.6 80.3 78.7 75.1 72.8 69.7 66.9
part-time 14.0 12.9 12.7 12.0 11.8 11.7 12.1 11.8
(re) training 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
marginally 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4
not employed 
total 4.2 5.8 8.3 11.9 14.3 16.7 19.7
unemployed 3.1 1.5 3.3 5.6 6.1 6.4 7.2
out of the LF 3.1 4.3 5.0 6.4 8.2 10.3 12.6
NOTES: in % of restricted sample (N=2160); labour market status as of time of survey for all 
categories; SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, waves 7-14, subsamples A and B, all individuals employed
at the time of the 1990 survey
years of transition, 1990-92. The average time spent in either unemployment or inactivity has 
further increased throughout transition. While those unemployed in the first years of transition 
remained on average around 4 months in unemployment, those unemployed in 1994 or later 
remained on average unemployed for more than half a year. The same observation holds for 
the average duration of spells of inactivity (cf. table 1.4).
In the early 1990s, labour market dynamics thus were much more pronounced in East 
Germany than in the West. This applies not only to transitions into unemployment but also 
to transitions out of unemployment or inactivity into employment. After almost ten years of 
transition, the patterns of labour turnover in East and West Germany still remain significantly 
different. While in particular transition rates out of employment and unemployment remain 
significantly higher and transition rates into inactivity considerably smaller in East Germany, 
retention rates in employment, unemployment or inactivity have come close to Western levels: 
around 90% stay in either employment or inactivity, and more than half of all unemployed stay 
in unemployment between two consecutive years.7
Most interestingly, according to GSOEP data, in East Germany retention rates in employ-
~This section restricts attention to descriptive evidence on employment durations and transitions. For a 
detailed analysis o f the determinants of such durations or transitions in general, and of transitions between 
emloyment and non-employment as well as of the duration in unemployment, cf. Hunt (1999b).
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Table 1.4: Non-employment experience in East Germany 1990-96
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
not employed
total 7.8 17.9 28.3 33.3 37.9 43.0 45.8
unemployed 5.1 13.2 21.3 26.4 30.5 35.7 38.7
out of the LF 2.7 5.6 9.7 11.6 13.8 16.4 18.9
calendar information
unemployed 7.3 12.7 23.1 30.1 33.3 37.9 41.6
out of the LF 7.3 11.2 15.3 18.2 20.9 23.1 24.7
average duration in ...
employment 11.2 10.6 11.0 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.2
unemployment 2.8 4.8 5.8 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.4
out of the LF 3.5 5.3 6.1 5.9 5.8 6.1 6.7
NOTES: in % of restricted sample (N=1284); percentage of individuals who were in the respective 
non-employment state at least at one survey date up to the respective year; calendar information 
reports the percentage of individuals who were either in unemployment or out of the labour force 
(vocational training) for at least one month up to the respective year and is based on monthly calendar 
information; average duration (in months) in the respective labour market state (out of the labour 
force restricted to vocational training) SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, waves 7-14, subsample C
ment have not increased and transition rates into unemployment have not decreased during 
transition. At the same time, transition rates into employment for those who lost or left their 
job in between have dropped sharply from levels above 40% in 1991/92 to disproportionately 
low levels in 1996/97, below 30% for transitions out o f unemployment and below 10% for tran­
sitions out o f  inactivity. While the fall in these latter transition rates also occurred in W est 
Germany, retention rates in employment remained significantly higher and transition rates into 
unemployment significantly lower in the West (cf. table 1.5 and table 1.9 in the appendix).
To sum up, the following observations seem particularly noteworthy. First, after initially 
dramatic increases the unemployment rate stabilised at a high level of around 15%, with al­
most 20% o f the population and more than 40% o f those employed in 1990 experiencing un­
employment at least for some time. Second, the increase in unemployment was paralleled b y  
a strong decline o f the labour force. By 1996, more than 25% of those employed in 1990 
were in non-employment, of which roughly 40% out of the labour force. Third, persistence o f  
non-employment considerably increased over time due to decreasing outflow rates from non­
employment to employment. At the same time, persistence o f employment remained relatively
18
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Table 1.5: Labour market transitions: East Germany (restricted sample)
LM transitions from ...
East
90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
employment to:
employment 92.2 88.6 87.3 91.5 91.3 89.2 92.2
unemployment 5.1 8.4 9.3 7.2 6.9 8.9 6.7
out of the labour force 2.7 3.0 3.4 1.3 1.8 1.9 1.1
unemployment to:
employment 45.5 38.6 35.6 38.2 29.1 27.6
unemployment 43.9 50.0 52.2 51.6 53.9 54.2
out of the labour force 10.6 11.4 12.2 10.2 17.0 18.2
out of the LF to:
employment 41.2 18.6 5.7 11.1 9.3 9.9
unemployment 11.8 20.3 21.6 17.2 15.7 13.7
out of the labour force 47.1 61.0 72.7 71.7 75.0 76.3
LM transitions from ...
West
90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 *
employment to:
employment 95.8 97.1 95.5 94.0 94.4 94.3 94.0
unemployment 1.1 0.9 2.1 3.9 2.8 2.6 3.0
out of the labour force 3.1 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.8 3.1 3.0
unemployment .to:
employment 37.5 36.4 26.8 31.7 18.9 13.8
unemployment 41.7 45.5 52.1 58.3 62.9 63.0
out of the labour force 20.8 18.2 21.1 10.0 18.2 23.2
out of the LF to:
employment 22.7 29.0 18.5 12.3 16.4 10.8
unemployment 7.6 14.0 4.6 6.5 4.0 6.3
out of the labour force 69.7 57.0 76.9 81.2 79.7 83.0
NOTES: one-year transition probabilities between labour market states at the time of the survey; 
SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, waves 7-14, subsamples A and B (West Germany; N=2160) and 
subsample C (East Germany; N=1284); all individuals employed at the time of the 1990 survey
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Table 1.6: Employed’s expectations and mobility intentions 1990
subjective probability o f .... very likely probably unlikely very unlikely
job loss 6.2 36.3 45.5 11.2
searching new job 16.2 17.2 21.3 44.6
quitting job 4.0 18.9 27.4 49.0
self-employment 1.6 6.2 15.4 75.9
promotion 1.6 13.1 37.4 47.2
demotion 3.0 9.8 36.9 48.8
leaving the labour force 0.9 4.9 13.8 79.3
NOTES: responses in % to 1990 survey question on subjective probability of the respective event; 
response categories are: very likely (1), probably (2), unlikely (3), very unlikely (4); differences to 100% 
are missing; SOURCE: GSOEP public-rise file, wave 7, subsample C, N=1284
stable and at a high level of around 90%. Consequently, the average duration in non-employment 
spells increased strongly for both unemployment and inactivity. Finally, the high and increas­
ing percentage in non-employment in general and in inactivity in particular contrasts sharply 
with the employed’s expectations at the beginning o f the transition process (cf. table 1.6). A t  
that time, only 6% of the sample population recognised the possibility o f dropping out o f th e  
labour force. Apart from economy-wide considerations, the combination o f a high awareness o f  
a potential job  loss (42%) on the one hand and a relatively low propensity to search a new jo b  
(33%) or to quit the current job  (23%) as of 1990 might explain partially the relatively high 
drop-out rates from the labour force.
1.3 Returns to job mobility during transition
Paralleling the above described labour market evolution, the income distribution as shown 
below (cf. figure 1-1) changed significantly throughout transition, most strongly between 1990 
and 1992.8 This suggests that those benefitting most strongly from the transition process could 
have been either those individuals who stayed on their job  throughout the transition process or  
those who changed to new opportunities right at the beginning of this process.
H Am ong the clear signs of the - initially unexpected - slowdown of wage convergence towards Western levels in 
some sectors from 1993/94 onwards were the employers’ single-sided withdrawal from collective wage agreements 
at that time and the increased public debate on wage convergence in the public sector. The determinants of wage 
growth during transition and the issue of wage convergence are discussed in more detail in Hunt (1997,1999a,b).
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Figure 1-1: East German income distribution 1990-96
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As described in the previous section, in these years both the risk of layoff as well as the 
accession rates from unemployment or inactivity to employment were also highest. Individuals 
were thus facing the trade-off between staying on their job - despite the largely unknown risk 
of layoff - and switching to a new job  - despite the largely unknown risk of both job  stability 
on the new job and the overall economic evolution throughout transition. This section briefly 
reviews theoretical issues related to individual job mobility decisions when facing this trade-off 
and further presents empirical evidence on returns to job mobility in transition from previous 
studies. It finally lays out the different approach to be follow-ed in the later empirical-analysis.
1.3.1 Theoretical considerations
Individual decision-making during transition is a standard example of decision-making under 
uncertainty with uncertainty referring not only to the further evolution of the economy in 
general and the labour market in particular but also to the development of the political and 
social environment. In this context, and given the dramatic changes in both the structure 
of labour demand and the reward structure, potential future costs and benefits o f individual
behaviour are inherently difficult to evaluate, especially at the beginning o f the transition  
process. Variations in labour market policies throughout transition are prone to exacerbate 
this difficulty further.9 Individual decisions to move to another job  (job mobility) are m a d e  
under these conditions of uncertainty and are based on the individuals’ expectations of fu tu re  
costs and benefits of such a move. The actual (ex post) returns to their behaviour, how ever, 
will be observed only much later. They might, moreover, differ substantially from the exp ected  
(ex ante) returns on the basis of which the job mobility decision was made.10
Suggestions as to the potential returns of job mobility might be obtained from theoretical 
models o f jo b  mobility decisions and income determination. Models of individual job  m ob ility  
decision-making like search or matching models usually depart from the standard assumption o f  
maximisation o f the present discounted value of the future income stream. They lead naturally 
to the formulation of stochastic dynamic optimisation problems and the notion o f the o p t io n  
value o f waiting. In the transition context, this latter option value will depend crucially on b o t h  
the expected speed of wage convergence to the Western levels and the expected employment 
prospects in different sectors. Models of income determination, moreover, identify changing 
rewards to individual characteristics like education, experience or tenure as major com ponents 
of the potential costs and benefits related to job mobility. Standard human capital theory e .g . 
predicts positive returns to both experience (general human capital) and tenure (firm-specific 
human capital). In the present framework of transition from a centrally planned economy t o  
a market economy, however, returns to job  mobility depend crucially on the potential trans­
ferability of general human capital and on the relative returns that jobs in a market econom y 
(new jobs) award to experience and tenure acquired on jobs in a centrally planned economy (o ld  
jobs). Clearly, new jobs might reward individual characteristics differently from old jobs. E xist­
ing studies o f  the changing reward structure during transition suggest e.g. considerably higher 
returns to education, especially university education, on new jobs in transition economies.
Theoretical predictions o f the returns to early job  mobility during transition are thus a m -
9Even after the establishment of both monetary and political union in July and October 1990, respectively, 
experts like Heilemann (1991) stressed the inherent unpredictability of the future transition process: “As for 
the long-term prospects, it is clear that there is neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis so far for a serious 
forecast (...)” .
10 As pointed out by Angrist (1998) in the context of analysing the returns to voluntary military service, even, 
voluntary movers could “fail to benefit (...) if they do not accurately evaluate future costs and benefits at the 
time of decision.”
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biguous. On the one hand, one might expect early job  movers to benefit from their move due 
to high rewards to market economy specific human capital investments and experience (i.e. 
tenure on a new job) as well as due to learning-by-doing effects. Moreover, they can probably 
better exploit the potential for job shopping at the beginning o f transition.11 Those moving 
already at the beginning of the transition period might further signal both higher motivation 
as well as higher flexibility to adapt to the new labour market situation. On the other hand, 
early job movers might fall behind the stayers if there is a significantly positive option value 
of waiting. In this case it could instead pay off to await at least a partial temporal resolution 
of the transition-specific uncertainty by observing the changes in reward and labour demand 
structures. The information obtained in the meantime could e.g. help to avoid costs o f  unprof­
itable human capital investments in further education or retraining. Initially staying on the 
job could further ensure benefits from the above average wage growth during the first years of 
transition. Finally, staying on the job  could be considered a signal of high productivity.
Following the theoretical distinction between forced and voluntary mobility, returns to early 
job  mobility, moreover, are likely to depend on the nature o f the move and are thus likely to 
be different across individuals. Immobility is probably most beneficial to individuals with few 
outside opportunities but maybe detrimental to individuals with good outside opportunities 
and a high risk o f displacement. Job mobility, on the other hand, is probably beneficial to 
individuals with good outside opportunities and a low risk of displacement due to firm closure, 
but even more beneficial to individuals with good outside opportunities and a high risk of 
displacement due to firm closure. Finally, individuals might realise at a later stage that it 
would have been beneficial to stay on their old job instead of switching to a new one, possibly 
because employment prospects on the new job unexpectedly turn out to be worse than on the 
old job or because the wage evolution on the new job  is not as favourable as expected. In 
other words, the realised (ex post) returns to early job  mobility can be negative.* 12 There exist
MM
“ similar to job shopping behaviour at the beginning of the career
12For an analysis o f the employment evolution in the period 1992-95 in old firms (already founded in the GDR 
before 1990) as opposed to new firms (founded after 1989), cf. Steiner et al. (1998), chapter 2, and the references 
cited therein. The authors present mixed evidence, showing that the relative employment performance of new 
firms as opposed to old ones depends, among other factors, on the respective sector. While e.g. new firms seem 
to do better in the service sector, the opposite seems to hold for the retail sector. It is at least questionable 
whether and to what extent these differences in employment prospects could have been predicted before 1992. 
In the sample used in the later analysis, moreover, displacement rates in the period 1993-96 are similar for early
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thus strong theoretical reasons to believe that returns to (early) job  mobility in transition a re  
heterogeneous across different subpopulations. The evaluation of these returns in the case o f  
the East German transition process clearly is an empirical problem that will be addressed in  
detail in chapter 4.
1.3.2 Previous studies
Despite a huge body of literature on the economics o f transition in general and the evolution  
of earnings and inequality during transition in particular, however, only a few studies h a ve  
undertaken an evaluation o f the returns to job mobility in the transition from a centrally 
planned to a market economy.13 In the special case o f the East German transitional la bou r 
market, previous empirical studies on the returns to job  mobility like Buechel and Pannenberg 
(1994) and Hunt (1999a), have tried to identify the returns to job mobility as coefficients o n  
the job  mobility indicators in some appropriate reduced form model. Both studies suggest th a t 
individuals moving voluntarily to a new job  early in the transition process experience significant 
gains with respect to job stayers, in terms of wage increase and job  or income satisfaction levels 
respectively, while forced movers do not seem to experience any gains.14 Moreover, the initially 
high returns to job  mobility are found to decline over the subsequent years.
While all these studies attempt to evaluate the returns to job mobility during transition, 
they differ considerably, however, in the definition o f job mobility, the choice o f the outcom e 
variable, the model formulation, and the sample used in the empirical analysis. Not surprisingly, 
they also lead to different conclusions about the magnitude o f returns to job  mobility.
Buechel and Pannenberg (1994) evaluate the returns from switching to self-employment 
and from changing the employer with respect to job  stayers as control group. They base their 
analysis on the balanced sample of all full-time employed individuals in the Eastern German
job-to-job movers (6.4% on average) and for stayers (6.2% on average).
u Cf. Boeri and Flinn (1999) in the context o f job  mobility between the public and the private sector in the 
Polish transition economy; “ (...) returns to mobility under the economic transformation may be too low to  
motivate people to abandon the most protected and unionised jobs in the public sector for more risky jobs in 
the private sector. What appears to be lacking in the literature is an evaluation of the private costs and benefits 
of job mobility.”
14 In these studies, the distinction between forced and voluntary movers is based on survey information about 
the nature of previous job endings. While job  changers who had previously been laid off or whose firm had closed 
down (and in Buechel and Pannenberg (1994) also those who had come to the end of a fixed-term contract) are 
considered as forced movers, quitters from their previous jobs are considered as voluntary movers.
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subsample of the GSOEP for the years 1990 and 1991. Due to the lack of valid income in­
formation for the self-employed the authors restrict attention to subjective income- and job 
satisfaction levels as outcome variables. The returns of mobility are considered to be identified 
as coefficients on the respective job  mobility indicator in a random effects probit model. The 
authors’ main finding is that voluntary job  mobility in the first year of transition significantly 
increases both income and job satisfaction while there are no significant returns to forced job 
mobility.10
Boeri and Flinn (1997), for the case o f Poland, jointly model wages and transition rates be­
tween the three labour market states private sector employment, state sector employment, and 
non-employment. In their search-theoretic model, individuals act according to static decision 
rules comparing costs and benefits of job-to-job shifts between two respective sectors. Identifi­
cation of these returns to job mobility is achieved by assuming a known functional form of the 
underlying individual decision mechanism. Based on subsamples of two consecutive quarters 
each of the Polish Labour Force Survey, their estimation results suggest the lack of incentives 
to move from the state sector to the private sector due to low or zero returns to experience 
and age in the private sector as well as due to the greater dispersion of private-sector offers. 
According to the authors this lack of incentives explains the observed low mobility o f workers 
across both industries and occupations in transition economies.
Finally, Hunt (1999a) analyses the effect of job mobility on year-to-year median wage growth 
in Eastern Germany for the years 1990-1996. She considers wage growth of job movers relative 
to stayers, further dividing movers into involuntary movers, namely those having experienced 
a job loss due to either firm closure or layoff, and voluntary ones. On the basis of estimates 
from quantile regressions she compares the determinants of changes in the logged gross monthly 
income for the two subperiods 1990-91 and 1991-96 and concludes that those individuals moving 
voluntarily between 1990 and 1991 experience large wage gains with respect to job stayers. Like 
job mobility rates, these high returns to job  mobility are found to decline over the subsequent 
years. When interpreting the estimated coefficients on the various job mobility indicators as l
lTn their own words: “Those people who were already able to realize a turnover in the first phase of the change 
of the economic system do not only receive pecuniary benefits (...), but also an increase in job satisfaction. (...) 
Regardless of the objective quality of their jobs, the perspectives for job-movers are much better than those for 
people remaining in their former jobs."
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returns to mobility the gains from voluntary job mobility with respect to stayers amount u p  t c  
15% for job  mobility within the east and up to 65% for moves to a job in the west. Involuntary 
job  movers are found to have a wage growth similar to job  stayers.16 Year-to-year median w a g e  
growth in the period 1991-96, on the contrary, is not found to be significantly different a c r o s s  
the three subgroups of stayers and voluntary and involuntary movers.
1 .3 .3  This study
Recent theoretical contributions to optimal job mobility behaviour under uncertainty, both  i n  
general and in the special case o f transition from a centrally planned economy to a m a rk et 
economy do suggest that individuals self-select into specific forms of job  mobility behaviour 
on the basis o f  their unobservable characteristics.17 In the presence o f such self-selection, 
however, standard results from both simple treatment-control comparisons of average in co m e  
or from simple regressions of reduced form earnings equations do in general not identify a n y  
causal effect o f  job  mobility on the outcome, thus questioning the interpretability o f the results 
obtained by Buechel and Pannenberg (1994) or Hunt (1999a).18
In order to estimate the causal effects of job mobility, this study will deviate from th ose  
mentioned above in several aspects. First, and most importantly, it will take explicitly in to  
consideration the potential endogeneity problem mentioned above. Second, the outcome vari­
ables in the above studies are defined to be year-to-year wage increases or satisfaction levels 
before and after moving, reflecting short-term effects of job  mobility. Optimal decision rules 
obtained from stochastic dynamic optimisation models can imply, however, temporary incom e 
decreases as part of the optimal strategy, e,g. due to retraining or further education which, 
in turn, might increase future employment probabilities. In order to capture both short-run 
and long-run effects of job mobility, this study will suggest the discounted income stream over
16 A closer look at the determinants of wage growth further reveals that initial wage growth is highest for those 
at the lower end of the income distribution, in particular the less skilled, the young, and women.
l< Cf Alexeev and Kaganovich (1998), Simmonet (1998), and Widerstedt (1998). The model developed in 
chapter 2 below adds to this literature bv showing that such self-selection might e.g. occur if the probabilities 
of being laid off from the current job or of being hired on a new job vary with unobservable characteristics like 
ability or the access to networks.
1KHunt (1999a) herself, however, recognises that the “coefficients on the moving dummies should not be 
interpreted as the return to an exogenous move by a random worker, since voluntary and involuntary movers are 
likely to be unobservably different from each other and from stayers.”
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the whole transition period instead as outcome variable, Third, although quite standard, the 
distinction between voluntary and forced movers on the basis of the nature of job losses previous 
to a job mobility episode is not unproblematic. It is questionable to what extent displacement 
due to firm closure or layoff is involuntary if it was to be expected with a high probability. By 
the same line of reasoning, job moves without previous displacement which are actually due to 
a high expected probability of either firm closure or layoff should probably be considered as 
involuntary (forced quits). This study will therefore base the distinction of forced and voluntary 
movers on information other than self-declared reasons for the job  change.
In this context, the causal effect of job  mobility on the discounted income stream over 
the transition period will be defined as the difference between the observed outcome given the 
individual’s actual behaviour and the counterfactual - or hypothetical - outcome in case he/she 
had behaved differently. In case an individual had actually changed job early in transition, 
the counterfactual outcome is the individual’s hypothetical income stream over the transition 
period if he/she had stayed on his/her job  instead. Accordingly, in case the individual had 
stayed on his/her job  early in transition, the counterfactual outcome is the income stream 
he/she would have received had he/she decided to change job  instead. While not observable 
at the individual level, these causal effects can be inferred in a quasi-experimented situation in 
which individuals - conditional on their observed characteristics - are selected randomly and 
independently of their potential outcomes into different states, leading to significant differences 
in job mobility behaviour. For a given quasi-experiment, three types of individuals can be 
distinguished with regard to their job mobility behaviour: first, those who change job  early in
j
transition independently of the underlying selection mechanism (the so-called always-takers)] 
second, those who - also independently o f the selection mechanism - do not change job  early in 
transition (the never-takers): and finally, those who only change job early in transition if they 
are selected into some group with high probability of job  change but who would not change job if 
they were selected into some other group (the so-called compliers). The chosen approach allows 
estimation of the causal effects of job  mobility for this latter group of compliers only, and it 
is this implicit dependence of the estimated causal effects on the respective quasi-experimental 
setting that will finally allow' a distinction between forced and voluntary job  movers. 19 ■ *I
19For a detailed description of the quasi-experimental approach to causal inference and a formal definition of
I
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The empirical evidence on returns to job  mobility obtained on the basis o f  this approac 
and presented in this thesis might help not only to judge the adequacy o f mobility incentive 
provided during transition and their potential impact on the speed of labour reallocation and t h  
human capital stock of the economy in the medium to long run but also to identify ‘winners 
and ‘losers’ during transition. It could hence prove useful in both understanding individua 
opinions about the transition process and designing future labour market policies and mobility 
incentives.
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1.5 Appendix
Table 1.7: Labour market status 1990-97: East Germany (full sample)
LM status 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
employed
total 81.3 71.5 65.0 62.2 60.7 61.1 58.8 57.6
full-time 6S.1 62.2 57.5 54.9 53.1 53.0 50.3 49.8
part-time 10.6 6.3 4.8 4.8 5.6 6.6 6.9 6.3
(re) training 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.8
marginally 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
not employed 
total 18.7 28.5 35.1 37.8 39.3 38.9 41.3 42.4
unemployed 7.9 12.2 13.2 13.6 11.7 12.5 12.4
out of LF 18.7 20.6 22.8 24.6 25.7 27.2 28.8 29.9
NOTES: in % of full sample (N—2696); labour market status as of time of survey 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C
Table 1.8: Labour market status 1990-97: West Germany (full sample)
LM status 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
employed
total 63.2 64.5 63.0 61.7 59.6 58.6 57.9 56.2
full-time 49.3 49.7 49.2 48.7 47.3 46.2 44.8 43.7
part-time 8.5 9.0 9.3 9.3 8.8 9.0 9.8 9.8
(re) training 3.4 3.2 2.5 1.8 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3
marginally 2.0 2.6 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.5
not employed 
total 36.8 35.5 37.1 38.3 40.4 41.4 42.1 43.8
unemployed 3.2 2.6 3.2 3.9 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.5
out of LF 33.6 32.9 33.8 34.4 35.2 36.3 37.1 38.2
NOTES: in % of full sample (N=6187); labour market status as of time of survey 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsamples A  and B
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Table 1.9: Labour market transitions: East Germany (full sample)
East
LM transitions from ... 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
employment to:
employment 84.0 84.4 86.1 89.8 90.9 88.2 89.8
unemployment 8.1 10.5 9.6 7.9 6.8 9.2 7.5
out of the labour force 7.9 5.1 4.3 2.4 2.3 2.6 2 .8
unemployment to:
employment 34.4 37.3 31.2 35.4 31.0 30.4
unemployment 47.6 46.7 53.4 47.4 50.3 53.6’
out of the labour force 17.9 16.1 15.5 17.2 18.7 16.1
out of the LF to:
employment 17.3 9.0 7.8 3.0 4.3 4.4 3.9
unemployment 6.8 4.9 5.5 6.8 4.5 3.4 4.8
out of the labour force 76.0 86.2 86.7 90.2 91.2 92.2 91.4
West
LM transitions from ... 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
employment to:
employment 93.3 92.2 91.6 90.9 91.6 91.6 91.5
unemployment 1.4 2.1 2.7 4.3 3.3 3.0 3.6
out of the labour force 5.3 5.7 5.7 4.8 5.1 5.4 4.9
unemployment to:
employment 
unemployment 
out of the labour force
34.2
36.2 
29.6
22.1
46.6
31.3
22.5 
50.0
27.5
24.9
53.9 
21.2
30.8
51.9 
17.3
26.7
54.1
19.2
22.4
55.9
21.7
out of the LF to: 
employment 13.1 8.9 9.9 7.3 6.7 7.8 5.8
unemployment 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.7
out of the labour force 85.1 89.2 88.5 91.5 91.8 90.7 92.6
NOTES: one-year transition probabilities between labour market states; labour market states as o f 
time of survey; SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, waves 7-14, subsamples A and B (West Germany; 
N=6187 and )subsample C (East Germany; N=2696)
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Chapter 2
A  th eoretica l m o d e l o f  in d iv id u al jo b  
m o b ility  d ecision s du ring tra n sitio n
2.1 Introduction
This chapter1 derives a 3-period theoretical model of individual job mobility decisions in the 
transition process from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The model builds 
on Alexeev and Kaganovich (1998), adapting their model to the East German case.2 It demon­
strates, first, the possibility of self-selection into early job mobility on the basis o f unobservable 
characteristics, and second, the possibility of divergence between expected and realised returns 
to early job  mobility in transition. Given an appropriate choice of the underlying assignment 
mechanism, the model is, moreover, easily amenable to an interpretation in a quasi-experimental 
framework which will be set out in the following chapter. Set in such a framework, it allows 
the characterisation of those subgroups - already mentioned in the introduction - which are of
*A shortened version of this chapter was published as: Siebern, F. (2000), A Theoretical Model of Job 
Mobility Decisions During Transition, in: W. Welfe and P. Wdowinski (eds), Modelling Economies in Transition, 
Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference, December 1-4,1999, Rydzyna, Poland
J Alexeev and Kaganovich (1998) is one of the few theoretical models which analyse the potential effect of 
ability on job mobility behaviour during transition. Following Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) and b.uilding on 
the concept of leapfrogging in the industrial organisation literature they demonstrate that uncertainty about 
the structure of future labour demand can give rise to adverse selection of the less productive individuals into 
the upcoming new occupations. According to their model, leapfrogging among individuals with respect to job 
mobility “systematically rewards the less able agents” since "the most able individuals may be systematically 
late to switch to the new ’market’ professions (Alexeev and Kaganovich (1998))
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central interest in the treatment effect literature: always-takers, never-takers, and compilers. 
The model thus provides a framework for the identification, estimation and interpretation o f  
the causal effects of job mobility on income or employment probabilities throughout transition. 
After presenting the model and its implications for individual job  mobility decisions and 
returns to jo b  mobility in section 2.2, section 2.3 clarifies the role o f unobservable individ­
ual characteristics such as ability or network access in job  mobility decision making and self­
selection. Section 2.4 restates the model in a quasi-experimental framework and characterises 
the subgroups o f interest - that o f compilers in particular - in terms of their unobservable 
characteristics. It finally suggests an instrumental variables approach for identification and es­
timation o f the returns to early job  mobility during transition. The model and its implications 
are illustrated throughout the chapter by way of numerical examples. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model
The main feature o f the transitional labour market retained in the model is the structural change 
in labour demand through, first, the unanticipated emergence of new market economy jobs, and, 
second, the different evolution of both remuneration patterns and employment prospects on the 
previously existent jobs and the upcoming ones.
2.2.1 T h e  general setup
Individuals are assumed to be unobservably heterogeneous in both their ability and their access 
to networks.3 Let a  € (0,1] denote an individual’s ability level and v  €  [0,1] a measure o f  
his access to  networks. Assume further a constant discount factor (rate of time preference) 
* € ( 0 , 1].
In t =  0, individuals in the centrally planned economy decide on their investment in ed­
ucation (human capital) and on their career (occupation, employment sector and employer),
■‘The consideration of two types of unobservable characteristics is based on the idea that “ability” alone 
might not fully capture the particularities of a labour market in transition. In addition, “networks" that had 
been formed in the centrally planned economy might have been of importance for employment prospects at 
least in an early stage of the transition process. The term “networks” here is meant to denote any private or 
institutional relationships stemming from the previous economic and social system which might have influenced 
- positively or negatively - an individual’s labour market outcomes throughout transition.
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summarised by the level o f human capital acquired, H  =  A (e; a , v) where H  is assumed to be 
a function of a choice variable effort, e € [0 , 1], and the unobservable characteristics (a ,^ ) . 4
At this stage, individuals do not anticipate any later structural change in the economic 
system and hence do not perceive any alternative to jobs in the centrally planned economy 
(denoted P-jobs in the sequel). Income from such jobs is given by y =  yp{H\ a ,! ')  as a function 
of both education and unobservable characteristics, and leaming-on-the job (tenure) effects lead 
to a proportional period-to*period increase of income by a factor Bp >  0 .
Given their ability level and their access to networks, individuals choose an effort level e* 
(implying an amount of leisure of (1  — e*)) in order to maximise the present discounted value 
of expected utility from future income streams, i.e.
e* =  a rgm ax{v [l - e ]  +  5u[yp(H ;a ,i/)] +  <52u [( l  +  0p )y p (H ;a ,i /) ]}  , (2 .1)
«€[0,1]
where v [.] and u [.] denote indirect utility functions and where H  =  h (e; a , i/) as defined 
above.5 6 The utility derived from unemployment is normalised to zero. The optimal human 
capital level is given by H * =  h{e*',a,v) and resulting income by y =  yj> =  yp (H *-,a ,v )?
At t as l ,  new market economy jobs (denoted M-jobs in the sequel) emerge due to an 
unexpected exogenous shock to the centrally planned economy. These new jobs pay income 
y =  o , i/) and offer a learning-by-doing (tenure) premium o f $m  >  0. Assume for
simplicity u) =  Kyyp(H*\a, i/), Ky >  0, and =  K$9p, where the parameters Ky
and kq capture the differences in pay and tenure premia between the two types o f jobs .7
* There exists at least anecdotal evidence stressing the importance of - individual or family - network access 
for educational attainment and/or career choice.
5 For pure convenience, n and u will be assumed linear in the sequel. Although far from being innocuous, this 
assumption will not change results qualitatively. For further details regarding the existence and characterisations 
of solutions to the above maximisation problem under standard monotonicity and functional form assumptions, 
see Alexeev and Kaganovich (199S).
6For notational simplicity H * is assumed to subsume optimal levels of both experience in the labour market 
and tenure on the job as of t — 0. Hence, given the dependence of y on if*, these characteristics will be reflected 
in the income level y.
' This assumption, again, is not innocuous at all. It ensures in fact the independence of job mobility decisions 
of unobservable characteristics by assuming that the reward structures on P-jobs and M-jobs are not systemat­
ically different. They are assumed instead to differ only by a proportionality factor ky which itself is assumed 
independent of (a, i/)..This rather restrictive assumption will be relaxed in the following section. This param- 
eterisation of y M (H * ;a t i/), however, allows flexibility in modelling the transitional change in the structure of
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In addition, at t =  1 , subsequent reforms of the labour market (restructuring and reallo­
cation o f  labour across occupations and industries) are announced, without there being any 
information about the details o f these reforms. These reforms might generally act on the prob­
abilities o f  being hired on and fired from a job  as well as on the payoffs and/or the learning- 
by-doing premia. Assume for simplicity that these reforms act exclusively on the probabilities 
of being hired on and fired from a job  (and not on the payoffs and/or leaming-by-doing pre­
mia). Assume in particular that, at t =  1,2, individuals are hired on a job  with probability 
hp (t) €  [0 , 1] and h j ( t )  e  [0 , 1 ], respectively, and they are fired from their job  with probabil­
ity fp  (t) €  [0,1] and } m  (t) e  [0,1], respectively. The hiring and firing probabilities for som e 
period t  are assumed known to the individuals in that period. At t =  1 individuals form expec­
tations about future hiring and firing probabilities at t =  2. These expectations are denoted b y  
Ei [hp{2 ) ] ,  Ei [M 2 ) ]  -El [ / p (2)] , E\ [ /a/ (2)], respectively. Assume finally, for simplicity, 
hp ( 1) =  hp  (2) =  0, i.e. no individual is hired on another P-job after labour restructuring has 
been announced, and fm  (1 ) =  0, i.e. no individual is laid off immediately from a M-job t o  
which he has changed at t =  l .B
2*2.2 J o b  m obility decisions during transition
Conditional on H* and their career choice at t =  0, individuals decide on whether to switch 
to the newly emerging M-jobs either at t =  1 (early) or at t =  2  (late), or they can decide 
to stay on their current job  throughout both periods. Let r  €  { l ,2 ,o o }  denote the time a t 
which an individual switches from a P-job to  an M-job, with r  =  oo for job  stayers, and let 
d =  (da, efe) € { 0 , l } 2 denote the sequence o f job  mobility decisions for periods 1 and 2 , w ith  
<k — 1 in case of job  mobility at t =  i and d{ — 0  otherwise.
labour demand. A demotion e.g. can be represented in the model by kv < 1, and the absence of any systematic 
difference in the remuneration patterns of P-jobs and M-job$ can be expressed as ky = k» =  1.
'‘The assumption that the announced labour market reforms influence the probabilities of being fired from the 
current job and/or hired on a new job is made in order to adapt Alexeev and Kaganovich’s (1998) model to the 
East German case. In their model, a reform is announced, but it is uncertain whether this reform will take place 
or not. If the reform takes place, moreover, existing (P-) jobs are assumed to disappear completely. Individuals 
form expectations about the realisation of the reform and act upon these expectations. In the East German case, 
however, there was surely no doubt as to whether there would be any reforms. However, uncertainty existed as 
to both their implementation and their timing, the Economic, Monetary, and Social Union (EMSU) probably 
being the most famous example. And even after the decisions regarding its timing and implementation had been 
taken, considerable uncertainty prevailed as to its consequences, especially with respect to the labour market, as 
well as with respect to the potential design of future labour market policies mitigating these consequences.
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Depending on the individual’s job  mobility decisions, inc
, J hM W yM {H *;a ,v )
Vi =  < if
and in period 2  by
i1 -  / a/ (2 )) (1 +  6M)yM{H*\aiv)  r  =  l
hM{2)yM( H ' ;a ,v )  if r  =* 2 . (2-3)
( 1 "  I p ( 2)) (1 +  BP) y P( H ' ; a , v) r  > 2
The optimal job mobility decisions are now obtained easily by backward induction. Indi­
viduals base their decisions on the calculation o f the expected gains from switching to a new 
job. In period 2, these are given by
ome in period 1 is given by
r  =  1 
r  > 1
(2.2)
a J hM{2)yM(H*\OL,v) -  (1 -  fM(2))(l +  0M )yM (H *;a tv) r  =  1 
¿*2 =  < if , (2.4)
{  hM(2)yM( fT ; a, u) -  (1  -  / P(2 )) (1  +  9P) yP(H *; a, */) r  >  1
where A 2 is a function of the parameters Ky,Ko,9P, hM{2), f P(2),/ m (2) which are assumed 
known to the individual at this stage. Conditional on his decision at t= l, an individual will 
change to a new job in t=2  iff A 2 >  0, giving rise to
Lem m a 1 Individuals who changed job in t =  1 (in which case t  ~ \ )  switch job again at t =  2 
i f f  T- f ^ ( 2] >  1 +  K9$P in case fai(2) €  [ 0 ,1) or 2 ) >  0 in case /m {2) =  1 .
Individuals who have not changed job before (in which case r  >  1) switch to a new job at 
t =  2 iff ^  in case f P {2) 6  [0,1) or iff hM(2 ) >  0 in case f P(2) =  1 .
Note that decisions at t =  2 are purely deterministic due to the assumption of known 
period 2 hiring and firing probabilities as of t =  2. Moreover, as mentioned before, individ­
ual job  mobility decisions are independent of unobservable characteristics due to the assump­
tion of proportionality between yp  and j/m  and the independence o f ky,kQy and $P as well as
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Figure 2 - 1 : Job mobility decisions at t=2 as a function o f period 2 hiring and firing probabilities
f / 2 )
hM(2) , fp {2) , fM(2)  o f (a,v) .  These seemingly rather restrictive assumptions have been m a d e 
on the basis o f the following observations: first, a relatively low degree of income inequality a t  
the beginning of transition together with a relatively high degree of centralised wage bargaining 
(ky independent of (a ,i/) ) ; second, the unaltered importance of centralised wage bargaining 
during the transition process (k$ and &p independent o f (a,z/)); third, the decreasing influence 
of networks stemming from the previous system throughout the transition process (fj  and h j , 
j=P,M , independent of z/); and fourth, the increasingly similar influence of ability on firing as 
well as retention probabilities on both types o f jobs ( f j  and hj, j=P,M , independent of a ).
Letting rj(hM (2 ) ,  f j  (2 )) =  f°r j  =  P ,M  be a function of the hiring and fixing
probabilities in period 2 , the above decision rule can be illustrated graphically by recognising 
that individuals switch to a new job  late iff rj(hm  (2 ) ,  f j  (2 )) >  c j^ where C2M =  1 +  *-$Qp and  
C2P ~  * Given their previous job  mobility decision and given the differences in pay an d
tenure premia, individuals will decide to switch job at t =  2  iff the probability of being hired 
on a new jo b  exceeds the retention probability on the current job by at least the factor c$j as 
illustrated in Figure 2- 1 .
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According to the above Lemma, four cases (denoted i= l,...,4 ) have to be distinguished:
i = \ 2
3 i f ! i ^ l T < l± £ £ a i l d l ^ > 1  +  ^ p 
. 4  > '  +  «*»>>
with choice sets at t =  2  given by:
(2.5)
d =  (rfi,d2) 6  <
.
Cl =  { ( 0 , 0 ), (1 , 0 ) }  for i =  1 
C2 =  { ( 0 , 1) , ( 1 , 0 ) }  fo r i =  2 
C3 =  {(0 ,0 ),(1 ,1 )}  for ¿ =  3 
C4 =  {(0 ,1 ),(1 ,1 )}  for t =  4
(2.6)
In the sequel, I will focus on case 1 in which both ratios, y~7 p^ 2; and 316 b on ded
above by and 1 +  n$&p, respectively, and in which individuals either switch job  in the first 
period or they stay with their initial job throughout both periods. The results and derivations 
for the other cases are deferred to the appendix.
The expected present discounted value of future income streams, =  E\ [yi +^S/2 |d], as 
a function of d at t = l  is given by
{ ( 1  -  fp{Y))  +  6Ei [(1 +  0 p )( l  -  fp{2)) ] }  yP d =  (0 , 0 ) 
{hA /(l) +  6E\ [(1+  /cf?0p)(l -  /A /(2 ))]}/cyyp d -  (1,0)
where E\ [ / p (2)] and E\ [fAI(2)] denote the expected layoff probabiUties on the respective 
type of job as of period 1 . Individual decisions in period 1 then are described by
Lem m a 2  Define
S{Ky, hfrl (1) , fp  (1)) =  KyflM (1) +  fp  (1) (2-8)
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and
4  =  1 +  W i  (S > «». Op, f p  (2) , St.1 (2 ) ,  fcM(2 )) (2.9)
where.
i>\ (•) =  Hi [ ( i + ep)( i  -  /p ( 2 )) -  « ¡ , ( 1  +  KteP){i  -  f M{ 2 ))] (2.10)
is a /unction o / the expected differences in both pap and learning-by-doing (tenure) e f ­
fects between P - and M -jobs, and in  the layoff probabilities and hiring probabilities, respectively,
on the two job types in the second period.
Then, individuals switch to a new job early iff
Hence, according to Lemma 2, for given parameters ky, k$, and Op and given expectations as 
of t  =  1 o f  the period 2 hiring and firing probabilities, hM(2), / p (2 ), and f M{2 ), it is individuals 
with either a high layoff probability or a high probability o f being hired on a new job  (or both ) 
who change job  early in transition* This is illustrated in figure 2-2*
2.2.3 C om parative statics
This section sheds some light on the individual decisions for different situations o f the transi­
tional labour market as described by the values for the parameters , #p, Ei [ fP (2 )] 5 E\ [/jvf ( 2 )]
Recalling the above definition of the ‘critical value’
s ( k v , h M  ( 1 ) ,  f p  ( 1 ) )  >  c f . (2*11)
cf =: 1 +  6E\ [(1  +  0P)(1 — fp (2)) — «^ (l +  Kg9P)[ 1 — / m (2))] ,
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Figure 2-2: Job mobility decisions at t = l  as a function of period 1 hiring and firing probabilities
it follows that
=  —8E\ [(1 +  K00p) ( l  — / m (2))]
“  " ^ i W p(1  ~ / a/ ( 2 ))]
=  6Ei [(1  -  f P(2)) -  Kytt9( l  -  Jm {2))}
= Ei [(1 + ep)(l -  fp{ 2)) -  «„(1 + M ri(i -  Im( 2))]
= -<5(l +  £i[0p])
“  6E\ [/Cy(l +  K $ 0 p )]
Consequently, ceteris paribus, cf is shifted down by increases in Ky, k& or E\ [ /p (2)] and shifted 
up by increases in E\ [ /a/ (2)], while increases in 9P and 6 further shift cf down (up) if
El K1 “  ¿p(2)) -  KyKe(l -  /m (2))] > 0 (< 0)
acf
ac;
ac;
dn$
acf
a^P
acf
as
[/p(2)]
acf
[ /m (2)1
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and if
Ei [d  +  s » )(l -  ƒ/>(2 )) -  « , ( 1  +  -  M 2))1 <  0  (>  0 ),
respectively. Furthermore, ^  =  * A i ( l ) ,  while ^  ^  =  i f  =  =  0.
The effects of changes in cf on the individual’s job mobility decisions as a function o f period  
1 hiring and firing functions then follow from Lemma 2: Individuals are more likely to switch 
job  early the bigger the wage differential or the difference in leaming-by-doing effects between 
both types o f jobs, and the bigger the expected probability of being laid off from their actual 
job  in the future, while they are less likely to switch to a new job  early the bigger the expected 
probability o f being laid off from such a job in the future. The effects of the actual tenure 
premia on P-jobs and the discount factor are ambiguous and do depend on some weighted 
difference in the expected period 2 firing and hiring probabilities. Finally, the larger the wage 
differential between new and old jobs, the more weight in decision-making is attributed to hiring 
probabilities relative to firing probabilities.
2.2 .4  The returns to early jo b  mobility
The above discussion of the individual job  mobility decisions has shown that the returns t o  
early job  mobility do depend on the individual-specific hiring and firing probabilities throughout 
transition. Two subgroups expect to benefit most from switching to a new career path early: 
those with a particularly high probability of being fired from their current job and those with 
a rather high probability o f being hired on a new job. Under the above assumptions, other 
individuals prefer to stay with their job  at the beginning o f transition.
At t=2, the uncertainty as to future structure of labour demand (i.e. period 2 hiring and 
firing probabilities) will have been resolved, and the count erf actual returns to the individual 
job mobility decision as of t = l  can be calculated by comparing the actual income obtained, 
given the job  mobility decision, with the potential income in case the alternative decision had 
been taken. Then, from Lemma 2 follows immediately
C orollary  3 The expected (ex ante) returns to early job mobility are given by
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A ' - { * K , / i A f ( l ) , / P ( i ) )  - c f t y p  ( 2 . 1 2 )
—  { K v h u ( X )  +  / p ( l )  _  c f } y ,
w h i t e  t h e  r e a l i s e d  ( e x  p o s t )  r e t u r n s  t o  e a r l y  j o b  m o b i l i t y  a r e  g i v e n  b y
A i  =  { $ ( K y y h \ t  ( 1 ) ,  f p  ( 1 ) )  —  c \ } y p  ( 2 . 1 3 )
=  { K y h M  ( 1 )  +  f p  ( 1 )  -  C l }  y p  
=  { i i s h M  ( 1 )  +  f p  ( 1 )  -  1  -  S r j ) ,  ( K y , K < , , $ p J p  ( 2 ) ,  f u  ( 2 ) , h M ( 2 ) ) } y p ,
where
C j  =  1  +  « V i  K ,  * * ,  9 p ,  f p  ( 2 ) ,  f M  ( 2 ) ,  h M ( 2 ) ) (2.14)
and
$1 (•) =  (1 +  0J>)(1 -  fp (2)) -  «,(1  +  n$6p)(l -  fu{2)) (2.15)
denote the realisations of cf and rj)\ (.) in period 2, respectively.
Consequently, the difference between realised and expected returns to early job mobility i 
given by
ts
where
A i  -  A\ -  {c* - c \ } y P 
=  { ^ i ~ i > i } y P
= {(1 +  Sp)e(fP {2)) -  «,(1 +  K9ep)e(fM (2))}yP
e(fp(2)) =  £ i [1 -  f P(2)] -  (1 -  f P(2)) =  fp(2) -  £ , [/il(2)] 
e(/Af(2)) =  Ei [1 -  f M(2)] -  (1 -  f M(2)) =  f M(2) -  E1 [/M(2)]
( 2 . 1 6 )
( 2 . 1 7 )
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denote the individual's ‘expectation errors’ with respect to the hiring and firing probabilities 
prevailing in the second period. In case e ( / (2 )) >  0 , the individual actually underestimates th e
respective firing probability in period 2 and vice versa.
The difference of realised and expected returns to early job  mobility is hence seen to depend 
on the difference of the individual’s weighted ‘expectation errors’ with respect to  the hiring a n d  
firing probabilities prevailing in the second period with the weights given by some function o f  
the parameters that characterise the job-specific remuneration pattern. Among the potentially 
long list o f  reasons for such ‘expectation errors’ one might mention, first, the in many cases 
unexpectedly bad performance of new firms that were established only after EMSU, and second, 
the sometimes unexpectedly positive performance of old firms following e.g. a management 
buyout or a takeover despite their being hit initially by a negative unification shock .9 A nother 
reason might be the unexpectedly low growth rates and the relatively poor overall econom ic 
situation in Eastern Germany from 1993 onwards.
Given this potential for individual misperceptions of the future structure o f labour demand, 
let alone that o f  remuneration and tenure premia,10 the conditions under which individuals 
would incur (counterfactual) losses (or gains) from their actual behaviour - i.e. realise returns 
from their actual behaviour that are lower (resp. higher) than the hypothetical returns th a t  
they would have realised had they taken a different decision - are summarised in the following
C oro lla ry  4  Given Ky and the period 1 hiring and firing probabilities hjvf(l) and fp ( l ) ,  an d  
letting s =  s(ny, h^j (1), fp  ( 1)) =  Kyh^f (1) +  fp  (1), counterfactual losses from mobility w ould  
be incurred i f  c\ >  s >  cf, whereas c\ <  s <  cf would imply counterfactual losses from staying
°For some empirical evidence on this issue, cf. Steiner et al. (1998).who, in an analysis of employment 
evolution in ‘old GDH-firms’ as opposed to ‘newly (i.e. after 1989) founded firms’, actually do find mixed 
evidence, depending on the sector.
10 As mentioned above, more general results could be obtained from allowing for uncertainty as to the parame­
ters reflecting these differences in the remuneration structure fcv, fc®,and 0p, in which case the difference between 
realised and expected returns to early job mobility would depend additionally on the potential ’expectation 
errors’ as regards the future remuneration structure on the two types of jobs.
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on the job at t =  1 . More generally:
Af > A i >  0 «• $ >  cf > C l
A i > Af >  0 8 >  C i > C f
Af > 0 > A i <& C l > s > cf
A i > 0 > Af cf > 5 > C l
0 > Ai >  Af cf > C i > S
0 > Af > A i C l > cf > S
(larger than expected) gains from moving 
(lower than expected) gains from moving 
counterfactual losses from moving 
counterfactual losses from staying 
(lower than expected) gains from staying 
(larger than expected) gains from staying
(2.18)
Clearly, the driving force behind the above results are individual expectation errors. This 
does by no means, however, amount to assuming irrational behaviour on the side of the individ­
uals, given that individual decisions at t =  1 basically have to be taken without any previous 
experience nor any objective information on the future structure of labour demand. Clearly, 
more restrictive assumptions on the expectation formation by the individuals would not seem 
justified in such a transitional setting.
2.2.5 A n  illustrative example
Assume for illustrative purposes the following parameter values: 6 =  1 (no discounting), 0p ~  
0.25 (period-to-period learning-by-doing (tenure) effects on existing jobs o f 25%), kq =  1.2 and 
hence 0m  =  0.3 (period-to-period leaming-by-doing (tenure) effects on new jobs o f 30%), and 
tiy =  1 (no wage difference between P- and M-jobs, i.e. no differences in the remuneration of 
individual characteristics). Assume, moreover, period 2 firing and hiring probabilities given by 
hp (2) =  0 (no hiring into P-jobs in period 2), Hm (2) =  0.75, fp  (2) =  0.25, and ƒm  (2) =  0.25, 
and expectations o f period 2 firing probabilities given by E\ [fp  (2)] =  0.25 and E\ [ƒ*/ (2)] =  
0.15, so that individuals do actually underestimate the probability of being laid off from an 
M-job in period 2.
Given the above parameter values, =  1 <  1-25 =  and =  1 <  1*3 =
1 +  K$0p, and hence case 1 (as defined in (2.5) on the basis of Lemma 1) applies. Further, since 
ip\ =  -0 .17  and cf =  0.83, expected returns to early job mobility amount to A f =  {s  -  c\) yp =
(1) +  f p  (1) — 0.83} yp,  and according to Lemma 2 an individual decides to switch to a 
new job  at t = l  iff s =  ha/  (1) +  f p  (1) >  0.83.
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<  o, <  0, >  0, and ?hM-^ a^ à. >  0. The relative influence o f th e
unobservable characteristics on both probabilities, as expressed by the absolute values o f th e  
above first derivatives, is less clear, though. Given that current employers should have m ore 
information on a worker’s unobservable ability than potential new employers, one might expect
One might further expect existing networks to lose importance in th e^ \9hM i(a,v)da >  | da
transition process and hence d P^'dvtl'~ ^  | 1 . For certain sectors or occupations th at 
see a steep increase in labour demand immediately after the labour market reforms have been  
announced, however, the opposite relationships might well hold true.
Given this specification of period 1 hiring and firing probabilities as functions o f the u n ob ­
servables, one derives the following
P ro p o s it io n  5 Let g : [0, l ]2 — ► [0,1] be a positive and monotonicaliy increasing function  
o f the unobservable characteristics and let s (a ,i/) =  f p t\(a,u)) where
: [0 , l ]2 — ► [0 , 1] and fp i  : [0 , l ]2 — ► [0 , 1] are monotonie and twice differentiable 
functions o f the unobservable characteristics (a ,i/) such that <  0 ,
>  0 and ^ A^ ,2— -  >  0. Then there exist two values g and g, 0 <  g <  g <  1, su ch  
that $(a,u) >  cf on {(a,*/) \g{a,v) <  g )  U {(a,*/) | ^ ( c t , >  g } .
P ro o f, From the above definition of $ it follows that s is twice differentiable with =
... dhM'iict'i/) , d fp i(a ,v) „ 1 02s{a,(/) _ „  92hM,i(a,u) , & fp^fai/) ^ e
Ky----- gr--------i----- ^ —  aim 3.2 — Ky----- qz------ 1------- qti— L >  0 , with convexity o f s follow­
ing immediately from the above assumptions. As to the monotonicity of s, it is easily seen that
^ ^ > ( < ) 0 i f f / c j | ^ ^  > ( < ) d- . Following the convexity o f s, it is further seen
that s is a U-shaped function in each o f the unobservables if dhM,x(a,u) ----- &----- ■=0 ---- £ -----
while s is an increasing function in the unobservable characteristics if fty
9{p,\{a,y)
W-
•=0
1=0
• Observing that cf is independent o f (ct, i/), the existence of the values g and
g then basically follows from the mean value theorem with
£ =  % {5 (0 ,0 ) >  c f}  min {^ (a , v) |s(a, u) <  of }
and
g  =  * {s (l, 1) <  c f } +  % { s ( l ,  1 ) >  c f } max {$ (a , u) [s(o , 1/) <  cf }
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where i denotes the indicator function. Note that the above sets are empty if g  =  0 and 
p — 1 , respectively. ■
Hence, in case the marginal firing and hiring probabilities are non-decreasing in the un­
observable characteristics for given parameter values Ky, Kg, and 0 p, and for given ex­
pectations of period 2  hiring and firing probabilities f p  (2 ) ,  ƒ*/ (2 ) ,  and /*a/ ( 2 ), two groups of 
individuals do self-select into early job  mobility: first, individuals with low ability levels or with 
weak networks (or both), and second, individuals with high ability levels or strong networks 
(or both). In the sequel, I will refer to the former as LW-mdividuals and to the latter as HS- 
individuals. In both cases, depending on the relationship between 1 ~
and between 1 and dhM£{a'i/) I respectively, self-selection might be dominated by one
of the two unobservable characteristics.13
Linear firing and hiring probabilities
To illustrate the above result, let g {a 7i/) =  au, and assume the period 1 hiring and firing 
probabilities to be o f the particular functional forms /p ,i (a ,i ')  =  P i ( l  — oc.v)7 pi € [0,1], and 
^Af,i(a >u) =  mi € [0,1]. Then, s (a , v ) = p i  +  (Kym\ — pi)a*/, and according to Lemma
2 , individuals will self-select into early job  mobility iff
g{a,v)  =  at/ <
<
>
ci-pi
Aymi-Pi
C l-P i
Kymi-pi
for
^ < * v
(2.19)
If ^  — Ky, all individuals will switch to a new job at t = l  if Pi >  cf and stay with their 
job otherwise. The subgroup o f individuals which self-select into early job mobility is seen to 
depend on both the maximal firing and hiring probabilities, pi and m i, and their ratio 
Self-selection will occur only if max(pi,/Cj,mi) >  cf. In the case that min(pi,Kj,mi) >  cf, all 
individuals switch to a new job  at t= l ,  independently of their unobservable characteristics, while 
all individuals decide to stay with their job  if max(pi,Kj,mi) <  c f. If further pi >  cf >  «„m i,
13 If, contrary to the above assumption of non-decreasing marginal firing and hiring probabilities, both firing 
and hiring functions are assumed to be concave, the opposite result holds, with LW-individuals and /fS-individuals 
self-selecting into immobility early in transition. Since later results on the compliance status as a function of 
unobservable characteristics will remain valid even under this assumption of concavity, attention will be restricted 
to the case of convex firing and hiring functions in the sequel.
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Figure 2-3: Job mobility and self-selectivity: Linear case
only individuals with low ability or weak networks [LW-individuals) self-select into early j o b  
mobility. If tty mi >  cf >  p i , instead, only individuals with high ability or strong networks (H S - 
individuals) do so. The relative importance of each o f these two subgroups will be determined 
by the slope ratio jn comparison to Ky. Figure 2-3 illustrates this result for the case 
Pi >  cf >  Kyirii in which only individuals with low ability or weak networks (at/ <  g) w ill 
self-select into early job mobility.
Quadratic firing and hiring probabilities
Assuming quadratic period 1 hiring and firing probabilities /p ,i(a , i/) =  P i(l  — a i/)2, pi € [0,1], 
and hM,\(<x,v ) =  m i(a i/)2, m i € [0 , 1]» °ne has s (a ,i/) —p\ -  2p i (av) +  (Kymi 4 -p i)(a i/)2, and 
hence, according to Lemma 2, individuals will self-select into early job mobility iff
g(a,  v)  =  av  € [0, g) U (£, 1] (2.20)
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1Figure 2-4: Job mobility and self-selectivity: Quadratic case
with
= max(o P » -> /P i f - (P i - « 1 ) ( « » ” » i+ p ,)
(KyTTli + p l)
and
g  =  m in (l,Pi +  v/Pi ~  (P» ~ cf ) ( 'ci>” »i + P i ) s
(KyTTli H-px)
In this case, either LW-individuals or HS-individuals or both will self-select into early job 
mobility, depending on p\ and Kymi.  As in the case of linear firing and hiring probabilities, 
self-selection will occur only if max (p! ,«^7711) >  cf. However, as opposed to the case illustrated 
above, in the case where min(pi,Kj,mi) >  c®, no longer will all individuals switch to a new job at 
t = l  independently o f their unobservable characteristics. Figure 2-4 summarises this finding for 
the case in which both types of individuals - those with low ability or weak networks (av < g) 
and those with high ability or strong networks (at/ > g ) ~  self-select into early job  mobility.
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1More general results can be obtained from more general functional forms o f the firing a n d  
hiring probabilities, allowing for non-multiplicative and potentially asymmetric influence o f  th e  
two unobservables.
2.3 .2  The illustrative example continued
Assume the following specifications o f the firing and hiring probabilities: p\ =  0.85 and m i — 
0.6, and hence f p  (1) (a ,y ) =  0.85(1 — oa/p and =  0.6(ay ) 7 with 7  =  1 in case o f
linear firing and hiring probabilities and 7  =  2  in the quadratic case.
Then, for the linear case, cf — pi =  0.83 — 0.85 =  -0 .02  <  0 and ^  ^  >  1 =  Ky.
According to Lemma 2 , the individual thus moves to a new job  in period 1 iff a v  <  =
3  ^2!  =  0*08- Hence, individuals with very low levels o f either unobservable characteristic w ill 
move to a new job  in this case at t = l .  This can represented in a graph which plots the contour 
lines for the difference s(a , v) —c\ ~  0.02—0.25c«/ on the z-axis as a function of the unobservable 
characteristics a  (x-axis) and v  (y-axis). Following Lemma 2, only those individuals for w h om  
this difference is positive will self-select into early job mobility.
Similarly, for the quadratic case, Pl * * * 1 =  ^ 1 ~4-  =  0.011885
and ri+V * J -£ ~ 3 >$ mi+Pl) =  =  1.1605, so that g =  0.011885 and 5  =  1 ,
and hence only individuals with a v  <  0.011885 will self-select into early job  mobility. As in th e  
linear case, a graph showing the contour lines of the difference s (a ,y ) — cf =  0 .0 2  — 1.7cxi/ 4 - 
1.45(ay ) 2 can illustrate the combinations of a  and v  for which self-selection into early j o b  
mobility occurs.
2.4 A  quasi-experimental framework for the analysis of the re­
turns to job mobility during transition
This section restates the above model in a quasi-experiment al framework. Moreover, the sub­
groups of interest in this framework are characterised and an instrumental variables approach 
is suggested for identification and estimation of the returns to early job mobility.
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2.4.1 Shocks to labour demand
It has been assumed above that some unanticipated exogenous shock to the centrally planned 
economy acts on the period 1 hiring and firing probabilities for both types o f jobs. This shock is 
likely to be specific to either a firm or sector, an occupation or a region while uncorrelated to the 
individuals’ unobservable characteristics. The reason for the latter being that the individuals 
self-selected into the various sectors, firms, occupations or regions at t — 0  by their choices of 
the optimal human capital level H* and their implied career choices without anticipating any 
such exogenous shock. It is hence inconceivable that the direct consequences of this exogenous 
shock - in terms o f changes in hiring or firing probabilities - should be correlated to unobservable 
individual characteristics.
In the sequel, this shock will be modelled as a uniform upward shift of either fp t\ or h ^ t\ by 
some constant Uf or u*, respectively: Assume that the firing probability is increased uniformly 
(i.e. at all levels of the unobservable characteristics) by Uf if the respective firm or sector 
is hit disproportionately by the shock or if the announced reforms lead to more pressure on 
labour reallocation and restructuring in this firm or sector to be expected. Such a firm or 
sector will be denoted as “bad” in the sequel, while firms or sectors not hit disproportionately 
will be called “good” , Similarly, assume a uniform increase in the hiring probability by u* if 
the respective occupation or region turns out to be “good” after the exogenous change in the 
structure of labour demand. By “good” is meant that the occupation or region is not facing 
any negative shock in labour demand or is even facing an increase in demand, and thus benefits 
disproportionately from either the exogenous shock itself or from the expectations related to the 
announced reforms. In the case of East Germany, one might interpret these shocks as negative 
firm/sector-specific unification shock and positive occupation/region-specific unification shock, 
respectively. These shocks are likely to be one o f two types of demand shock. On the one 
hand, a demand shock associated with the dramatic de facto  revaluation o f the East German 
currency, the steep increase in wages and labour costs, and the breaking up of trade agreements 
together with the loss of export channels in the former COMECON area. On the other hand, 
a demand shock associated with the immediate modernisation of infrastructure and housing, 
and the privatisation and restructuring of the financial and service sectors.
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The modified period 1 hiring and firing probabilities are then given by
f p ti ( < * , v )  =  +  U f Z f  ( 2 . 2 1 )
=  p i( l  — CM/ ) 7  +  UfZf
and
hM,i{ajv) =  fiM tifav) +  Uhth (2 .2 2 )
=  m i { a v y  +  uhzh
where Uf >  0  and Uh >  0  denote the actual increase in either probability as a consequence o f  
the exogenous shock and where 7  =  1 in the linear case and 7  =  2  in the quadratic case, z f  and 
Zh are indicators of the quality of the firm/sector or occupation as perceived at the beginning 
of the transition process14 such that
*ƒ =
0  firm or sector is “good” 
if
1 firm or sector is “bad”
and
Zh =  <
0  occupation or region is “bad”
1 occupation or region is “good” 
Individual job  mobility decisions in period 1 then are made according to
C orollary  6  Let u =  KyU^ Zh +UfZf.  Given the exogenous shocks to labour demand u, indi­
viduals decide to switch job early iff
${Ky, f p  (1)) >  =  cf -  u. (2.23)
Given further the assumptions in Proposition 5, there exist two values g and g, 0 <  g <  g  <
14 Most importantly, this assessment is assumed to be made before any partial resolution of uncertainty about 
the labour market consequences of EMSTJ or the design of future labour market policies.
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0g < 9 <  1 » suck that s(a ,^) >  cf on {(a,i/)|<7(a ,i/) <  g } U {(a ,! / )  \g{ct-,v) >  g } .
P roof. Follows immediately from Lemma 2 and Proposition 5 by replacing s(a , v) by 
s(a ,i/) =  KyhA/,1 (<*, i') +  fp ,i (ct, *>) =  s (a ,i/) + u  and noting that cf remains unchanged. Given 
the assumptions stated in Proposition 5, it is seen that
p =  t { s ( 0 , 0 ) >  cf}m in {p (a ,r/)|s(a ,t/) <  2J}
and
g =  i { s (  1 , 1) <  c f}  +  z { s ( l , l )  > c f } m a x { p ( a i i/) |s(a,i/) < 3 f } .
■
2.4.2 Subpopulations o f interest
The above model can be interpreted as a quasi-experimental framework (Rubin’s causa/ mode/ ) 15 
by defining Zf or or some combination of them (like iam(zf,zh)  or m a x fz /,^ ))  as binary 
assignment to treatment, and early job  mobility status (di) as binary treatment indicator.16
As mentioned in the introduction and as discussed in detail in chapter 3, different subpop­
ulations of interest can be distinguished in this framework: always-takers, never-takers, and 
compilers. Always-takers do select themselves into the treatment status independently o f the 
assignment to treatment they receive, as opposed to compliers who receive only treatment if 
they are assigned to treatment. The never-takers, finally, select themselves into the control 
group o f stayers, independently of their assignment to treatment status. With respect to job 
mobility during decision, always-takers do change job  early in transition independently of any 
firm/sector- or occupation-specific shocks to labour demand at the beginning of the transition 
process, as opposed to never-takers who decide to stay on their job under any circumstances. 13
13For an authoritative introduction into this model cf. e.g. Angrist et al. (1996) and Imbens and Rubin (1994). 
Cf. also chapter 3.
1GThe main intuition behind this quasi-experimental interpretation is that a higher layoff probability on the 
current job due to a negative firm-specific unification shock is likely to result in higher rates of job changes 
at an early stage of transition. Similarly, a higher probability of being hired on a new job due to a positive 
occupation-specific unification shock will also increase the propensity to switch to a new job early in transition.
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Compilers, finally, change job  only in case of such firm/sector- or occupation-specific shocks to  
labour demand at the beginning o f the transition process but would not do so otherwise. Given 
this definition, the above-mentioned subpopulations of interest are given by the following
Lem m a 7 Let u =  KyU^ Zh +  u /2 / .  Then, one can distinguish always-takers (AT), compliers 
(C), and never-takers (NT) with respect to the given assignment to treatment definition on the 
basis o f their unobservable characteristics as:
AT  =  { (a,  v) |s(a, v) >  c\ }  (2.24)
=  { (a , i /)|0 < g ( a , v )  <  s }  U {(a ,i /) ]s  < g ( a , v )  <  1 }
C  =  {(a , i/)|cf -  u <  s ( a , u) <  c f }  (2.25)
^  {{<*>v)\g< g(0L,v) < g ) U  {{pi,v)\g <  g {a ,v )  < g }
N T  s  { (a ,  v )| s(a, i/) <  cf — u}  . (2.26)
=  {(a ,* ')|p<s(tt| i') < g ]
The interpretation of these subpopulations depends on the choice of the assignment to treat­
ment indicator. While generally four different assignment to treatment status z — (zh,z/) €  
{ (0 , 0 ), (0 , 1 ), ( 1 , 0 ), ( 1 , 1)}  are possible in the above setting, for practical reasons and for bet­
ter interpret ability one would probably restrict attention to either or Zf as the assignment 
variable. When increasing only the firing probability at each level o f ability and network accessi­
bility, the shock mainly induces individuals with relatively low ability levels and weak networks 
to change job  early, their main motivation being the increased probability of layoffs. When in­
creasing the hiring probability at each ability-network combination instead, mainly individuals 
with relatively high ability and strong networks are induced to change job  early due to good 
outside opportunities.
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Linear firing and hiring probabilities
In the linear case, always-takers (AT), coinpliers (C), and never-takers (NT) are given by:
{ ( 0,I/) 1°s  « '  < max 0 ^ r * ° ) }  £ > « *
{(<*»*') I Pi > c f }  if J% =
C =
{ (Q ,I/)|maX ( ^ ^ r , 0 ) < o . / < m a X ( ^ i l ^ , 0 ) }
{ ( q , i/)| c f - u < p i  < c f }  if %i =  Ky
' { ( a , i / ) | m » x ( ^ t e , o )  < a i / < l }  £l > K v 
N T = <  < c f - u }  ii £L =  Ky
{ ( Q , i / ) | o < Q i / < m i n ( ^ ^ , l ) }  ¿ £ < « y
In the case p\ >  cf >  « ym i, the above subpopulations can be represented graphically as in 
figure 2-5:
In this case, the subgroups of always-takers and compilers are made up of individuals with 
relatively low levels of ability or weak networks (ai/ <  g). Compilers will self-select into early 
job mobility because of the increased firing probability, while individuals with high levels of 
ability or networks decide to stay on their job nevertheless.
Q uadratic firing and hiring probabilities
In the quadratic case, letting flll =  gul ,
5,2 =  and gu2 =  ~  (AT),
Figure 2-5: Job mobility and compliance status: Linear case
compliers (C ), and never-takers (NT) are given by
A T  =  ATlw  U ATh s  with 
ATLW 3  { (a , |0 <  qi/ <  max (0 ,p a ) }
ATh s  s  { (a , v) |min (guU 1) <  a v  <  1 }
C  =  =  Cl w  Li Chs with 
C m  =  {(<*,v ) lmax <  ^  <  max (0 , p&)}
Chs =  { (a,  u) |min (gu27 l )< o a / <  min (gux, 1)}
N T  =  { (a ,  v) |max (0 ,gi2) < a v <  min (gu2, 1 )}
The above subpopulations can be represented graphically as in figure 2-6:
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Figure 2-6: Job mobility and compliance status: Quadratic case
Contrary to the linear case discussed above, in this case individuals with intermediate 
levels of ability or network access decide to stay on their job  despite the increase in the firing 
probability, while the groups of always-takers and compilers are both made up of two distinct 
subgroups, namely individuals with either very low or very high levels o f ability and network 
access.
2.4 .3  The returns to early job  mobility for the different subpopulations
Following Corollary 3, the expected (ex ante) returns to early job  mobility as a function of 
unobservable characteristics are given by
A f =  {s (a ,i/)  (2.27)
=  {s (a , v) -  cf +  u } yp{H *; a , v)
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while the realised (ex post) returns to early job mobility are given by
A i =  { s {a ,v )  -  ci +  u }y p(IT -,a ,v ). (2.28)
Consequently, the average returns to early job mobility for the subgroups o f always takers and 
compilers are given by
respectively, where A denotes some measure of the weight o f ability-network combinations in 
the subpopulation of interest. The subgroup of never-takers, finally, is not considered here since 
they will not move under any circumstance by definition. It is thus questionable to  what extent 
information on their ‘realised’ (ex post) returns to job  mobility can be of interest.
2.4 .4  The illustrative exam ple continued
In the case of linear firing and hiring probabilities, as discussed above, for the given parameter 
values, always-takers - those who self-select into early job  mobility even without increases in  
either the hiring or the firing probabilities due to some exogenous shock - are characterised in  
terms o f their unobservable characteristics as AT — { (a ,i /)  \av <  0.08}.
Now assume a negative shock to some firm or sector which is modelled by u  =  Uf »  0.15. 
Then, individuals will decide to change job  early iff a v  <  a =s -^ ~ pl =  — S & r  =
0.68, and the group of compilers will be given by C  — { ( q , i/) |0.08 <  av <  0.68 }. This group 
is made up o f individuals with either relatively low ability or weak networks or both. In the 
absence of an exogenous increase in the firm-specific layoff probability, these individuals would 
not want to change to another job  or employer. However, given this increase, they are forced 
to switch to a new job early.
(2.29)
(a.i'Je A T
and
(2.30)
(a,y)ec
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The never-takers are given by N T  — { ( q , v ) \av >  0.68}. Given their either relatively high 
ability level or their good access to networks, or both, they prefer staying on their job  even in 
case their firm turns out to be a “bad” one.
As for the subpopulation self-selecting into early-job mobility, the compliance status can 
be represented graphically by the modified contour lines for the difference s(a , z/) — (cf — it) =  
0 .17-0.25qia For never-takers, this difference remains negative, while for compilers it is shifted 
to positive values.
Similarly, in the case of quadratic firing and hiring probabilities, the subpopulations of 
interest are given by AT  =  {(a ,i /)  |olv <  0.011885}, C  =  {(a ,* ')  |0.011885 <  au <  0.11039}, 
and N T  =  {(a ,i /)  \au >  0.11039}. The modified difference necessary for the plot o f contour 
lines is s(a, u) — (cf — u) =  0.17 — l.7au  *f 1.45(q^)2 in this case.
The realised returns to early job mobility amount to A i =  {0.04 — O ^ a ^ } yp(H*; a , v) in 
the linear case and to A i =  {0.04 — 1.7a^ -f 1.45(ai/)2}  yp(fi* ; a , u) in the quadratic case. In 
both cases, they are in the range A i 6 (0.02yp, 0.04yp] for always takers and A i € (-0.13yp, 0.02yp] 
for compilers and hence on average positive for always takers while likely to be negative for 
compilers. Given the nature of the assignment mechanism, the latter can probably best be 
interpreted as returns to forced early job  mobility during transition.
Assume now a positive shock specific to some occupation or region which is modelled 
by u =  Uh =  0.4 instead. Then, given the substantial increase in the probability'of being 
hired on a new job, in the linear case all individuals will decide to change job  early with the 
groups of compilers and never takers consequently given by C  — {(<*,*') |0.08 <  otv <  1 } and, 
N T  =  0 , respectively. In the quadratic case, the subpopulations o f interest are given by A T  =  
{(a,i^) \av <  0.011885}, C =  { {a ,! ')  |0.011885 < a v  <0 .20721} U {(ct,i/) |0.9652 <  ai/ <  1}, 
and N T  =  {(a , v) 10.20721 < cku<  0.9652}. In this case, the subgroup of compliers is hence 
made up o f both types of individuals, LW-individuaXs and HS-individuals, who can to be inter­
preted as voluntary early job movers in this case.
The realised returns to early job mobility amount to A i =  {0,29 -  0.25a^} yp{H*] a , u) 
in the linear case and to A i =  {0.29 — 1.7ai/ +  1.45(o:v)2} y p(i i* ;a ,i /)  in the quadratic case. 
In both cases, they are in the range A i € (0.27yp, 0.29yp] for always takers. For compliers, 
A i € (0.04yp, 0.27yp] in the linear case, and in the quadratic case A i € (1.8 x 10“ 7yp, 0.27yp]
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for LW-individuals who comply with the assignment, and A i € (—4 x 10~6yp,0.04yp] for HS~ 
individuals who comply with the assignment. The returns to early job mobility are again seen 
to be positive on average for always takers and this time also positive on average for compilers.17
2.5 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has presented a model o f individual decision-making in a transitional labour market 
which helps to clarify the role o f unobservable characteristics in job mobility decision making 
and rationalises the endogeneity status o f the job mobility indicator. More precisely, under the 
model assumptions it can be shown that mainly individuals with either relatively low levels o f  
ability and network access or with relatively high levels o f ability and good access to networks 
do self-select into early job mobility.18
Rephrasing the model in a quasi-experimental framework allows, first, a characterisation 
of the subgroups of compilers in terms o f their unobservable characteristics, and second, the 
calculation o f counterfactual gains or losses from job  mobility for this subgroup. On the basis 
o f appropriate assignment to treatment mechanisms, the compilers can be interpreted as the 
subgroup of either forced early job  movers or voluntary early job  movers. Moreover, the returns 
to each of these types of job mobility are seen to differ significantly across the subgroups o f  
always takers and compliers.
The model thus underlines that the so-called local average treatment effect (LATE) can be 
an economically interesting parameter in this context and, finally, suggests IV  estimation o f  
the (causal) returns to job mobility on the basis of appropriate instruments like e.g .. firm-level 
announced layoffs (as suggested by the above described shift in fp  (1) due to a sector- or firm- 
specific shock induced by the announced reforms) or like occupation-specific outside options (as 
suggested by the shift in (1) due to an occupation-specific shock induced by the announced
17As mentioned above, there is no interest in calculating the ‘realised’ returns to early job mobility for the 
subgroup of never-t&kers in this framework. Doing so nevertheless yields a range of Ai € (-0.13yp, — 0.21yp] in 
the case u =  u/ =  0.15 (in both linear and quadratic case), and Ai € (—4 x 10“ 6yp,1.8 x 10” 7yp] in the case 
u — Ufc *= 0.4 (in the quadratic case only, since N T  =  0 in the linear case).
^Steiner et al. (1998) present some evidence that, in the group of early job movers, two ’occupational’ groups 
seem to be dominating, namely the unqualified (probably individuals with lower ability levels being affected by 
negative firm/sector*specific demand shocks) and service sector workers (probably individuals with higher ability 
levels and/or good networks who are mainly affected by positive occupation-specific demand shocks).
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reforms). After reviewing the necessary results on identification and estimation of causal effects 
by instrumental variables methods in the next chapter, this empirical issue will be addressed 
in chapter 4.19
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2.7 Appendix
This section presents the above lemmata and propositions for the cases i=2,3,4:
The expected present discounted value o f future income streams as a function of d  at t= l  
is given by
Ei [Y |di =  h d2 -  j ] (ad (2.7))
' { ( l - f p m )  +  è{l + eP)Ei [ l - fp (2 ) ) }yP d =  (0,0) 
i {hM W + ö ( l  +  K$9 p )E i [ l - fM(2)}}Kyyp m d =  (1,0)
{ ( W p (1)) +  K £ i [M 2 )] }s/p *  d =  (0,1)
, +  d =  (1,1)
19Cf. also Siebern (2000).
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Jh
Define
s(«yt /ia/  (1) > f p  (1)) =  (1) +  fp  (X) (ad (2.8))
and
cf =  1 +  Stl>f (fty-i t$0y @Pi fp  (2) , / a? (2) , /iA/(2)) > (ad (2.9))
where
E i [(1 +  6P)(1 -  M 2)) -  *v (l +  « « M ( l  -  / m (2))] i =  1
« ( • )  =  <
El [KyhM{2) -  *y(l +  ««flp)(l -  / m (2))1 
Ei [(1 +  M (1  - / p(2)) -  k,'»w (2)]
if
% —  2 
¿ =  3 
* =  4
(ad (2.10))
are functions o f  the expected differences in both pay and leaming-by-doing (tenure) effects 
between P- and M-jobs, and in the layoff probabilities and hiring probabilities, respectively, on 
the two jobs in the second period.
Then, individuals switch to a new job  early iff
t
hM ( ! )  * fp  W )  >  ci • (ad (2.11))
The realised returns to early job  mobility are given by
A* K y f iM  (!) +  fp  (1) -  Ci ( a d  ( 2.13) )
Kyhu (1) +  fp  (1) -  x _  Si>i (Ky,Ke,ep,fp (2) , f M (2),hM(2) ) ,
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where
i>i (■) =  -
(1 +  0 „)(i  -  f p (2)) -  « „ (1 + « * « ? ) (  1 -  M 2 ) )  i =  1
M m (2) -  «v i1 +  “ ¿O p))! -  / a*(2)) for ¿ =  2
( l  +  i p) ( l - / p ( 2 ) ) - « i 'iw(2) » = 3
(ad (2.15))
with expectation errors defined as
e(fH 2)) =  [1 -  / p (2)] -  (1 -  /p(2)) = /p(2) -  £ i Lfr(2)]
e(/m (2)) s  £ , [1 -  /a/(2)] -  (1 -  /m (2)) =  f M(2) -  E\ \fM{2)\
e ( M 2 ) ) 5 £ i [ M 2 ) ] - M 2 )
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(ad (2.17))
h 0 i =  4
denotes the realisation of (.) in period 2.
Consequently, the difference o f realised and expected returns to early job mobility is given
by
A i - A f  =  W - i p i} y P (ad (2.16))
where
’ (1 +  6p)e ( fP(2)) -  Ky(l +  M p M / a,(2)) i =  l-----V------
IIi Kye(hM(2)) -  Ky(l +  K t$ p )e(M '2) )
(l +  0 p )e (fp (2)) — Kye(hu{2))
i =  2 
for
¿ =  3
(ad (2.16))
0 i =  4
Chapter 3
Id en tifica tio n  a n d  e stim a tio n  o f  
cau sal effects in  o b serv a tio n a l 
stu d ies
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has developed a model according to which individuals self-select into 
specific job  mobility patterns during transition on the basis o f (to the econometrician) unob­
servable characteristics like ability or access to networks that are correlated with earnings. This 
selection (or endogeneity) problem generally invalidates inference on the returns to jo b  mobility 
in standard regression approaches.
In the applied statistics literature, this problem has been treated extensively as problem o f 
inference from nonrandom samples (e.g. Smith (1983) and references cited therein). Applied 
economists, too, have been aware of this problem, and work by Roy (1951) and Gronau (1974) 
figures among the earliest and most prominent applications in labour economics. Starting with 
the influential work by Heckman (1976,1978,1979) on the so-called dummy endogenous variable 
model, they have developed a range o f  identification strategies and estimation methods that 
take account explicitly of self-selectivity.1
lFor overviews, cf. e.g. Angrist and Krueger (1998), Heckman (1990,1999b), M&nski (1993, 1994, 1995) and
These methods generally require rather strong parametric identifying assumptions regard­
ing both the functional form and the error distributions. Two problems are therefore related 
to this parametric identification approach. First, the assumptions made to achieve identifica­
tion are generally restrictive and untestable. Second, further (even more restrictive) implicit 
assumptions have to be made for some parameter of interest - like the coefficient on a job  mo­
bility indicator in an earnings equation - to be interpretable as a causal effect.2 More recent 
contributions to the literature allow for semi- and nonparametric identification of selectivity 
models, thus avoiding unnecessarily strong identifying assumptions.3 The second criticism, 
however, also applies to these semi- and nonparametric versions o f the dummy endogenous 
variable model.
The main reason for this criticism lies in the understanding that causal effects can in general 
only be identified in a potential outcome framework. This framework steins originally from the 
experimental biostatistical literature and has found its way into the economics literature in 
particular in the context o f evaluating the labour market impact o f training programmes and 
active labour market measures,4 the effects of military service on subsequent earnings, the 
returns to education and various other applications based on non-experimental data.5 6
In the form of a commented literature review, this chapter presents the potential outcome 
model as a general statistical framework for causal inference in observational studies and clar­
ifies the assumptions needed for the identification of causal effects by instrumental variables 
methods.5 The presentation will be related to the subsequent empirical applications: first, the 
estimation of returns to job mobility during transition - where job  mobility is interpreted as 
treatment the effect of which on income and employment probabilities as outcome variable is 
to be evaluated; and second, the estimation o f returns to education - with duration of schooling
Rosenbaum (1995).
aCf. e.g. Heckman (1997,1999) and section 3 below.
3Cf. e.g. Heckman and Honoré (1990), Ahn and Powell (1993), Chen (1999) and IVoehlich (1998).
4Cf. e.g. Friedlander et al. (1997), Ham and LaLonde (1990), LaLonde (1986,1995), Heckman (1992), Heck­
man and Hotz (1989), Heckman et al. (1999), Heckman and Robb (1995a,b) and Hotz (1992). For applications 
to German data or other transition economies, cf. also Fitzenberger and Prey (1996,1997), Httbler (1997), Kraus 
et al. (1997), Lechner (1998a,b,1999), Puhani (1998,1999), Schmidt (1999) Steiner and Kraus (1995).
5Cf. e.g. Angrist (1990,1998), Angrist and Krueger (1991,1998), Card (1995,1999), Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 
(1999,2000) and Meyer (1995a,b).
6The chapter builds extensively on Angrist and Imbens (1995), Angrist et al. (1996), Heckman (1997), 
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999,2000a,b,c), Holland (1986), Ichino (1999), Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Imbens 
and Rubin (1997).
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as treatment and earnings as outcome variable. The chapter is organised as follows:
Section 3.2 provides the basic notation, defines the treatment effects of interest and derives 
the relationship between them. Section 3.3 reviews potential identification strategies and states 
the assumptions sufficient for instrumental variables estimates to have a causal interpretation, 
in particular as local average treatment effect {LATE). It also discusses some extensions to 
more general outcome variables and further reviews results on the identification and estimation 
of local average treatment effects in the case of variable treatment intensity or, equivalently, 
multivalued treatment variables. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 A  general statistical framework for causal inference: The 
potential outcome model
The ‘potential outcome model (or Rubin’s causal model) considers the causal effect o f some 
treatment on potential outcomes ( counterfactuals) 7  The underlying hypothetical question in 
this model is o f the type “ What would the outcome have been had state 2 been realised instead 
of state 1 ? ” or, in the concrete applications of the later chapters, “ What would a job mover 
have earned had he stayed in his previous job?” , “ What would a person have earned if he had 
stayed one more year in school?” and the like. Causal effects axe then defined as the difference 
between the realised outcome and the relevant counterfactual outcome.
This section reviews the model as a framework for causal inference in non-experimental stud­
ies, provides the basic notation, defines the (unit-level) causal effects and (average) treatment 
effects o f interest and clarifies the relationship between them.
3.2.1 Basic notation and definitions
Let Yu and Yoi denote some potential outcome o f interest in case of treatment and non­
treatment, respectively, and let Yt denote the (observable) outcome for individual (or, equiv­
alently, unit) i with observable individual characteristics X i in a population I. Assume that
'Cf. the seminal contributions Rubin (1974, 1977, 1978). Acknowledging the early contributions on experi­
mental approaches in the statistical literature by Neyman (1923), Fisher (1935) and Cox (1958), Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2000a,b,c) also speak of the Neyman - Fisher - Cox - Rubin model o f  potential outcomes. Moreover, as 
noted by Heckman and Vytlacil, this model is isomorphic to both the Roy (1951) model of income distribution 
and the switching regression model of Quandt (1972).
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the potential outcome functions are of the form Yu =  /xx in case of treatment and
Yoi ~  fiQ (XuUoi) otherwise, with generally unrestricted functions Vo and Vi and E\uoi |X»] =  
|JVi] =  0. Conditional on observable characteristics X i , (Mo(-)>Pi(*)) and {u<H)u u) de­
note the common components and the idiosyncratic components o f  the potential outcomes 
across the two treatment status, respectively. It is generally further assumed that the potential 
outcome functions are additively separable in the common and idiosyncratic components, i.e. 
YU ~  /xi (X i.uu) =  fii{X i) +  Hii in case o f treatment and Yo* =  Pq (X,-,uo*) =  Vo (^*) +  txoi 
otherwise.
Let further D* denote some binary treatment indicator taking the value 1 in case o f (re­
ceipt of) treatment o f individual i and 0 otherwise, and let Z{ be some binary intention-to-treat 
variable that describes the assignment mechanism into treatment and control groups. Z , takes 
the value 1 if individual i is assigned to the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Assignment to 
treatment is described by the conditional probability of assignment, conditional on observable 
individual characteristics and potential outcomes. It is defined as strongly ignorable iff, condi­
tional on observable characteristics, the probability o f assignment is independent of potential 
outcomes. In case Di =  Z{ for all i € I, there is full compliance with the assignment. Let Du  
and Dot denote the potential treatment status in case o f assignment to treatment and in case 
o f non-assignment to treatment, respectively.8
Assume an individual’s treatment status to be potentially a function of all individuals’ 
assignment status, D* =  D (Z ;X i), where Z  — (Z i , ..., Zpj) denotes the full vector of assignment 
status in the population. Similarly, let the outcome variable Y{ for the individual potentially 
depend on all individuals’ assignment and treatment status, Yi — Y (D , Z\Xi), where further 
D  =  (D i, ...,D n ) denotes the full vector o f treatment status in the population. The observed 
cross-sectional data are ( f e , tjv-
'’ One might, further, also think of the variables in X i as dependent on the treatment status and hence define 
X u  and Xio as the potential individual characteristics in the case of treatment and in its absence, respectively. 
In general, however, the assumption X i =  Xio ** X n  is made, since it would otherwise be difficult to separate 
direct causal effects of D i on Yi from the consequences of changing individual characteristics X i for Yi. (Cf. 
Holland (1986) and Lechner (1998a,b)).
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3.2 .2  Subpopulations o f interest
Within the population under consideration, several subpopulations might be distinguished on 
the basis o f their observed or potential treatment status. The most common subpopulation 
of interest in evaluation studies is the treatment group (or simply the treated), i.e. all those 
individuals who actually receive treatment, It  =  { i  €  I  \D{ =  1 }  as opposed to the control 
group, I f  =  { i  € I |D* ^  1}.
On the basis o f the individuals’ potential treatment status, one might further distinguish 
between the following groups:
always — takers : I  at  =  {i  €  I  |X?o* — D u  =  1 }
never — takers : Ijvr =  {i  € /  |f?o* — D u  =  0 }
compilers : 1q  =  { i  € /  \Du -  Aw =  1 }
defiers : /¿> s  { i  €  /  P i i  — =  —1}
While the first two groups are not affected by the assignment to treatment, the latter two 
groups are both affected, but they differ in their compliance behaviour. As suggested by the 
above names, the compilers fully comply with the assignment mechanism. In contrast, the 
defiers do right the opposite and self-select into treatment only if they are not assigned to it.
The relationship between these different subgroups depends on the experimental design, i.e. 
on the assignment mechanism and the compliance behaviour. An individual is generally said 
to comply with the assignment Z, if Di =  Z,. However, some individual with Di =  Z, =  1 
might have self-selected into treatment even in the (counterfactual) case of non-assignment, or
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an individual with D* =  Z* — 0 might not have complied with an assignment to treatment. 
The potential outcome model draws a distinction between these different types of observed 
compliers, denoting any potential non-complier among these as either always-taker or never- 
taker. Observed non-compliers, i.e. A  ±  Z», on the other hand, can be part o f one o f  these 
two categories or they can be defiers. The compliers are all those individuals who only change 
treatment status because of assignment.
3.2*3 Parameters of interest
The notion o f causai effect in the potential outcome model refers to the effect of A  on Y¿, A¿ =  
( Y u  — Ibi)* A* is the so-called (unit-level or individual-specific) treatment effect This effect has 
a counterfactual interpretation by definition. Since only Yi =  Yqí (1 — A )+ T i* A  =  Vói +  A ,A  
can be observed, it cannot be inferred directly.9 Interest therefore generally focuses on some 
feature of the distribution of in some (sub-)population of interest, generally some average 
(or mean) treatment effect According to the population o f interest one might distinguish 
between three different treatment effects, namely the average treatment effect or treatment 
effect on a person selected randomly from the population, A  ate  =  £[A¿ |Xi], the treatment 
effect on the treated, A r r  =  E{&i A  =  1], and the local average treatment effect (LATE), 
A l a t e  =  £ [A ¡ \XU (D u -  DK) *  O].10 11
Under the above assumption o f additively separable potential outcome functions, the unit- 
level treatment effect can then be written as A,- =  (^ ( X , )  — hq (AT,)) +  (un — uqí). The
9Holland (1986) refers to this as the fundamental identification problem o f  causal inference.
10 If interest is restricted to some subpopulation characterised by a vector of characteristics Xj =  X, like 
e.g. all unemployed or all public service employees, these effects can be defined accordingly as ¿?(A* |X< *  X], 
E[Ai \Dt = l , X i  = x], and E[A,- |(Ai -  Ao) /  0 , X i  = xj.
11 While based on different conditioning sets all of these effects are mean treatment effects. In evaluating 
the effect of some treatment, one might, however, also be interested in distributional effects on the outcome 
variable. More general parameters of interest for causal inférence which might capture such effects can be 
defined. Among these are: median treatment effects, quantile treatment effects (Abadie et al. (1998)); the 
distribution of programme gains F(Yi — Vo |X); and the difference of full outcome distributions by treatment 
status, F(Yi  |X )  — F (Y q |X). The main difficulty generally consists in identifying the joint distributions of the 
potential outcomes, viz. F{Yo\Y\\X). For a more in depth discussion, cf- Manski (1993, 1994, 1995). In 
this work, we will follow advice by Lechner (1998a): “However, the latter quantities are impossible to estimate 
without knowledge of the join t distribution of the potential outcomes, whereas the expectation solely depends 
on the two marginal distributions of the potential outcomes. Therefore, causal analysis using the other features 
would need far more stringent assumptions to achieve identification than causal analysis based on first moments 
only. Since identification of the expectations will prove to be difficult enough, identifying these other quantities 
will not be attempted in this work."
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first term, (^ (X * )  — fiQ (X*)), denotes the common gain from treatment which is equal for 
all individuals with the same observable characteristics X{. The second term, (tin — uo*), the 
idiosyncratic gains from treatment, generally differs even across observably identical individuals. 
While they might be observed by the individuals themselves, they are generally unobservable 
to the econometrician.
Conditional on individual characteristics X*, treatment effects are heterogeneous in this 
model unless UQi =  «i,- Vi =  1,..., N. In the special case of y i(X ») — y$ (X*) 4- A  and ucn — uu  
for all i € /  , the treatment effect is in fact A* =  A  for all i €  I  and hence homogenous across 
individuals conditional on individual characteristics X*.
In the case o f job  mobility, the return to job  mobility for a randomly selected individual who 
is subsequently forced to change job  and hence the average treatment effect A  a t e  are certainly 
not of interest. It is less clear, however, which of the remaining two effect, A t t  or A latE i 
constitutes the main parameter o f interest and which can actually be identified on the basis o f 
the observed data.
3.2.4 Relationship between the parameters o f interest
Recalling the definition of (unit-level) treatment effects, At =  (Mi(^*) “  ya t^*)) +  (wi* “  
uoi), and assuming the absence o f any systematic difference in the idiosyncratic components o f  
potential income, ¿?[uot |Xi] =  E[uu  |Xj], the above defined average treatment effects can be 
expressed in terms o f the common and idiosyncratic components o f the potential outcomes as 
follows:
Aate =  EjAilXi] (3.1)
=  -  Mo (*>)) +  (“ »  "  “ « )  !*•]
=  — Mo (*i) +  E[uu — uoi l^i]
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(3.2)A r r  =  £ [A jp fj,£ i =  1]
= E[(^(Xi)  -  fio (Xi)) + (Ulj - « oí) =
— fli(X i) — fio (X i) +-E[fclt “  *¿0» |-^i)A =  1]
=  fi i (X i) -  f¿Q (^ T<) +  £[«i¿ - uqí\Dí =  1]
&LATE — £[A¿ |X*,(Al — A o )  #  o] (3.3)
=  E [(^(Xi) -  tiQ (.Xi)) +  (uu -  uqí) \XU (Du -  Doi) ¿  0]
= fii (Xj) — /íq (-Xi) + -E[uit — uqí |.Xi, (At An) 7^  0]
= fii(Xi) — fiQ(-X<) 4* E[uu — not |(A* “  Du) 5^  0]
In the absence o f idiosyncratic responses to treatment, uu =  no* Vi € / ,  all individuals with 
the same characteristics respond in the same way to the treatment and hence all three average 
treatment effects are in fact equal. The same result holds in the case of strongly ignorable 
assignment and full compliance with the assignment, in which case potential outcomes are 
independent of the assignment mechanism, and necessarily Du =  Zi =  1 and Do» =  Z* — 0.
In most empirical applications, these conditions are unlikely to be met and the above average 
treatment effects will not coincide. In particular the average treatment effect for the treated 
and the average treatment effect for a randomly selected person will differ from each other 
unless the average idiosyncratic gains for the treated are zero or, in other words, if “agents do 
not select into treatment on the basis o f expected (idiosyncratic) gains from it.” (cf. Heckman 
(1997)) Similarly, the local average treatment effect will differ from these two effects unless the 
average idiosyncratic gains for the subpopulations of compilers and defiers are zero and the 
treatment effects for these two groups are further identical with those for always-takers. More 
generally:
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i u
&ATE =  &TT ^  — u& IA  =  1] =  (3*4)
&ate — A i^ rE  E[ul{ -  uoi I ( A i  — Aw) 7^  0] =  0 (3.5)
Hence, a priori information on the assignment mechanism and the compliance behaviour 
is of crucial importance for the identification of treatment effects. In the absence of such 
information, identifying assumptions have to be invoked. This will be discussed in more detail 
below.
\ .
3.2.5 Relationship to economic models: The marginal treatment effect
An additional treatment effect which is explicitly derived from economic theory and discrete 
choice formulations o f individual decisions on the treatment status can be defined in a latent 
variable framework: Let potential outcome functions and observed outcome be defined as above, 
and assume that the treatment status Di is generated according to  a latent variable (or single 
index) model
A  = i {A->0}
“  l {v>Di ^
(3.6)
where
A* -  Vd ÌZì^ u d ì ) (3.7)
“  y-D {Zi} X ì) — udì
with unobservable random variable udì which is generally interpreted as unobserved net utility 
or net gain from choosing one o f several alternatives.
D efinition  8 (marginal treatment effect, Heckman and VyUacil (1999,2000a, b,c))
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Additional to the above uindex condition” 3.6 assume the following regularity conditions:
(1) Conditional on X  — x, \iD (Zi,Xi =  x) is a nondegenerate random variable.
(2) (tioijWDt) and (uuiUdì) are absolutely continuous.
(3) {uoi.UDi) o.nd ar  ^ independent o f (Zi, X i ) .
(4) Pr(Z?t — 1,-X*) >  0, i.e. the probability o f treatment is strictly positive at each level o f 
X  =  x  for each individual i.
Define, moreover, the propensity score as
P(z)  s  P r (A  =  1 \XU Zi =  z )  =  FUd (md  (Zi =  * ,* « ))
where Fud is the distribution function o f  up. Then, conditional on Xi =  x  and P (Z i) =  
P (z ) ,  the marginal treatment effect A m t e ( x , P ( z ) )  is defined as
& m t e (x ,P ( z))
0 S [ i W = : X , P ( 3 )  -ƒ > (* )]  
dP(z) (3.8)
Like the local average treatment effect A late* the marginal treatment effect A m t e  is 
defined on the basis o f an instrument Z and thus varies with it. This implies that, using different 
instruments, one should expect different estimates of causal effects for different subpopulations. 
Contrary to the local average treatment effect, however, the marginal treatment effect is - by 
definition - a continuous function o f P(z).
The relationships between the marginal treatment effect and the above parameters are de­
rived in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999,2000a,b,c). They show in particular that the above defined 
average treatment effects can be generated by integrating the marginal treatment effect over 
some well-defined range of the propensity score used as instrument. The marginal treatment 
effect A  mte  thus is a limit form of the local average treatment effect. Heckman and Vytlacil 
(1999) interpret it as “the average effect for people who are just indifferent between partici­
pation or not at the given value o f the instrument” . For values o f P (z)  close to 1, it is “the 
average effect for individuals with unobservable characteristics that make them the most in­
clined to participate” and, similarly, for values of P(z)  close to 0, it is “the average effect for 
individuals with unobservable characteristics that make them the least inclined to participate” . 
The relationships between the above treatment effects are summarised in the following
C orollary  9 (relationship between the different average treatment effects, Heckman and Vyt~
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lacil (1999,2000a,b,c))
L etP (z )  ^  P (z ') at each pair (z ,* 7) where P (z)  =  P(Zi), and le tpD (z) =  p,D (Z, =  z,X* =  x , udì). 
In the context o f  the above latent variable model, the conditional versions o f the above average 
treatment effects conditional on X , =  x  then can be written as
Aate(x) — E[Ai \Xi = x],
Arr(x,P(z)) = E[Ai |X< = x,P(ZO = P(z),A  = 1]
& l a t e ( X j P ( z) ,P ( z')) =  E  [Ai |Xi =  X,  (i {p D (z) >  0 } -  x {p D (z ') >  0 } )  ^  0]
Given the assumptions from the above definition, it follows that these (conditional) average 
treatment effects are an appropriately weighted average o f the marginal treatment effect fo r  
some range o f the propensity score with
l
AytTEOc) — y*P[A* \Xi =  x ,tiDi =  u]du 
o
P{z)
&t t (x ,P { z)) =  P {z )~ l J P[A i \Xi =  x , uzh =  u]du
o
P(z)
AiATE(x t P (z), P (z'))  =  (P (z )  — P(z'))~i f  P [A i | X i= x ,5 IW =  U]du
P(z’ )
where ujoí =  FUD (udí) denotes the on the interval [0,1] uniformly distributed probability 
transform ofupH.
Each of the average treatment effects thus is an average of the marginal treatment effect for a 
well-specified range o f  the propensity score defined by the instruments considered. The average
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treatment effect is obtained by integrating the marginal treatment effect over the fall support 
o f udì, while the average treatment effect for the treated is the integral over the range [0,P(z)] 
as defined by the given value of the instrument. According to Heckman and Vytlacil (1999), “it 
is primarily determined by the average effect for individuals whose unobserved characteristics 
make them the most inclined to participate in the program.” The LATE, finally, integrates the 
marginal treatment effect over the range [P (z ') ,P (2 )] ^ d  is “the average treatment effect for 
someone who would not participate if P (Z )  <  P{Y)  and would participate if P (Z ) >  P (z ) .” 
(ibidem)12
3.3 Causal inference
Causal inference attempts at identifying and estimating the above average treatment effects 
on the basis of a comparison between average outcomes across treatment and control groups. 
In order to identify the above effects, various identifying assumptions are necessary that allow 
the construction o f counterfactuals from observations on the treatment group and the control 
group. Both the choice of the parameter o f interest and the strength of the necessary identifying 
assumptions depend on the nature of the available data (experimental vs observational), their 
dimension (cross-section, longitudinal, or panel data), the (sub-)population of interest, and the 
underlying (implicit) experimental design (assignment mechanism and compliance behaviour), 
or, in economic parlance, the way in which individuals select into treatment.
This section discusses the identification of causal effects by instrumental variables tech­
niques. It reviews in particular the assumptions under which instrumental variables estimates 
have a causal interpretation in the simple case of a binary assignment-binary treatment model 
with a continuous outcome variable.
3.3.1 The econometric model
As defined above, the general potential outcome model is given by (£*, (Do*»^it), (Vo*, 
with potential outcomes Yen — +  uoi and Yu =  fj.\ (X j) +  uu, parameter o f interest
A i — (Yit — Ybt), and observability rules Di — A>i(l — Zf) +  DuZi and Yj- =  Ybi(l.— D {) +
1!iFor empirical applications of this concept cf. e.g. Aakvik (1999) and Aakvik et al. (1999).
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yiiD i =  Y<n +  &iDi. Its econometric implementation is generally based on the so-called dummy 
endogenous variable model (with either fixed or random coefficient) or the additively separable 
correlated random coefficient model Consider a simple simultaneous equations specification 
including an outcome equation
Yi =  Xi/3 +  D{Si 4- U{ (3.9)
and a participation (or selection) equation
Di — X^ot +  T’ +  Vi (3.10)
This model is interpreted as a heterogeneous treatment effect model with outcome variable 
Yi, treatment indicator D,, assignment-to-treatment indicator Zi, and (unit-level) treatment 
effect Si- For the estimation of the average causal effect o f the treatment Di on the potential 
outcome Yi, a fixed coefficient specification of the heterogeneous treatment effect is imposed, 
interpreting 6 as some average treatment effect o f Di on Y,, conditional on individual character­
istics X j .13. Because of the selection (or endogeneity) bias due to E[D,u^ =  E[ui \D, =  1] ^  0, 
two difficulties arise in causal inference: first, to estimate consistently 6, and second, to ensure 
the interpret ability o f the estimate obtained as an average causal effect in the above poten­
tial outcome model. Several methods can be applied which aim at taking into account both 
of the above problems directly14: first, control for confounding variables, using regression or 
matching techniques (matched treatment-control-comparisons), second, pre-post comparisons 
on the same units of observation to reduce bias from unobserved differences (and in a similar 
vein: fixed-effects models and difference-in-difference estimates), and third, instrumental vari­
ables estimation, interpreted in a quasi-experimental framework. In the sequel, attention will 
be restricted to the identification of causal effects by instrumental variables methods, adopting 
the view expressed inter alia by Lechner ( 1998a,b) that nonparametric identification strategies
13 Note that, assuming 6i =  S for all * € I  would implicitly assume A» =  A  for ail t € / ,  and hence impose 
equality between all average treatment effects (A a t e  — A rr =  A late) defined above.
14Cf. e.g. Angrist and Krueger (1998).
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axe a “more credible way of identifying [causal] effects.”
3 .3 .2  Identification of causal effects by instrumental variables techniques
A  well-known solution to the problem o f endogenous treatment status Di in the above outcome 
equation 3.9 consists in the use of instrumental variables as a source of exogenous variation 
in D t. These instruments can be interpreted as generating a quasi-natural experiment by 
assigning individuals to treatment independently of unobserved characteristics.15 Estimates 
are obtained from comparing the outcomes across groups which differ with respect to the value 
o f  an instrumental variable that is related to the outcome of interest only by virtue of correlation 
with the probability of treatment. Instrumental variables techniques consistently estimate S in 
the above model in the presence of an endogenous regressor Di if - loosely speaking - conditional 
on X i, Zi is correlated with the outcome Vi only through treatment status Di, i.e. if conditions 
(IV I) p\ìmN~1D > Z  =  S  > 0 and (IV2) p\imN~lZ'u =  0 hold. In the special case without 
covariates, the IV estimator has the simple Wald estimator as probability limit, where the 
Wald estimator is defined as the ratio o f the causal effect o f the assignment on the outcome 
(E[Yi \Zi =  1] -  E\Yi \Zj =  0]) and the causal effect o f the assignment on the treatment status 
(E[Di \Zi =  1] -  E[Di \Z{ =  0]).
Identification o f causal effects hence requires the existence o f a variable Zf- that affects the 
selection into treatment but does not affect the outcome directly. However, even if IV estimates 
are consistent for 6, it is a highly controversial matter in the literature under what (further 
implicit) conditions this estimate does actually identify one of the above-mentioned average 
treatment effects o f interest.
The following theorems each state the respective conditions for the instrumental variables 
estimate to have a causal interpretation as an average treatment effect on a randomly selected 
person (ATE), an average treatment effect on the treated (TT), and a local average treatment 
effect (LATE).
15Cf. Angrist (1998): “In labor economics, at least, the current popularity of quasi-experiments stems precisely 
from this concern: because it is typically impossible to control for all relevant variables it is often desirable to 
seek situations where one has a reasonable presumption that the omitted variables are uncorrelated with the 
variables of interest. Such situations may arise if the researcher can use random assignment, or if the forces of 
nature or human institutions provide something close to random assignment.”
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T h eorem  10 (Heckman (1997), conditions for a causal interpretation of linear IV  estimates 
in the heterogeneous treatment effect model as average treatment effect on a randomly selected 
person)
(1) unon-zero treatment effect”
E  [A  |ZiyXi]  — Pr [Di =  1 \Zi,Xi] ^  0, i.e. the treatment probability is a nontrivial function 
o f Zi given X i.
(2) uexclusion restriction”
The instrumental variable Zi is mean-independent of the idiosyncratic components uqì and itu 
(and hence o f the potential outcomes Y& and Yu), i.e. E  [uoì +  A  (« it  -  u<òì) \Xu Zi] =  0.
This latter condition implies:
(2a) E  [uot \Zì , X ì ] =  E  [tioi \Xi] =  0, *.e. the instrument is uncorrelated with the potential 
idiosyncratic component of the potential outcome in the case of non-treatment.
(2b) E [D i  (uit — wo*) \Xi,Zi] =  E [u u  — i£o»] =  0, i.e. conditional on the instrument, the id­
iosyncratic gain is uncorrelated with the treatment.
Theorem 11 (Heckman (1997), conditions for a causal interpretation of linear I V  estimates 
in the heterogeneous treatment effect model as average treatment effect on the treated)
The instrumental variable estimate o f  6 in the heterogeneous treatment effect model has a 
causal interpretation as average treatment effect for the treated under the following assumptions:
(1) “non-zero treatment effect”
E[Di |Zi,X {]  =  P r [A  =  1 1Z{,Xi]  0, i.e. the treatment probability is a nontrivial function 
of Zi given Xi.
(2) “exclusion restriction”
The instrumental variable Zi is mean-independent o f  the idiosyncratic gains uoi and un (and 
hence o f the potential outcomes Y&i and Y u), i.e.
E  {uoi 4- Di (uu -  uoi ) -  E  [uii -  uoi | A  =  1, X {] \Xi, Z ij =  0.
This latter condition implies:
(2a) E  [tioi \Zi,X{] =  E  [woi |-^ t] =  0, i.e. the instrument is uncorrelated with the potential 
idiosyncratic component of the potential outcome in the case of non-treatment.
(2b) E  [uit — uoi |A =  1, Zi,Xi]  =  E  [uit — uoi |A =  hXi\, i.e. conditional on the treatment, 
the idiosyncratic gain is uncorrelated with the instrument.
7 9
In many applications based on observational studies, the implicit assumptions underlying 
theorems 10 or 11 do not seem reasonable. This applies in particular to assumption (2b) 
which states that the average idiosyncratic gains of those who are assigned to treatment and 
do comply with this assignment equal the average idiosyncratic gains in the whole population 
or in the group o f all the treated, respectively. Since these groups are relatively heterogeneous 
and since, in most economic applications, individuals are likely to self-select into treatment 
according to their expected idiosyncratic gains from doing so, these implied assumptions do not 
seem warranted. The fact that these assumptions are not needed for a causal interpretation of 
linear IV estimates as local average treatment effects is one o f the main differences regarding 
the identifiability o f the treatment effect o f the treated, on the one hand, and the local average 
treatment effect, on the other. It is also, however, one o f the main reasons for conceptual 
controversies in the field of causal inference as will be discussed briefly below.
T heorem  12 (AIR (1996), conditions fo r  a causal interpretation o f linear IV  estimates in the 
heterogeneous treatment effect model as local average treatment effect)16
The instrumental variable estimate o f 6 in the heterogeneous treatment effect model has a 
causal interpretation as local average treatment effect under the following assumptions:
(1) “stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA)
Potential outcomes for each individual i are unrelated to the treatment status o f other individ­
uals.
(2) “strongly ignorable assignment to treatment”
Conditional on observables, the assignment to treatment is random, ie . Pr(Z* =  1|J£¿) =  
Pr(Zi — 0 |Xi), or equivalently, treatment status is independent o f potential outcomes.
(3) “strong monotonicity”
The treatment probability is a nontrivial and monotonic function o f the instrument, i.e. 
E[Du -D oi\ X i]> 0 .
16 Cf. Angrist et al. (1996), here referred to as AIR(1996). Cf. also Imbens and Angrist (1994), 
Angrist and Imbens (1995), and Angrist and Krueger (1998). For a different point of view, cf. e.g. 
Heckman (1997) who shows that in the heterogenous treatment effect model the instrumental variable 
estimate o f Sate only identifies a causal effect if individuals do not self-select into the treatment status 
on the basis of idiosyncratic gains to treatment If this strong condition is fulfilled, the identified effect is 
necessarily the average treatment effect fo r  the treated. The author generally questions the validity and 
usefulness o f the LATE.
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(4) “exclusion restrictions"
The (unit-level)  potential outcome variables depend on the assignment status Zi only through 
the treatment status A , i.e. (>oi,^ii) -L %i IA  *
Under certain assumptions, causal effects in the above heterogeneous treatment effect model 
can thus be estimated by means o f standard two-stage least squares methods for a given ap­
propriate instrument. The more difficult question is which o f the above average treatment 
effects can be identified by IV estimation. The answer hinges on the assumptions - implicit or 
explicit - one is willing to make on the assignment and selection mechanisms underlying the 
given quasi-natural experiment or - as Heckman (1997) puts it -  on the way in which individ­
uals “process information” . While e.g. AIR  (1996) argue that the only treatment effect that 
IV can consistently estimate is the local average treatment effect, Heckman (1997) argues that 
IV can at best identify the average treatment effect for the treated, or no treatment effect of 
interest at all.17 In more recent work, Heckman and Vytlacil (2000a,b,c) suggest to estimate 
treatment parameters in a latent variable framework when they are identified or bound them 
otherwise. While, contrary to the identification of local average treatment effects, no assump­
tions on monotonicity or strong ignorability are required for the identification o f such marginal 
treatment effects, statistical support conditions for the propensity score are required which 
are difficult to interpret economically. Furthermore, even for bounding treatment parameters, 
problematic assumptions of known lower and upper bounds on potential outcomes have to be 
invoked.
These controversies are problematic since, in the presence o f heterogeneity, the above treat­
ment effects will differ significantly. Since the assumptions underlying the above theorems 
generally refer to unobservable individual-level potential outcomes and treatment status and 
are thus untestable,18 the interpretation o f IV  estimates as one or the other causal effect has 1
1 ‘ With respect to the case where the average treament effect for the treated and the local average treatment 
effect differ, Heckman (1997) states: “In the likely case in which individuals possess and act on private information 
about gains from a program that cannot be fully predicted by variables in the outcome equation, instrumental 
variables methods do not estimate economically interesting evaluation parameters.” He further adds that “[a]ny 
valid application of the method of instrumental variables for estimating (...) treatment effects in the case where 
the response to treatment varies among persons requires a behavioral assumtion about how persons make their 
decisions about program participation.” In Heckman’s (1997) view, this issue “cannot be settled by statistical 
analysis.”
lHCf. Lechner (1998a) on test procedures suggested by e.g. Heckman and Hotz (1989) for the evaluation of
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to rely entirely on the presumed plausibility of these identifying assumptions. Even here, how­
ever, there are strong differences in the literature: while AIR (1996) consider the local average 
treatment effect as the only treatment effect o f interest which can effectively be estimated by 
instrumental variables methods, Heckman (1997) claims that this would imply both “ignorance 
or irrationality about unobserved components o f gain on the part o f the people being studied” 
and absence o f “private information that is useful in forecasting the gains that they use in 
making their decisions but that is not available to the analyst.”
The predominant role of inherently untestable identifying assumptions notwithstanding, 
there exists an agreement in the literature to provide diagnostics on the instrument relevance. 
Following the suggestions by Bound et al. (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997), first-stage 
F-statistics and partial Remeasures will be reported in the later empirical applications. Other 
methods have been suggested to investigate in particular the plausibility of the exclusion re­
striction* 19 but these will not discussed here any further.
3 .3 .3  Extensions
The previous section focussed on the simple case of a binary assignment-binary treatment 
model with a continuous outcome variable. The methods discussed, however, can in general be 
adapted easily to more general outcome variables such as discrete or non-negative outcomes such 
as frequencies, counts or durations.20 Other extensions o f interest are, first, the estimation of
different sample selection models: “Test procedures do only work when there are overidentifying restrictions to 
test. It should be clear by now that the fundamental lack of identification inherent in causal analysis requires 
identifying restrictions in the first place. Such restrictions are never testable.”
19Cf. e.g. Blomquist and Dahlberg (1999), Angrist and Krueger (1995) and Angrist et al. (1995).
20 Angrist (2000) e.g. argues that “the dificulty with endogenous variables in non-linear LDV models is, in 
fact, more apparent than real.” According to him, at least for binary endogenous regressors, technical challenges 
related to LDV models “come primarily from what I see as a counterproductive focus on structural parameters 
such as latent index coefficients or censored regression coefficients, instead of directly interprétable causa! effects.” 
The main question of interest in this context is whether standard estimation procedures such as 2SLS remain 
applicable in the case of dependent variables which do not have a continuous support. While Angrist (2000) 
presents arguments in favour of both, standard linear IV methods as well as semi-parametric nonlinear IV 
estimators, he argues in particular that any of these approaches have two main advantages over structural models 
based on a latent index or censored regression framework: computational simplicity and weak identification 
requirements.
For evaluation studies with discrete or non-negative outcomes, cf. e.g. Angrist (1998, 2000), Card and 
Sullivan (1998) (binary outcome variables); Angrist (2000), Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and Mullahy (1998) 
(count data); Abbring and van den Berg (1999), Angrist (2000), Ham and LaLonde (1996), Hujer et al. (1996, 
1997a,b, 1999) and Bidder (1986,2000) (duration data); and Cockx and Bardoulat (1999), Ham and LaLonde 
(1990) and Lubyova and van Ours (1998) (transition rates).
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full outcome distributions for compilers, and second, the identification and estimation o f causal 
effects in the case of multivalued treatments.
Estimation of full outcome distributions for compliers
As shown in Imbens and Rubin (1997), under the assumptions stated in theorem 12 it is possible 
to estimate the entire marginal outcome distributions by treatment status, Yoi and Yu, for the 
subgroup o f compliers. These distributions are implicitly estimated by the IV estimator of local 
average treatment effects - generally without imposing any non-negativity restrictions. The 
estimated outcome distributions for compliers can be used as a diagnostic tool - in particular 
with a view to checking the plausibility o f the exclusion restrictions. The authors further show 
that IV estimates based on the restriction of non-negativity o f  these outcome distributions 
might differ substantially from the unrestricted estimates. A comparison o f the unrestricted 
and restricted IV estimates of local average treatment effects therefore represents an additional 
intuitive diagnostic check in causal inference.
Observe first that one can estimate both the population proportions and the outcome dis­
tributions for the two groups o f non-compliers (always-takers and never-takers). Let and 
4>at denote the population proportions o f  these two groups, and let g ^ r  and g at denote their 
outcome distributions. Let further f zd denote the directly estimable outcome distribution in 
the subsample defined by Zi =  z and di =  d. Then,
4>n t  =  Pr(4* =  0\zi =  1) (3.11)
<Pat =  Pr(di =  1 \zi =  0) (3.12)
and
9NT(Vi) =  foiiVi) ~  Pr(yi \<h =  0,Zi =  1) (3.13)
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9 a t (V ì )  =  f i o ( V i )  =  P r(y i \<U =  l , z ,  =  0 ) (3.14)
are directly estimable from the observed data ((z*, d», yj), JVi)i = 1 ^ .
From independence of assignment and compliance behaviour it follows that the directly 
estimable sampling distributions foo sud f u  416 mixtures of the above (directly estimable) 
distributions for never-takers or al ways-takers, on the one hand, and of the (not directly es­
timable) outcome distributions for compilers, on the other. Letting <j>c denote the population 
proportion of compilers and g\c and goc the potential outcome distributions for compilers with 
and without treatment, respectively,21 one can thus write
M y i ) = * ^ r 90C(VÙ + * M ^ 9NTiyi) (3.15)
/ i , w = + * M ^ 9at(vì) (3.16)
It follows that
<j>C =  1 — ÓtfT ~~ $AT (3.17)
and
90c(y<) =  t z ± ^ f o o l v i )  - (3.18)
21 For the above subpopulations of always-takers and never-takers only one distribution had to be defined in 
each case since it is conceptually impossible to envisage either treatment of a never-taker or non-treatment of an 
al ways-taker.
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3 ic(y .) =
9C 9c
(3.19)
On the basis o f  these relationships, by replacing the population values by theiT sample 
estimates, one can thus estimate the full (marginal) outcome distributions for compliers, Yqì 
and Yu, as well as their means E  [Yoi (Du — D& =  1] and E [Yu |Z>u — Aw =  1] and not just 
their difference equal to A late =  E  [Yi,- — Yqì [A t  — Aw =  1]. In chapter 4, the results of the 
estimation of the full (marginal) potential outcome distributions for compliers will be discussed 
as part o f  the discussion on the plausibility o f the identifying assumptions and the robustness 
of the results obtained.
Variable treatm en t intensity
This section extends the above quasi-experimental Rubin’s Causal Model to the case of multi­
valued treatments - or so-called variable treatment intensity, building on Angrist and Imbens 
(1995). Let Yji denote the potential outcome of interest for individual (or, equivalently, tinti) 
i € I  in case of treatment j  =  0, l , J. As above, Yqì denotes the potential outcome in the 
absence o f treatment, and Y » , j  =  the potential outcome in case the multivalued treat­
ment variable takes the value j .  In the later empirical analysis, j  will indicate the number of 
years o f schooling and Yfi the potential earnings of individual i for j  years o f schooling. As 
above, 1* is the observed outcome variable for individual i. Let further A t  € {0 ,1 ,..., J }  denote 
the individual’s potential (multivalued) treatment status as a function of the binary assignment 
status Zi. As before, Zi takes the value k — 1 if individual i is assigned to the treatment group 
and k =  0 otherwise. The observed cross-sectional data is ((«*, d», yi), A ’t)i=1) Ar, where di =  do* 
in case o f non-assignment and di =  du in case of treatment and where further yi =  yoi in the 
case of non-assignment and yi =  yji in the case of treatment j  e  {1 ,2 ,..., J }.
In this framework, both the subpopulations and the parameters o f interest are defined with 
respect to  a specific value j  of the multivariate treatment variable. The unit-level treatment 
effect o f treatment j  on outcome Yi is given by Aji =  Yfi — - the causal effect of an
additional j th year o f schooling in the later empirical analysis.
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Estimates of 6 in the outcome equation 3.9 have a causal interpretation only if they have 
probability limit equal to a weighted average o f for all j  in the respective subpop­
ulation of interest. Furthermore! as in the case of bivariate treatments, the linear IV estimate 
identifies a causal effect for a well-defined subpopulation.
T h eorem  13 (Angrist and Imbens (1995), conditions fo r  a causal interpretation o f linear IV  
estimates in the heterogeneous treatment effect model with multivalued treatment as weighted 
average of per-unit average causal effects)
Assume
(1) “independence”
The (unit-level) potential outcome and treatment variables A)*»^i*»5'bii5',ii,...,iO* are jointly 
independent o f Zi.
(2) ustrict monotonicity”
With probability 1, either Du  — Do* >  0 or Du  — Do* <  0 fo r  each individual i 6  /  and 
P r (A *  >  j  >  Doi) >  0 fo r  at least one j  =  0 ,1 ,..., J.
Then, the probability limit o f the linear 2SLS-IV estimator is given by
,. ?  £[X|Zj =  l]- .E [K | 2 i =  0] 
E[Di\Zi =  1] -  E[Di\Zi =  0]
j
=  '5 2 “ r T(j)  =  6
3-1
where
_  PrÇP» ^  J >  Aw)
(3.20)
(3.21)
and
r(j)  =  E[Yj{ -  Y j - ^ D u  > j >  Aw]- (3.22)
The fact that 0 <  ufj <  1 and 2 /= i  =  1 implies that 6 is a weighted average of average
causal responses to a unit change in the treatment value for those whose treatment status is 
affected by the instrument, E[Yji — > j >  An]. The weight uij is proportional to the
number of compliers, P r(A *  >  j  >  Do*). Angrist and Imbens (1995) refer to the parameter 6 
as the average causal response (ACR). The weights u>j reflect the weight of the subpopulation
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in calculating this average causal response.r(j) further shows the weights o f the respective 
schooling levels in computing the average treatment effect.
To identify a meaningful average treatment effect, the literature typically assumes a constant 
unit treatment effect, Yji -  =  or, for all j  — 0 ,1 ,..., J  and all i €  I .  By means of the
above monotonicity assumption, however, Angrist and Imbens (1995) impose a nonparametric 
restriction on the process determining D  as a function o f Z  instead o f restricting treatment effect 
heterogeneity. The authors further show that, for multivalued treatments, this assumption has 
the testable implication that the respective conditional cumulative distribution functions of D 
given Z  — 1 and Z  =  0 should not cross.
This approach will be applied in the analysis o f returns to  schooling in Germany in chapter 
5. It allows in particular to take into account the following facts: first, different subgroups 
are affected by different instruments; second, individuals in these subgroups are affected by 
the respective instrument in different ways; and third, the instrument may induce changes of 
behavior at different levels o f schooling.
3.4 Summary and conclusions
This chapter - in the form o f a commented literature review - has presented Rubin’s Causal 
Model and its extension to multivalued treatment variables as a general framework for the 
identification and estimation of causal effects in observational studies. This model allows nat­
urally for a focus on causal effects o f individual decisions - job  mobility during transition or 
educational choices. Empirical applications o f Rubin’s Causal Model below will be based on 
the identification results reviewed in this chapter, in particular on those stated in theorem 12. 
Both on theoretical grounds (following the results o f chapter 2) and because of data availabil­
ity, the following empirical applications will concentrate on the identification and estimation o f 
local average treatment effects in the case of, first, binary treatment (job mobility), and second, 
variable treatment intensity (schooling).
87
3.5 References
Aakvik, A. (1999), Assessing the effects o f  labour market training in Norway, University of 
Bergen, Department of Economics, mimeo
Aakvik, A., J.J. Heckman, and E.J. Vytlacil (1999), Training effects on employment when 
the training effects are heterogeneous: An application to Norwegian vocational rehabilitation 
programs, University of Chicago, Department of Economics, mimeo
Abadie, A., J.D. Angrist and G.W. Imbens (1998), Instrumental variables estimation of 
quantile treatment effects, NBER Technical Working Paper No. 229
Abbring, J.H. and G.J. van den Berg (1999), The non-parametric identification o f treatment 
effects in duration models, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculteit der Economische Weten­
schappen en Econometrie, mimeo
Ahn, H. and J.L. Powell (1993), Semi-parametric estimation o f censored selection models 
with a nonparametric selection mechanism, Journal o f Econometrics, 58, 3-29
Angrist, J.D. (1990), Lifetime earnings and the Vietnam era draft lottery: Evidence from 
social security administrative records, American Economic Review, 80(3), 313-336
Angrist, J.D. (1998), Estimating the labor market impact o f voluntary military service using 
social security data on military applicants, Econometrica, 66(2), 249-288
Angrist, J.D. (2000), Estimation of limited-dependent variable models with dummy endoge­
nous regressors: Simple strategies for empirical practice, NBER Technical Working Paper No. 
248
Angrist, J.D. and G.W. Imbens (1995), Two-stage least squares estimation of average causal 
effects in models with variable treatment intensity, Journal o f the American Statistical Associ­
ation, 90(430), 431-442
Angrist, J., G.W . Imbens and A.B. Krueger (1995), Jackknife instrumental variables esti­
mation, NBER Technical Working Paper No. 172
Angrist, J., G.W. Imbens and D.B. Rubin (1996), Identification of causal effects using 
instrumental variables, Journal o f the American Statistical Association, 91(434), 444-472 
Angrist, J.D. and A.B. Krueger (1991), Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect School­
ing and Earnings, Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 106, 979-1014
Angrist, J.D. and A.B. Krueger (1995), Split-sample instrumental variables estimates of the
88
return to schooling, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 13, 225-235
Angrist, J.D. and A.B. Krueger (1998), Empirical strategies in labor economics, Mas­
sachusetts Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 98-7, Cambridge, forthcoming in: 0. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds) (1999), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A , North-Holland, 
Amsterdam
Blomquist, S. and M. Dahlberg (1999), Small sample properties o f LIML and Jackknife IV 
estimators: Experiments with weak instruments, Journal o f Applied Econometrics, 14, 69-88 
Bound, J., D .A . Jaeger and R.M. Baker (1995), Problems with instrumental variables esti­
mation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variables 
is weak, Journal o f the American Statistical Association, 90(430), 443-450
Cameron, A.C. and P.K. Trivedi (1998), Nonrandom samples and simultaneity, in: Regres­
sion Analysis o f Count Data, Econometric Society Monograph No. 30, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, chapter 11
Card, D. (1995), Using Geographic Variation in College Proximity to Estimate the Return to 
Schooling, in: L.N. Christofides, E.K. Grant, and R. Swidinsky (eds), Aspects o f Labour Market 
Behaviour: Essays in Honour o f John Vanderkamp, University o f Toronto Press, Toronto, 201- 
222
Card, D. (1999), The Causal Effect o f Education on Earnings, in: O. Ashenfelter and D. 
Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, 1801-63
Card, D. and D. Sullivan (1988), Measuring the effect o f subsidised training programs on 
movements in and out of employment, Econometrica, 56(3), 497-530
Chen, S. (1999), Distribution-free estimation of the random coefficient dummy endogenous 
variable model, Journal of Econometrics, 91, 171-199
Cockx, B. and I. Bardoulat (1999), Vocational training: Does it speed up the transition rate 
out of unemployment?, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1RES and Département des Sciences 
Economiques et Sociales
Cox, D.R. (1958), The planning of experiments, Wiley, New York 
Fisher, R. (1935), The design of experiments, Oliver and Boyd, London 
Fitzenberger, B. and H. Prey (1996), Training in East Germany: An evaluation of the 
effects on employment and wages, Center for International Labor Economics Discussion Paper
89
N o. 36-1996, Universität Konstanz
Fitzenberger, B. and H. Prey (1997), Assessing the impact o f training on employment: The 
case o f East Germany, ifo-Studien, 43, 71-116
Froehlich, M. (1998), Semiparametric estimation of selectivity models, Diplomarbeit, Uni- 
versitaet Konstanz
Gronau, R. (1974), Wage comparisons: A  selectivity bias, Journal o f Political Economy, 82, 
1119-1143
Ham, J.C. and R.J. LaLonde (1990), Using social experiments to estimate the effect o f 
training on transition rates, in: J. Hartog, G. Ridder, and J. Theeuwes (eds), Panel data and 
labor market studies, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 152-172
Ham, J.C. and R.J. LaLonde (1996), The effect o f sample selection and initial conditions in 
duration models: Evidence from experimental data on training, Econometrica, 64, 175-205
Heckman, J.J. (1976), The common structure of statistical models o f truncation, sample 
selection, and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models, Annals o f 
Econom ic and Social Measurement, 5, 479-492
Heckman, J.J. (1978), Dummy endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation system, 
Econometrica, 46(6), 931-960
Heckman, J.J. (1979), Sample selection bias as a specification error, Econometrica, 47(1), 
153-161
Heckman, J.J. (1990), Varieties o f selection bias, Econom etrica, Papers & Proceedings, 
80(2), 313-318
Heckman, J.J. (1992), Randomization and social policy evaluation, in: C .F. Manski and 
I. Garfinkel (eds), Evaluating welfare and training programs, Harvard University Press, Cam­
bridge MA
Heckman, J.J. (1997), Instrumental variables, A study o f im plicit behavioral assumptions 
used in making program evaluations, Journal of Human Resources, 441-462
Heckman, J.J. (1999), Causal parameters and policy analysis in economics: A  twentieth 
century perspective, NBER Working Paper No. 7333
Heckman, J.J. and B. Honoré (1990), The empirical content o f the Roy model, Econometrica, 
58(5), 1121-1149
90
Heckman, J.J. and V.J. Hotz (1989), Choosing among alternative nonexperimental methods 
for estimating the impact o f social programs: The case o f manpower training, Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 84, 862-880
Heckman, J.J., R.J. LaLonde, and J.A . Smith (1999), The economics and econometrics 
of active labor market programs, in: O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook o f Labor 
Economics, Vol. 3, North-Holland, Amsterdam
Heckman, J.J. and R. Robb (1985a), Alternative methods for the evaluating the impact of 
interventions: An overview, Journal o f Econometrics, 30, 239-267
Heckman, J.J. and R. Robb (1985b), Alternative m ethods for the evaluating the impact 
of interventions, in: J.J. Heckman and B . Singer (eds), Longitudinal analysis o f labor market 
data, Econom etric Society Monograph N o. 10, Cambridge University Press, New York, 156-245 
Heckman, J.J. and R. Robb (1986a), Alternative m ethods for solving the problem o f selection 
bias in evaluating the impact of treatment on outcomes, in: H. Wainer (ed.), Drawing inferences 
from self-selected samples, Springer-Verlag, Berlin
Heckman, J.J. and E.J. Vytlacil (1999), Local instrumental variables and latent variable 
models for identifying and bounding treatment effects, Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 96, 4730-4734
Heckman, J.J. and E.J. Vytlacil (2000a), The relationship between treatment parameters 
within a latent variable framework, Econom ics Letters, 6 6 (1), 33-39
Heckman, J.J. and E.J. Vytlacil (2000b), Local instrumental variables, in: C. Hsiao, K. 
Morimune, and J. Powell (eds), Nonlinear Statistical Inference: Essays in honor o f Takeshi 
Amemiya, Cambridge University Press
Heckman, J.J. and E.J. Vytlacil (2000c), Econom etric evaluations of social programs, in: J.J. 
Heckman and E. Learner (eds), Handbook o f Econom etrics, Vol. 5, North-Holland, Amsterdam 
Holland, P.W . (1986), Statistics and causal inference (with discussion), Journal o f the Amer­
ican Statistical Association, 81, 945-960
Hotz, V.J. (1992), Designing an evaluation o f the Job Training Partnership A ct, in: C.F. 
Manski and I. Garfinkel (eds), Evaluating welfare and training programs, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA
Hiibler, O. (1997), Evaluation beschäftigungspolitischer Maßnahmen in Ostdeutschland,
91
ISHIHlHHPUm iWHBHMJIHIu m iM H l
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 216, 21-44
Hujer, R ., K.-O. Maurer, and M. Wellner (1996), The impact o f training on employment:
A  survey o f microeconometric studies, Discussion Papers in Economics No. 69, Universität 
Frankfurt/M ain
Hujer, R ., K.-O. Maurer, and M . Wellner (1997a), Estimating the effects o f training on 
unemployment duration in West Gemany: A  discrete hazard-rate model with instrumental 
variables, Discussion Papers in Economics No. 73, Universität Frankfurt /M ain
Hujer, R ., K.-O. Maurer, and M . Wellner (1997b), The impact o f training on unemployment 
duration in West Germany: Combining a discrete hazard-rate model with matching techniques, 
Discussion Papers in Economics No. 74, Universität Frankfurt/Main
Hujer, R ., K.-O. Maurer, and M . Wellner (1999), Estimating the effect o f vocational training 
on unemployment duration in West Germany, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 
218(5 /6), 619-646
Ichino, A . (1999), The problem o f causality in the analysis o f educational choices and labor 
market outcomes, Lecture notes, European University Institute, Florence, mimeo
Ichino, A . and R . Winter-Ebmer (1999), Lower and Upper Bounds o f Returns to Schooling: 
An Exercise in IV Estimation with Different Instruments, European Economic Review, 43(4-6), 
889-901
Ichino, A. and R. Winter-Ebmer (2000), The Long-Run Educational Cost o f W orld War 
Tw o, European University Institut, Florence, mimeo
Imbens, G.W . and J.D. Angrist (1994), Identification and estimation of local average treat­
ment effects, Econometrica, 62(2), 467-475
Imbens, G.W. and D.B. Rubin (1997), Estimating outcom e distributions for compliers in 
instrumental variables models, Review o f Economic Studies, 64, 555-574
Kraus, F., P.A. Puhani, and V. Steiner (1997), Employment effects o f publicly financed 
training programmes: The East German experience, ZEW  Discussion Paper No. 97-33,-Mannheim 
LaLonde, R. (1986), Evaluating the econometric evaluations o f training programs with ex­
perimental data, American Economic Review, 76, 604-620
LaLonde, R. (1995) The promise o f public sector-sponsored training programmes, Journal 
o f Economic Perspectives, 9(2) ,149-168
92
Lechner, M. (1998a), Training the East German labour force: M icroeconom etric evaluar 
tions o f continuous vocational training after unification, Studies in Contemporary Economics, 
Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg
Lechner, M. (1998b), Mikrooekonometrische Evaluationsstudien, Anmerkungen zu Theorie 
und Praxis, in: F. Pfeiffer and W . Pohlmeier (eds), Qualifikation, Weiterbildung und Arbeits- 
markterfolg, ZEW-Wirtschaftsanalysen, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden
Lechner, M. (1999), Earnings and employment effects of continuous off-the-job training in 
East Germany after unification, Journal o f Business and Econom ic Statistics, 17, 74-90
Lubyova, M. and J.C. van Ours (1998), Effects o f active labour market market programmes 
on the transition rate from unemployment into regular jobs in the Slovak Republic, CentER 
Discussion Paper No. 98127, Tilburg University
Manski, C.F. (1990), Nonparametric bounds on treatment effects, Econometrica, Papers & 
Proceedings, 80(2), 319-323
Manski, C.F. (1993), The selection problem in econometrics and statistics, in: C.R. Rao and 
G.S. M addala (eds), Handbook o f Statistics, Vol. 11, Econometrics, Elsevier Science Publishers, 
73-84
Manski, C.F. (1994), The selection problem, in: C. Sims (ed .), Advances in econometrics, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 143-170
Manski, C.F. (1995), Identification problems in the social sciences, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge M A
Meyer, B. (1995a), Lessons from  the U.S. unemployment insurance experiments, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 33(2), 91-131
Meyer, B. (1995b), Natural and quasi-natural experiments in economics, Journal o f Business 
and Econom ic Statistics, 13(2), 151-161
Mullahy, J. (1998), Instrumental variables estimation o f count data models: Applications 
to models o f cigarette smoking behavior, Review o f Economics and Statistics, 1 1 , 586-593 
Neyman, J. (1923), Statistical problems in agricultural experiments, Supplement to the 
Journal o f the Royal Statistical Society, 2(2), 107-180
Puhani, P.A. (1998), Advantage through training?, A microeconometric evaluation o f the 
employment effects o f active labour market programmes in Poland, ZEW Discussion Paper No.
93
98-25, Mannheim
Puhani, P.A. (1999), What works? An evaluation of active labour market policies in Poland 
during transition, ZEW  Economic Studies, Mannheim
Quandt, R . (1972), Methods for estimating switching regressions, Journal o f the American 
Statistical Association, 67(338), 306-310
Ridder, G. (1986), An event history approach to the evaluation o f training, recruitment, 
and employment programmes, Journal o f Applied Econometrics, 11, 109-126
Ridder, G . (2000), Identification o f the effect o f treatment on the treated, lecture notes, 
Johns Hopkins University, Department o f Economics, Baltimore
Roy, A.D . (1951), Some thoughts on the distribution o f earnings, Oxford Economic Papers,
3, 135-146
Rosenbaum, P.R. (1995), Observational Studies, Springer Series in Statistics, Springer- 
Verlag, Heidelberg, New York
Rubin, D .B. (1974), Estimating causal effects o f treatments in randomised and non-randoraised 
studies, Journal o f Educational Psychology, 6 6 , 688-701
Rubin, D .B. (1977), Assignment to treatment group on the basis o f a covariate, Journal o f 
Educational Statistics, 2, 1-26
Rubin, D .B. (1978), Bayesian inference for causal effects: The role o f randomization, Annals 
o f Statistics, 6 , 34-58
Rubin, D.B. (1990), Formal models o f statistical inference for causal effects, Journal o f 
Statistical Planning and Inference, 25, 279-292
Rubin, D.B. (1991), Practical implications of models o f statistical inference for causal effects 
and the critical role o f the assignment mechanism, Biometrics,6  47, 1213-1234
Schmidt, C.M. (1999), Knowing what works: The case for rigorous program evaluation, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 77, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn
Smith, T.M .F. (1983), On the validity o f inferences from non-random samples, Journal o f 
the Royal Statistical Society, A , 146(4), 394-403
Staiger, D. and J.H. Stock (1997), Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments, 
Econometrica, 65, 557-586
Steiner, V . and F. Kraus (1995), Haben Teilnehmer an Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaftnahmen
94
il
111
I
I
in Ostdeutschland bessere Wiederbeschäftigungschancen als Arbeitslose?, in: V . Steiner and 
L. Bellmann (eds), Mikroökonomik des Arbeitsmarktes, Beiträge aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung No. 192, Nürnberg
*
■ >
95

Chapter 4
Id e n tific a tio n  a n d  e stim a tio n  o f  th e  
re tu rn s to  e a rly  jo b  m o b ility  d u rin g  
tra n sitio n
4.1 Introduction
As described in chapter 1 , the incidence o f both job  endings and job  m obility in the East 
German transition process was dramatic. The massive job  loss especially at the beginning of 
the transition period, when displacement rates in the East exceeded those in the West by a 
factor o f 5 to 10, was accompanied by a considerable reallocation o f labour through job  mobility, 
with jo b  m obility rates in the East generally doubling those in  the West. Rates o f both job  
losses and job  changes peaked early in transition and declined considerably afterwards.
The considerably higher incidence o f displacement in East Germany throughout the tran­
sition process suggests a much higher portion o f so-called forced movers in East Germany as 
compared to the W est. As discussed in chapter 2, the continuously high displacement rates are, 
moreover, likely to yield negative realised returns to early jo b  mobility for those individuals 
who did not expect displacement rates on new jobs to remain at such a high level.
This chapter1 estimates the returns to early job  m obility in the transition process. Fol-
1A shortened version of this chapter was published as: Siebem, F. (2000), Better LATE? Instrumental
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lowing the above observation that individuals are likely to self-select into specific forms o f job  
m obility behaviour on the basis o f their unobservable characteristics, standard results from 
both  simple treatment-control comparisons o f average income or from  simple regressions o f 
reduced form earnings equations do in general not identify any causal effect o f job  mobility. 
This chapter attempts to identify the causal effects o f job  m obility during transition in the 
quasi-experimental framework (Rubin’s causal model) established in chapter 3 and to estimate 
the returns to early job  mobility in the East German transition process for the period 1990-96 
while taking explicitly into account the potential endogeneity problem. Job mobility early in 
the transition process is viewed as a treatment the effect o f which on two different outcome 
variables - total income and employment probabilities throughout transition - is to be evalu­
ated. Results from simple treatment-control comparisons and from  standard OLS regressions 
are contrasted with those obtained from instrumental variables estimation, exploiting differ­
ent sources o f exogenous variation in the observed job  m obility behaviour. Identification of 
the returns to job m obility is achieved through the choice o f adequate instrumental variables 
without referring to either assumptions about the exogeneity o f job  mobility or distributional 
or functional form assumptions. Two different instruments are proposed which imply different 
assignment-to-treatment mechanisms in the quasi-experimental framework. The use o f these 
instruments allows, moreover, a distinction between the returns to forced job  m obility and those 
to  voluntary job  mobility without recurring to  survey information on the nature o f previous job  
losses.
The results obtained suggest both the presence of strong self-selection and the heterogeneity 
o f returns to job  mobility. Although suffering potentially from instrument weakness and finite 
sample bias, the results thus seem to question the validity o f simple regression approaches for 
the estimation of returns to job  mobility. They additionally represent an example in which the 
interpretation of instrumental variables estimates as local average treatment effects (LATE) as 
defined in Angrist et al. (1996) seems the most appropriate one.
The remainder o f the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 describes the database used 
and reviews the sample definitions. Section 4.3 defines the treatment and outcome variables
Variables Estimation of the Returns to Job Mobility During Transition, German Economic Review, 1(3), 335- 
362
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used in the later analysis. Section 4.4 presents results from  simple treatment-control compar­
isons and from OLS estimation. Section 4.5 discusses the choice o f instruments in the light of 
the conditions for IV  estimates to identify causal effects and reports the results from instru­
mental variables estimation. Section 4.6 presents results from sensitivity analyses and discusses 
the robustness o f the results obtained with respect to alternative sample definitions, outcome 
measures or treatment variables. It also reports results from the estimation of full outcome 
distributions for compilers. Section 4.7 discusses the employment effects o f early job  mobility, 
contrasting again results from OLS estimation with IV  estimates based on the above two in­
struments. Section 4.8 addresses some frequently asked questions regarding the identification 
and estimation o f causal effects. Section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Database and sample selection
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on data from  the German Socio-Econom ic Panel 
(GSOEP) The GSOEP is a representative panel survey o f the German population that was 
started in 1984 fox the then Federal Republic o f Germany and was extended to East Germany 
at the beginning o f 1990. Most notably, it is the only German panel survey which managed to 
gather information on a representative East German sample before the start o f the Economic, 
Monetary and Social Union (EMSU) in July o f that year.2
For the purpose o f the evaluation o f job  m obility during the transition from a centrally 
planned econom y to a market economy this paper makes use o f the East German subsample 
(subsample C) only. Information on this subsample is available for the years 1990 to 1997 with 
the first wave containing some important retrospective information for 1989.
In order to follow the same individuals over the first 8  years o f the transition period the 
sample is restricted to those individuals with valid survey responses in all eight waves, yielding 
a balanced panel o f 2696 individuals (denoted “full sample” in the sequel) o f which more than 
80% (2192 individuals) were gainfully employed in 1990.
aA short introduction into the public use version of the GSOEP is presented in Wagner et al. (1993) while 
Schupp and Wagner (1990) concentrate on the implementation of the survey in the then German Democratic 
Republic in 1990. A detailed description of the GSOEP public-use file is DIW (1998). It is available at 
http://www.diw.de.
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Table 4.1: Sample definitions
observations
Full sample 2696
not employed 1990 -504 2192
in vocational training or in self-employment 1990 -128 2064
Sample age below 20 or above 55 in 1990 -228 1836
restrictions missing information on the instruments -48 1788
missing information on exogenous variables -121 1667-
missing information on outcome variable -383
Restricted sample 1284
SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, waves 7-14, subsample C
In the empirical analysis those individuals not employed in 1990 and those in either voca­
tional training or in self-employment are excluded from the sample. Further sample restrictions 
due to missing values on crucial variables (outcom e variable, exogenous or instrumental vari­
ables) and due to the concentration on the age group 20-55 in 1990 leave a sample o f 1284 
individuals (denoted “restricted sample” in the sequel) (cf. table 4.1 ) . 3
If not mentioned otherwise, all sample statistics and estimation results in this paper are 
based on this restricted sample. For the purpose o f comparison, a comparable restricted sample 
has been constructed for West Germany from  subsamples A and B in the GSOEP.* The full 
W est German balanced sample consists o f 6187 individuals (of which 63% employed at the time 
o f the interview in 1990), its restricted version o f 2160 individuals.
4.3 Definitions
This section defines the treatment and outcome variables used in the subsequent analysis.
3 This study concentrates on the analysis of returns to job-to-job mobility and does not discuss issues related 
to individual retirement decisions. For this reason, individuals aged over 55 in 1990 are excluded from the sample.
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4.3 .1  D efinition o f the tr e a tm e n t v a r ia b le : early job  m obility
The job m obility indicators have been constructed on the basis o f a set o f yearly repeated survey 
questions regarding the individual’s job  situation.
First, all individuals are asked whether they have ended an employment relation since the 
beginning o f the previous calendar year and, if so, for what reason. According to the reason 
stated, job endings /  job  separations can be classified into four categories: quits, displacement 
(firm closure or individual layoff), (early) retirement, and other job  endings.4
Second, individuals who are employed at the time o f the survey are asked whether they 
have had any change in their professional situation since the beginning o f the previous calendar 
year. In the affirmative case, further information on the type o f this change is provided which 
enables the classification o f job changes into the following three categories: job -to-job  shifts, 
within-firm jo b  changes, and re-entry into employment after some period of non-employment. 
Job-to-job shifts are moves between two different employers (including moves into or out of 
self-employment) whereas individuals re-taking employment after some break (e.g. periods of 
further training or maternity leave) report a re-entry into employment. Note, however, that 
intervening spells in unemployment might also occur in the case o f job-to-job  shifts since the 
classification o f the type o f job  change is left to  the respondent.
Third, in the case o f both job  endings and job  changes, additional information on the timing 
o f the event is provided. All this information is used to  define the job  m obility indicators 
presented in table 4.2 below .5
Given the responses to the above questions, the treatment group is defined as the group of 
early job -to-job  movers, i.e. those individuals whoy by the end o f 1991, had indicated at least 
one job -to-job  shift. This group covers 20.2% o f the East German sample as opposed to 9% in 
the West German sample. All remaining individuals are part o f the control group .6 Table 4.3
4 Other job endings include e.g. regular time-limited contract endings or within-firm job changes.
5 Given that the survey response refers to both the calendar year previous to the survey year as well as to 
the time up to the survey in the survey year itself, further controlling for the timing of the respective event is 
necessary in order, both to give a correct picture of the incidence of job mobility during transition and to avoid 
counting some mobility episodes twice.
6In the following analysis, results will also be reported when defining the treatment group as job mobility 
in 1990 ("early (1990)” ) or job mobility between 1990 and 1992 ("early (1990-92)” ). When defining as early 
job-to-job movers all those individuals who experienced at least one job-to-job shift in 1990, the treatm ent group 
covers 8.3 %  of the East German sample. When defining as early job-to-job movers all those individuals who,
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Table 4.2: Definitions of job  mobility status: Overview
d efin ition obs %
jo b  stayers n eith er jo b  en din g n or jo b  change in  1990-96 248 19.31
jo b  m overs any ty p e  o f  jo b  change 1990-96 860 66.98
within-firm within-firm job  change 1990-96 307 23.91
job-to-job change of employer 1990-96 541 42.13
early (1990) job-to-job shift 1990 106 8.26
early (1990-91) job-to-job shift 1990-91 259 20.17
early (1990-92) job-to-job shift 1990-92 336 26.17
re-entries re-entry into employment 1990-96 281 2 1 .8 8
jo b  losers jo b  ending w ith ou t jo b  change in  1990-96 176 13.71
NOTE: last column reports percentage of restricted sample (N=1284) 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C
below  contains an overview o f the two subgroups o f treatment group and control group.
4 .3 .2  Definition o f the o u tc o m e  v a r ia b le : toted income 1990-96
Following the suggestions from theoretical models of individual decision-making under uncer­
tainty, the outcome variable of interest is defined as the present discounted sum o f total yearly 
incom es for the years 1990 to 1996.7
Total yearly income is defined as sum of various potential types o f income received through­
out the calendar year, namely labour income (employment or self-employment income including 
prem ia), income from a second job , unemployment benefit or relief, social assistance payments, 
payments during maternity leave, and grants.8 Each of the single income components is calcu-
by the end of 1992, had indicated at least one job-to-job shift, the treatment group covers 26.2 %  of the East 
German sample as opposed to 12.5 %  in the West German sample.
' For arguments in favour of chosing an aggregate measure of income instead of year-to-year increases in income, 
cf. also the discussion of adequate outcome measures in studies of the returns to job mobility in Simmonet (1998).
* Given that e.g. job search off-the-job, unemployment, or continued education might represent the optimal 
behaviour for some individuals, all the above-mentioned potential income sources necessarily have to be included 
into the outcome variable.
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Table 4.3: Definition o f treatment and control groups: Overview
d escrip tion ob s %
treatm en t group (D  =  1) early  (1990 -91 ) 
jo b -to -jo b  m overs 259 20.17
con tro l group  (D  =  0 ) all rem ain in g: 1025 79.83
job  stayers 248 19.31
other job  movers 601 46.81
late job-to-job movers 282 21.96
only within-firm 175 13.63
only re-entry 123 9.58
within-firm and re-entry 21 1.64
job  losers 176 13.71
NOTE: last column reports percentage of restricted sample (N=1284) 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C
lated as product o f the number o f months the income was received in a calendar year and the 
average monthly amount for the income source.9
As in Hunt (1999), the calculated nominal values are then deflated to 1991 values, using 
two different region-specific deflators for West and East Germany, respectively, according to 
the individual’s residence.
The outcome variable o f interest is obtained by adding up these discounted yearly income 
measures. It is defined as missing only if information on the amount o f yearly labour income 
is missing. In the case other components o f the total yearly incom e measure exhibit missing 
values these components are set to zero instead .10 Table 4.4 contains summary statistics for 
these income variables.
In the empirical analysis, the log of the present discounted sum o f total yearly income will
9This income information is extracted from the individual-specific calendar files in the GSOEP.
10This treatment of missing information is motivated both by the observation that labour income is by far the 
most important component of total yearly income and by the wish to reduce the number of missing values of 
the outcom e variable to a reasonable minimum. It has to be noted, however, that in the many cases of missing 
information on the average amount of unemployment benefits it might be more accurate to replace the missing 
value by some fraction of previous labour income than by zero. Alternatively, one could use total yearly labour 
income only as outcom e variable. The robustness of the results obtained with respect to alternative outcome 
variables will be discussed more in detail in section 4.6.
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Table 4.4: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics: Total income throughout transition
variable description mean st. dev. min max
TYI90 total income 1990 12.864,80 5.925,79 0 65.100
TYI91 total income 1991 21.192,15 10.441,71 0 99.519
TYI92 total income 1992 22.913,48 11.423,00 0 108.134
TYI93 total income 1993 24.771,13 12.877,90 0 125.859
TYI94 total income 1994 25.623,60 14.593,66 0 140.089
TYI95 total income 1995 25.674,38 16.367,92 0 215.600
TYI96 total income 1996 25.487,78 15.623,07 0 118.863
PDVTYI06 discounted sum 1990-96 158.527,30 75.924,73 16.716 757.495
NOTE: All income values gross in 1991 DM 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (N=1284)
be used as dependent variable.
4.4 Income effects of early job-to-job mobility: Some first evi­
dence
This section presents some first empirical evidence on the returns to  early job -to-job  m obility 
on the basis o f simple treatment-control comparisons and ordinary least squares estimates.
4 .4 .1  Treatm ent-control comparisons
Given the above definition o f early job -to-job  m obility as treatment (D = l), this section compares 
the income o f early job-to-job  movers with that from the control group (D =0). As shown in 
table 4.5 below, the mean income for the treatment group is considerably higher than that for 
the control group, suggesting positive returns to early job  m obility o f at least 16%. In the case 
o f early (1990-91) job -to-job  mobility, the mean income for the treatment group amounts e.g. 
to 178.493,80 DM (with a standard deviation o f 90.234,73 DM ) as compared to 153.482,10 DM 
for the control group (with a standard deviation o f 71.026,77 D M ), thus yielding a difference 
in mean income between early job-to-job  movers and the control group o f roughly 25.000 DM 
or 3.600 DM per year. On the basis o f the other definitions o f early job  mobility, the returns
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Table 4.5: Outcome variable by treatment status: Total income
treatment group E[Y|D=1] E[Y|D=0] t-test KS-test
eaily job-to-job movers 
(1990)
209.809,20
(112.313,10)
153.912,80
(70.001,80)
-5.037
(0.000)
0.275
(0.000)
early job-to-job movers 
(1990-91)
178.493,80
(90.234,73)
153.482,10
(71.026,77)
-4.148
(0.000)
0.144
(0.000)
early job-to-job movers 
(1990-92)
177.845,10
(86.659,78)
151.680,50
(70.525,89)
-4.981
(0.000)
0.166
(0.000)
NOTES: standard deviations in parentheses; t-test refers to the one-sided two-sample t-test‘of equal 
means allowing for unequal variances with alternative H\ : E\Y \D ~  1] >  E [Y  |D =  0];KS-test 
refers to the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smimov test statistic of equal outcome distributions for 
treatment and control group with alternative H \  : i V | D - i  <  F y \ D = 0  >for both tests p -values in 
parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
to early jo b  m obility seem even higher.
Standard tests on the equality o f means and distributions across treatment groups respec­
tively clearly reject the respective null o f equal means and equal distributions: A  one-sided 
two-sample t-test o f equal means (allowing for unequal variances) yields a test statistic o f -4.98, 
thus clearly rejecting the null o f equal means at any standard significance level. A two-sample 
Kolm ogorov-Smimov-test o f equal outcom e distributions for treatment and control group gives 
a test statistic o f 0.17 which, again, allows a clear rejection o f the null of equal distributions. 
Similar tests on the yearly mean incomes and income distributions, respectively, also indicate 
significant differences between treatment and control groups. This result is also supported by 
a closer look at the distribution o f the outcom e variable by treatment status in Figure 4-1. The 
comparison o f the kernel density estimates o f the present discounted sum o f total yearly income 
between 1990 and 1996 clearly suggests a considerable income gap between the treatment and 
control groups.
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Figure 4-1: Distribution o f total income 1990-96 by treatment status
o treatment status; o control group 
4 .4 .2  S e le c tio n  o n  co v a ria te s
The above simple treatment-control comparisons are likely to suffer from ignoring systematic 
differences in observable characteristics between the treated and the control group. A  natu­
ral extension therefore consists in estimating potential returns to job  m obility conditional on 
observable individual and job  characteristics.
OLS regression
For this purpose, in a first step the outcome equation (3.9)
, . Yi =  X'i !3 +  D i6 +  ui =
has been estimated on the cross-section defined above by simple OLS. 1 * denotes the outcom e 
variable, X i a matrix o f exogenous regressors, including individual characteristics, firm charac-
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teristics, monthly income 1989, and potentially a set o f occupation or industry dummies, D{ 
a binary indicator o f the job  mobility status under consideration, and u* the error term. The 
parameter o f interest is (/?,£ ), with 6 considered as the returns to  jo b  mobility.
Descriptive statistics on the observable characteristics in the sample and by treatment sta­
tus are presented in tables 4.29 and 4.30 in the appendix. As can be seen from the descriptive 
statistics by treatment status and as one would expect in the case o f self-selection /  non- 
randomisation, the means respectively distributions o f some “pre-treatment” observable char­
acteristics do indeed differ significantly with treatment status: M en, the young, those with 
lower tenure on the job , the more educated (1 0  or 12  years o f schooling, university degree), 
employees in the non-state sector, workers in agriculture and employees in trade and retail are 
more likely to be treated. Women, employees in the transport or public sector, and those in a 
low position are less likely to be treated. It is important to note, however, that neither the mean 
nor the distribution o f gross monthly earnings in the year previous to the interview do differ by 
treatment status. The “pre-treatment” labour market or employment status are further equal 
by definition o f the sample.
Table 4.6 below contains the results from the regression of the log o f the present discounted 
sum o f total yearly income over the transition period on different sets o f exogenous variables. 
Already the results from the first specification which includes individual characteristics only 
indicate the explanatory power o f these characteristics for the outcom e variable under consid­
eration: Additionally to gender and age effects, the outcome variable also differs considerably 
with educational and vocational attainment as o f 1990.11 The inclusion o f further regressors 
like firm characteristics and lagged income in 1989 as well as either a public service dummy 
(specification 2), occupation dummies (specification 3) or industry dummies (specification 4) 
does not change these results qualitatively. The estimation results suggest, finally, considerable 
returns to early job-to-job  m obility of 8 - 1 2 %.
W hile the OLS estimates of the returns to early (1990-92) jo b  m obility are similar, the OLS 
estimates o f the returns to early (1990) jo b  m obility seem considerably higher o f around 20% 1
11 Most noteworthy seems the considerably higher income stream for men with technical or university degree. 
Given that it is generally understood that these qualifications were undervalued in a centrally planned economy 
with respect to vocational training, one might want to classify graduates of either technical schools or universities 
as among the ‘winners’ during transition. On the other hand, elder individuals, women, and individuals with 
low schooling and /  or without any vocational degrees seem to be among the ‘losers’.
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Table 4.6: OLS estimates o f the outcome equation
(1) (2 ) (3) (4)
constant 13.885 12.566 12.651 12.553
(0.623) (0.684) (0.675) (0.672)
D 0.078 0.101 0.090 0.113
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
sex (female=l) -0.338 -0.265 -0.290 -0.254
(0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
age -0.200 -0.245 -0.228 -0.241
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053)
age2/ 100 0.647 0.739 0.691 0.725
(0.145) (0.146) (0.146) (0.144)
age3 / 1 0 .0 0 0 -0.652 -0.714 -0.675 -0.701
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.126)
8 years schooling -0.135 -0.112 -0.078 -0.106
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
12 years schooling 0.032 0.025 -0.004 0.009
(0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
no vocational degree -0.302 -0.209 -0.084 -0.205
(0.061) (0.054) (0.058) (0.052)
masters degree 0.064 0.036 0.023 0.038
(0.043) (0.040) (0.044) (0.039)
technical degree 0.324 0.241 0-152 0.245
(0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.034)
university degree 0.415 0.293 0.201 0.308
(0.064) (0.062) (0.067) (0.063)
small firm (< 20) - -0.101 -0.116 -0.117
(-) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
large firm (> 200) - 0.029 0.004 0.023
(-) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
monthly income 1989 - 0.282 0.250 0.272
» (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
public service dummy no yes no no
occupation dummies no no yes no
industry dummies no no no yes
N 1284 1284 1284 1284
0.382 0.441 0.452 0.454
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of total income 1990-96; D: indicator of early 
job-to-job mobility (1990-91) (treatment status); robust standard error estimates in parentheses; 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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(Cf. tables 4.39 and 4.42 in the appendix).
M in cer (1986) approach
As mentioned in Mincer (1986), heterogeneity in workers’ wage profiles creates a selectivity bias 
in using all stayers as the control group.12 Additionally to  the selection on covariates, the author 
therefore suggests to restrict the control group im plicit in the regression to “those stayers whose 
m obility behavior, in addition to other observable characteristics, is similar to that o f current 
period movers” , considering their wage growth on the jo b  a proxy o f the wage growth foregone 
by the job  movers. Mincer (1986) proposes to  proxy the expected wage growth o f movers by the 
wage growth o f those stayers who, besides having similar personal and job  characteristics, in 
particular tenure on the job, are observed to  change jo b  one year later. Table 4.7 presents the 
estimation results based on the restriction o f the control group to these “comparable stayers” 
or “next period movers” . These suggest again gains from early job  m obility in the order of 
15% when compared to late (1992-96) movers. Late jo b  movers are found to incur losses with 
respect to non-movers in general and jo b  stayers in particular, while early movers experience 
clear income gains with respect to both  o f these groups. Gains seem to be highest for those 
moving still in 1990, reaching income gains o f around 30% w ith respect to those moving later. 
Movers in the first two years o f transition, however, do not seem to experience any significant 
gains with respect to those moving in 1992 (Cf. also tables 4.37 and 4.40 in the appendix).
4 .4 .3  Interpretation o f results
The results obtained from simple treatm ent-control comparisons and from standard regression 
analysis suggest considerable positive incom e effects o f early job -to-job  mobility. They can in
li “Since wages change (usually grow) for stayers as well as for movers, a correct estimate of the wage gain 
from moving is the difference between the actual wage gain of movers over the interval and the unobserved but 
expected wage gain of movers had they not moved over the same interval. In the usual procedure, the coefficient 
of a job change dummy (St) in a wage growth equation is used to estimate the wage transition. What it really 
measures is the difference between the wage gain of movers and wage gain of stayers both defined over this 
particular time interval (t). (...) What is known as the “selectivity problem” is that wage growth of stayers (...) 
is not likely to be the same as the expected wage growth of movers (...) had they stayed. Put more strongly, the 
coefficient on St tells us how much better (or worse) movers fared compared to stayers, but this is an irrelevant 
and even faulty question. It is prima facie faulty, because any answer would suggest that one or the other group 
is acting irrationally (...). It is irrelevant because economic optimization means that movers are doing their best 
by moving and stayers by staying. Strictly speaking this is true ex ante, as well as, on average, ex post, so long 
as most people are not misled by incomplete information.”
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T able 4.7: OLS estimates of the returns to early (1990-91) job  m obility following Mincer (1986): 
O verview
(1) (2 ) (3) (4) estimated returns
control: movers in 1992
G{m) =  bt -  bt+i -0.014 0.010 0.004 0.029 0%
coefficient on D 0.086 0.109 0.098 0.121
(s.e.) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
coefficient on D 0.100 0.099 0.094 0.093 *
(s.e.) (0.038) (0.03$) (0.037) (0.037)
R2 0.385 0.443 0.454 0.456
control: late movers in 1992-96
G ( m ) - b t ~  bt+i 0.130 0.142 0.139 0.156 13.9 % - 16.9 %
coefficient on D 0.056 0.083 0.069 0.093
(s.e.) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
coefficient on D -0.074 -0.059 -0.070 -0.063
(s.e.) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
R2 0.386 0.443 0.455 0.456
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of labour income 1990-96; D: early job-to-job 
mobility (1990-91); model specifications (1) to (4) as defined above; robust standard error estimates in 
parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=l284)
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general not, however, be considered as estimates of causal effects due to the inherent problem 
o f self-selection.
The same negative result holds true for OLS estimates: If, as discussed in chapter 2, job  mo­
bility status is correlated with unobservable characteristics like ability or the access to networks, 
these estimates are biased. As suggested in the above theoretical discussion, the direction o f 
this bias is generally unknown. In other words: The conditional independence (or unconfound- 
edness) assumption implicit in the selection on observables is not valid.
Moreover, even in the case these conditional independence assumptions were to be met, the 
above results would represent the treatment effect on the treated when assuming treatment 
effect homogeneity in the treated population. The next section therefore turns to a different 
approach to identification and estimation o f returns to job  m obility which addresses explicitly 
the problem o f self-selection while allowing for treatment effect heterogeneity across different 
subpopulations.
4.5 Instrumental variables estimation of the returns to job mo­
bility during transition
As discussed in chapter 3, a well-known solution to  the problem o f endogenous treatment status 
D{ in the above outcom e equation (3.9) consists in the use o f instrumental variables as a source 
o f identifying information. The instrumental variables are interpreted as generating a quasi- 
natural experiment by assigning individuals to treatment independently o f their unobserved 
characteristics. Under the conditions AIR(1996) laid out in theorem  12  in chapter 3, the IV  
estimate o f the coefficient on the treatment indicator, is not only a consistent estimate o f 
S, but it has, moreover, a causal interpretation as local average treatment effect (LATE).
4 .5 .1  Choice o f instrum ents and discussion o f identifying assumptions
Two instruments have been chosen for the instrumental variables estimation: first, an indicator 
o f firm-level announced layoffs, and second, an indicator o f occupation-specific labour mar­
ket opportunities. Both instruments stem from  the 1990 survey and thus convey pre-EMSU
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inform ation .13 They axe motivated in turn.
Firm-level announced layoffs as instrument
Individuals were asked in the first, wave whether their current employer had already announced 
layoffs on the firm level. In the restricted sample defined above, 601 individuals answer affir­
m atively and 683 negatively. I define the first instrument as indicator taking the value 1 if the 
response is affirmative.
This instrument is correlated with the treatment status o f early job-to*job m obility while 
on ly slightly (and negatively) correlated with the outcome (C orr(Z,D )=0.14 and C orr(Z ,Y )=- 
0.03). The treatment probabilities, moreover, differ significantly by assignment status: O f 
those assigned to treatment 26% switch to a new job  early, as opposed to only 15% o f those 
not assigned to treatment. A one-sided t-test o f equal treatment probabilities for different 
assignment status yields a statistic o f -4.67, thus clearly rejecting the null.
The instrument seems to be reasonably equally distributed across the sample population. 
M en, employees o f large firms, blue collar workers, and workers in the manufacturing sector 
are over-represented in the group o f individuals assigned to  treatment due to their employers’ 
announcement o f mass layoffs at the beginning o f transition. On the other hand, especially 
employees in the transport sector and the public sector faced a significantly lower probability 
o f early mass layoffs. There is no statistical evidence for differences in firm-specific layoff 
probabilities with respect to either educational and vocational degrees or hierarchical positions 
on the current job. Further evidence on the distribution o f the instrument in the sample 
population is presented in table 4.31 in the appendix.
Average outcomes by instrument and treatment status are summarised in table 4.8 below. 
They show that, while there is a positive effect o f firm-level announced layoffs on early job  
mobility, firm-level announced layoffs have a negative causal effect on total income 1990-96. The 
sim ple (unconditional) Wald estimate of the causal effect o f early job  mobility on total income *Il
13It is crucial to understand that it is only the framework of transition which allows to employ this infor­
mation as an exogenous source of variation in observed job mobility behaviour. Even if it were available, the 
same information on firm-level announced layoffs in West German firms or on occupation-specific labour market 
opportunities of West German survey respondents would certainly not constitute valid instruments in an analysis 
of job mobility in West Germany!
I l l
Table 4.8: Average outcome by instrument and treatment status (instr. Z l)
Dots—0 Dots- 1 Total D
Z\,ob$ — o 158.881,20
(72.573,99)
(N=580)
171.865,50 
(90.285,35) 
(N—103)
160.839,30
(75.579,65)
(N=683)
0.151
(0.358)
(N=683)
1—1IIibí 146.445,10
(68.401,16)
(N=445)
182.870,10
(90.223,91)
(N=156)
155.899,90
(76.292,84)
(N=601)
0.260
(0.439)
(N=601)
Total 153.482,10
(71.026,77)
(N=1025)
178.493,80 
(90.234.,73) 
(N=259)
158.527,30 
(75.924,73) 
(N—1284)
0.202
(0.401)
(N=1284)
NOTES: Zj =  firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990; standard deviation and number of observations 
in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
1990-96 based on firm-level announced layoffs as instrument is -0.28, suggesting considerable 
negative returns to early job  m obility o f around -25%.
As to the plausibility o f the conditions AIR(1996) stated in theorem  12 in chapter 3, one 
might, first, want to accept SUTVA as the usual assumption o f the absence o f general equi­
librium effects in analyses o f this kind on the microlevel. Second, it is important to note that 
the instrument conveys information about potential job  loss in a given firm and/or sector. It 
does, especially, not contain information about the individual-specific probability o f job  loss 
due to unobservable characteristics unless individuals have self-selected into “good” and “bad” 
firms in the centrally planned economy.14 Since such a self-selection seems unlikely, there is 
good reason to believe that, conditional on the covariates retained, assignment to treatment 
is strongly ignorable. Third, it seems unlikely that individuals who decided not to change job  
in the case their firm had announced future layoffs would have done so if their firm had. not 
announced any layoffs. Together with the evidence o f non-zero average treatment effects o f the 
chosen instrument, this underlines the plausibility o f the assumption o f strong m onotonicity in
14 “Good” and “bad" here refer to the firms’ reactions (in terms of labour demand and labour restructuring) to 
the negative shocks following unification as reflected by the immediate announcement of future firm-level layoffs. 
Cf. also the discussion in chapter 2, section 2.4.
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this case. Finally, since, as stated above, the announcement o f firm-level layoffs is unlikely to be 
correlated with unobserved income components, and since it is not clear whether individuals in 
these firms have a significantly lower employment probability throughout the transition process 
than individuals in firms that did not announce layoffs immediately the exclusion restrictions 
might hold.15
As discussed in detail in chapter 2, an increase in the layoff probability due to a firm -specific 
negative unification shock is likely to induce mainly individuals with either low ability or weak 
networks (LW-individuals) to  switch early to a new job .
Occupation-specific labour market opportunities as instrument
Individuals were further asked in the first wave to  evaluate the possibility o f finding an equivalent 
job  if they were to lose their current job . In the restricted sample defined above, 213 individuals 
report that it would be easy while the remaining 1071 consider it as difficult or impossible. I 
define the second instrument as indicator taking the value 1 if  an individual considers finding 
an equivalent job  easy.
Like the first instrument, also this second instrument is correlated w ith the treatment status 
o f (early) job-to-job m obility and to a much lesser degree (and positively) with the outcom e 
(C oit(Z ,D )= 0 .1 2  and C orr(Z ,Y )=0.05). The treatment probabilities also differ significantly by 
assignment status. O f those assigned to treatment by the instrument, 31% do actually switch 
to a new job early, as opposed to only 18% in the case o f no assignment to treatment. The 
value o f the t-statistic o f a test for equal treatment probabilities for different assignment status 
is -3.83 thus clearly rejecting the null hypothesis o f equal treatment probabilities.
As can be seen from table 4.32 in the appendix, the instrument further seems to be reason­
ably equally distributed across the sample population, although to a much lesser degree than the 
first instrument. Most noteworthy are probably the differences between blue and white collar 
workers in evaluating their occupation-specific labour market chances: The former seein to face
15Indeed, only half (54%) of those individuals who are in firms that had announced mass layoffs in early 
1990 also declared that their individual layoff was likely, contrary to the other half (46%) who declared a small 
likelihood of individual layoff. Independently of the treatment status, layoff rates later in the transition process 
are further found to be similar for those in firms that had announced layoffs and those whose firms had not done 
so. Finally, the results reported later in this chapter are found to be robust against excluding those individuals 
laid off from the sample.
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Table 4.9: Average outcome by instrument and treatment status (instr. Z2)
D065—9 D065—1 Total D
22,065 — 0 152.902,60
(71.878,27)
(N=878)
174.661,80
(87.018,84)
(N=193)
156.823,70
(75.255,31)
(N=1071)
0.180
(0.385)
(N=1071)
22,065 =  1 156.943,30
(65.835,75)
(N=147)
189.699,50
(98.895,14)
(N=66)
167.093,10
(78.829,99)
(N=213)
0.310
(0.464)
(N=213)
Total 153.482,10
(71.026,77)
(N=1025)
178.493,80 
(90.234.,73) 
(N=259)
158.527,30
(75.924,73)
(N=1284)
0.202
(0.401)
(N=1284)
NOTES: Z2 =  occupation-specific labour market opportunities as of 1990; standard deviation and 
number of observations in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany,
N=1284)
significantly more favourable employment prospects at the beginning o f transition. Moreover, 
with respect to educational attainment and hierarchical employment position in 1990,‘both the 
low-level and the high-level groups report significantly less favourable occupation-specific labour 
market prospects. There are, further, significant age- and tenure-differences in evaluating the 
chances o f finding an equivalent job . Am ong the sectors the construction sector offers the most 
favourable outside options while the manufacturing sector offers the least favourable.
Average outcomes by instrument and treatment status are summarised in table 4.9. They 
show that there is a positive effect o f occupation-specific labour market opportunities on both 
early job  mobility and total income 1990-96. The simple (unconditional) Wald estimate o f the 
causal effect of early job  mobility on total income 1990-96 based on occupation-specific labour 
market opportunities as instrument is 0.50, suggesting considerable positive returns to  early 
job  mobility o f around 65%.
As in the case o f the first instrument, SUTVA, strongly ignorable treatment assignment, 
and strong m onotonicity seem to be plausible assumptions: It seems unlikely that individuals 
self-selected into “good” and “bad” occupations in the centrally planned economy according to
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their unobservable characteristics.lü Hence, conditional on the covariates retained, assignment 
to treatment on the basis o f the second instrument might be considered as strongly ignorable. 
Strong m onotonicity further seems a plausible assumption because, first, there is a clear non­
zero average treatment effect o f occupation-specific labour market opportunities as assignment 
and, second, it seems again unlikely that some individual would only change jobs in the case of 
rare outside options, but not do so if it was easy to find an equivalent job .
The validity o f the exclusion restriction, however, is probably more difficult to justify in 
this second case. As before, it is important to note that the instrument conveys information 
about the availability of outside options for a given occupation and/or hierarchical position, 
more precisely about the availability o f an option equivalent to the current job. It should not, 
again, contain information about the individual-specific chances to simply find som e job  due 
to unobservable characteristics like e.g. motivation, and should therefore be uncorrelated with 
unobserved income components. Moreover, it was certainly not obvious at the beginning o f the 
transition process whether the same occupations would remain favoured throughout the whole 
process. These observations provide some evidence for the validity o f the exclusion restrictions 
also in the case o f the second instrument.
Finally, according to the model in chapter 2, one might expect the group o f individuals 
complying with the assignment that is im plicit in this second instrument to consist mainly of 
individuals with either high ability or strong networks (HS-individuals).
Extensions: Interaction of instruments and multiple instruments
As discussed above, the instruments proposed are likely to refer to different groups o f compilers, 
either those who only change job  early because of firm-specific risk o f job  loss or those who only 
change job  early because o f occupation-specific outside opportunities on the labour market. 
By using different instruments, different assignment mechanisms and groups of compilers are 
captured. This section suggests as an extension to the above choice o f instruments to look also 
at the interactions o f the above instruments (namely the minimum and the maximum o f the 
two instruments above).
:6Here the adjectives “good” and “bad” refer to increases and decreases in occupation-specific labour demand 
at the beginning of transition. Cf. also the discussion in chapter 2, section 2.4.
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Table 4.10: Average outcome by instrument and treatment status (instr. Z3)
Doòs~ 0 Doòs—1 Total D
jobs — 9 153.967,60
(71.636,40)
(N=971)
172.773,20
(83.028,66)
(N=226)
157.518,20
(74.250,72)
(N=1197)
0.189
(0.392)
(N=1197)
! h 144.751,70
(58.875,01)
(N=54)
217.671,40
(123942,10)
(N=33)
172.410,90 
(95.491,22) 
(N=87) '
0.379
(0.488)
(N=87)
Total 153.482,10
(71.026,77)
(N=1025)
178.493,80 
(90.234.,73) 
(N=259)
158.527,30
(75.924,73)
(N=1284)
0.202
(0.401)
(N=1284)
NOTES: Z3 =m in(Zi,Z2) where Zi =  firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990 and Z2 =  
occupation-specific labour market opportunities as of 1990; standard deviation and number of 
observations in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
The above arguments in favour o f the choice o f instruments remain valid when combining 
these, and both interaction instruments show a clear non-zero average treatment effect. Av­
erage outcomes by instrument and treatment status in the case o f interaction instruments are 
summarised tables 4.10 and 4.11. When compared to the average outcomes by instrument and 
treatment status in the case o f the first two instruments, it is clear that the interaction o f 
these captures some intermediate effects: Simple (unconditional) Wald estimates on the effect 
o f early job  mobility on total income 1990-96 based on these interaction instruments suggest 
strongly positive returns o f around 65% for those who only change job  early because o f both 
firm-specific risk o f job  loss and occupation-specific outside options compared to negative re­
turns o f around -13%  for those who only change job  early because o f either firm-specific risk o f 
jo b  loss or occupation-specific outside options.
W hile instrumental variables estimation on the basis o f both instruments simultaneously 
further has the advantage o f allowing for tests o f overidentifying restrictions, it is not clear how 
to interpret the assignment mechanism im plied by such a multiple instrument, whether the 
results can still be interpreted as causal effects and to which subgroup o f compliers they would 
apply. These reservations notwithstanding, results from instrumental variables estimation using
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Table 4.11: Average outcome by instrument and treatment status (instr. Z4)
Do6s—0 Do6s—1 Total D
24,06s — 0 157.899,40
(73.286,19)
(N=487)
176.644,90
(103.135,90)
(N=70)
160.255,20
(77.803,72)
(N=557)
0.126
(0.332)
(N=557)
Zi,obs =  1 149.483,60
(68.741,45)
(N=538)
179.178,60
(85.254,13)
(N=sl89)
157.203,40
(74.479,82)
(N=727)
0.260
(0.439)
(N=727)
Total 153.482,10
(71.026,77)
(N=1025)
178.493,80 
(90.234.,73) 
(N=259)
158.527,30
(75.924,73)
(N=1284)
0.202
(0.401)
(N=1284)
NOTES: Z4 =m ax(Zi,Z2) where Zi — firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990 and Z2 '=  
occupation-specific labour market opportunities as of 1990; standard deviation and number of 
observations in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
both instruments simultaneously will be presented in the sequel for comparison.
4.5 .2  Estim ation results
The (conditional) instrumental variables estimates o f the returns to early jo b  mobility on the 
basis of the chosen instrument have been computed using the two-stage least squares procedure: 
in the first stage, the treatment indicator D  is regressed on the whole list o f exogenous variables 
augmented by the instrumental variable =  1 , 2 ,3 ,4  using a simple linear probability model;
in the second stage, the predicted value o f the dependent variable from the first stage regression, 
D it is then used as additional regressor in the outcome equation instead o f the treatment status 
D  itself. For one selected specification, the following tables 4.12 and 4.13 contain the detailed 
results of the two separate regressions for each of the four instruments discussed above.
There is a clear significant and positive effect of all instruments on the treatment status of 
early job  mobility. Apart from gender, none o f the other exogenous variables seems relevant for 
differences in early job  mobility behaviour, however.
The estimated returns to early job  m obility differ substantially according to the instrument
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Table 4.12: IV first stage estimates for a selected specification
i — 1 ¿ =  2 ¿ =  3 i =  4
instrument Zi ¿2 min(Zi,Z2) max(Zj,Z2)
constant 0.940 0.888 0.893 0.920
(0.720) (0.719) (0.711) (0.726)
Zi 0.108 0.128 0.176 0.135
(0.023) (0.034) (0.054) (0 .022)
sex (female=l) -0.091 -0.090 -0.093 -0.084
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
age -0.036 -0.031 -0.029 -0.037
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058)
age2/ 100 0.115 0.104 0 .1 00 0.119
(0.155) (0.156) (0.155) (0.156)
age3 / 1 0 .0 0 0 -0.118 -0.107 -0.105 -0.119
(0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135)
8 years schooling -0.039 -0.035 -0.034 -0.039
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
12 years schooling 0.062 0.077 -0.067 0.070
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) .
no vocational degree 0.023 -0.009 0 .0 00 0.023
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064)
masters degree -0.042 -0.034 -0.031 -0.041
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
technical degree -0.032 -0.027 -0.023 -0.032
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
university degree -0.015 -0.005 -0.003 -0.015
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
small firm (< 20) 0.004 -0.032 -0.018 -0.015
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
large firm (> 200) -0.019 0.008 -0.008 -0.022
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
monthly income 1989 -0.059 -0.005 -0.059 -0.058
(0.033) (0.026) (0.033) (0.033)
NOTES: dependent variable: indicator of early job-to-job mobility (1990-91) (treatment status D); Zi 
=  firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990; Z2 =  occupation-specific labour market chances as o f 1990; 
Z3 =  min(Zl,Z2); Z4 =  max(Zl,Z2); Z5 =  (Z1,Z2); results for model specification (3), including 
firm-size dummies, monthly income 1989 and occupation dummies among the regressors; robust 
standard error estimates in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany,
N=1284)
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Table 4.13: IV second stage estimates for a selected specification
2 = 1 ¿ =  2 ¿ =  3 i =  4
instrument z2 m in (Z i,Z 2) max(Zi,Z2)
constant 13.617 12.326 12.671 13.248
(1.106) (0.720) (0.714) (0.884)
Di =  I V  Ei -0.937 0.435 0.069 -0.546
(0.804) (0.242) (0.276) (0.191)
sex (female=l) -0.392 -0.256 -0.292 -0.353
(0.050) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
age -0.262 -0.217 -0.229 -0.249
(0.084) (0.056) (0.054) (0.068)
age2/ 100 0.804 0.654 0.694 0.761
(0.226) (0.153) (0.147) (0.183)
age3 / 1 0 .0 0 0 -0.792 -0.636 -0.678 -0.747
(0.196) (0.134) (0.129) (0.159)
8 years schooling -0.117 -0.064 -0.078 -0.102
(0.047) (0.035) (0.032) (0.038)
12 years schooling -0.068 -0.027 -0.002 0.041
(0.075) (0.052) (0.052) (0.060)
no vocational degree -0.090 -0.082 -0.084 -0.088
(0.093) (0.061) (0.058) (0.074)
masters degree -0.024 -0.039 0.022 -0.006
(0.064) (0.048) (0.044) (0.052)
technical degree 0.118 0.164 0.151 0.131 *
(0.065) (0.040) (0.038) (0.045)
university degree 0.185 0.206 0.200 0.191
(0.096) (0.071) (0.068) (0.080)
small firm (< 20) -0.136 -0.109 -0.116 -0.128
(0.062) (0.046) (0.044) (0.052)
large firm (> 200) 0.000 -0.005 0.004 0.002
(0.036) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029)
monthly income 1989 0.193 0.269 0.249 0.215
(0.056) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045)
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of total income 1990-96; D: indicator of early 
job-to-job mobility (1990-91) (treatment status); Z\ =  firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990; Z2 =  
occupation-specific labour market chances as of 1990; Z3 =  min(Zl,Z2); Z4 — max(Zl,Z2); Z5 =  
(Z1,Z2); results for model specification (3), including firm-size dummies, monthly income 1989 and 
occupation dummies among the regressors; robust standard error estimates in parentheses; SOURCE: 
GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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used. They are summarised in the rows denoted IV E i, IVE2 , IVE 3 and IVE4 respectively, 
o f table 4.14 below. For the purpose o f comparison, the row denoted IVE5 contains the IV 
estimation results when using both instruments simultaneously.17 First-stage F-statistics and 
partial R2 measures are reported as a diagnostic tool following the suggestions o f Bound et al. 
(1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997). In both cases, the instrument quality seems reasonable 
as suggested by these measures.
The estimated returns to early job  m obility contrast strongly with the OLS estimates dis­
cussed above. They give, moreover, qualitatively different results according to the instrument 
used: W hen using firm-level announced layoffs as an instrument, IV  estimates o f the returns to 
early job -to-job  m obility are found to be significantly negative. W hen using occupation-specific 
labour market opportunities as instrument instead, the IV  estimates o f the returns to early 
job -to-job  m obility are positive but only marginally significant. The estimation results for the 
alternative treatment variables are similar (Cf. tables 4.39 and 4.42 in the appendix).
4 .5 .3  Interpretation of results
The assumption that individuals do not decide on their job  m obility behaviour during transition 
on the basis o f some idiosyncratic gains from  moving seems problematic. For this reason, the 
average treatment effect on the treated cannot be identified by instrumental variables methods, 
leading Heckman (1997) to refuse the interpretability o f the IV  estimate as a causal effect18 
The obtained results from instrumental variables estimation should therefore be interpreted as 
estimates o f local average treatment effects in the sense o f Imbens and Angrist (1994): For those 
individuals who only change job  early in transition due to a high firm /sector-specific risk o f 
displacement, the returns to job  m obility are found to be strongly negative. For those, on the 
contrary, who are induced to early job  m obility only by the occupation-specific availability o f
17In this latter case of two instruments, however, it is not clear how the estimates have to be interpreted in 
a quasi-experimental framework. As shown in ter  alia in Imbens and Angrist (1994), the instrumental variables 
estimate based on multiple instruments can be interpreted as a weighted average of local average treatment 
effects obtained from separate IV estimations for each single instrument. Nevertheless, the characterisation of 
the subgroups of interest - and in particular of the subgroup of compliers - remains problematic. In the case of 
the above instruments, the IV estimate I V E s represents the weighted average of the causal effects of forced  job 
mobility, on the one hand, and voluntary job mobility, on the other. While informative about the "quality” of 
the two separate instruments Z i and Z2, the magnitude of this weighted average is thus of limited interest.
l*Cf. the discussion in chapter 3, section 3.3.
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Table 4.14: Estimates o f the returns to early (1990-91) jo b  mobility: Overview
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) estimated returns
OLSE
R2
0.078
(0.026)
0.382
0 .1 01
(0.026)
0.441
0.090
(0.026)
0.452
0.113
(0.026)
0.454
8.1  % - 12.0 %
rvEi
1st stage F 
partial R2
-0.886
(0.321)
18.40
0.0147
-0.876
(0.359)
14.62
0 .0 121
-0.937
(0.304)
21.12
0.0172
-0.859
(0.378)
12.96
0.0107
-60.8 % - -57.6 %
IVE2 0.455 0.349 0.435 0.276 31.8 % - 57.6 %
(0.270) (0.233) (0.242) (0.239)
1st stage F 12.28 14.48 14.18 13.56
partial R2 0.0119 0.0139 0.0136 0.0133
IVE3
1st stage F 
partial R2
0.148
(0.288)
9.63
0.0108
0.057
(0.296)
9.92
0 .0 1 1 0
0.069
(0.276)
10.82
0.0120
0.107
(0.310)
8.14
0.0094
5.9 % - 16.0 %
IVE4 -0.525 -0.463 -0.546 -0.491 -42.1 % - - 37.1 %
(0 .2 1 0 ) (0 .2 1 2 ) (0.191) (0.223)
1st stage F 32.16 27.49 36.44 25.58
partial R2 0.0230 0.0207 0.0267 0.0194
IVE5 -0.281 -0 .2 2 2 -0.326 -0.232 -27.8 % - -19.9 %
(0.184) (0.181) (0.169) (0.190)
1st stage F 17.55 15.98 20.04 14.41
partial R2
NOTES: dependent variable: log o f the discounted sum of total income 1990-96; treatment variable D: 
early job-to-job mobility (1990-91); Zi =  firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990; Z2 =  
occupation-specific labour market chances as of 1990; Z3 =  min(Zl,Z2); Z4 =  max(Zl,Z2); Z5 =  
(Z1,Z2); model specifications (1) to (4) as defined above; robust standard error estimates in 
parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Table 4.15: Estimates o f the fractions o f thé various subpopulations for the assignment mech­
anisms implied by the different instruments
instrument A T
lower bound
N T
lower bound
C
upper bound
Zi 8 .0 2 %
(N=103)
34.66%
(N=445)
57.32 % 
(N=736)
z2 15.03 % 
(N=193)
11.45%
(N=147)
73.52 % 
(N=944)
Z3 17.60 %
(N=226)
4 .2 1  %
(N=54)
78.19 % 
(N=1004)
z4 5 .4 5  %
(N=70)
41.90 % 
(N=538)
52.65 % 
(N=676)
NOTES: treatment variable: early job-to-job mobility (1990-91); Zi =  firm-level announced layoffs as 
of 1990; Z2 =  occupation-specific labour market chances as o f 1990; Z3 =  min(Zl,Z2); Z4 =  
max(Zl,Z2); SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)*
outside options, job  mobility seems to pay o ff instead. Interpreting the relevant subpopulations 
of compilers in these two cases as forced movers and voluntary movers, respectively, allows to 
summarise the causal effects o f early job -to -job  m obility during transition as follows: Voluntary 
movers have gained from switching to a new job  early in transition while forced movers have 
incurred substantial losses from doing so.
Although the respective subpopulations of compliers are unidentifiable by definition one can 
at least put lower bounds on the fractions of always-takers and never takers and consequently - 
since existence o f defiers is ruled out by definition - an upper bound on the fraction o f compliers 
in the sample. The lower bound for always-takers is given by the fraction o f individuals with 
D =1 despite of Z =0, that for never-takers by the fraction o f individuals with D =0 despite o f 
Z = l. Table 4.15 shows these bounds and shows that the group o f compliers is not unlikely to 
represent a considerable fraction of the population.
Another attempt in illustrating the above estimated returns to early job  m obility for the 
unidentifiable group o f compliers would be to make assumptions about the likely (observable)
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characteristics o f the compliers and to re-run the above OLS regressions for this subgroup only. 
If one were able to identify the subpopulation o f compliers, the OLS results should indeed be 
dose to the obtained TVE results which - by definition - do measure the treatment effect for 
this subpopulation exclusively.
In a first approach, the above regressions were re-estimated on a sample which -excluded 
the observed always-takers and never-takers. For the first instrument, the estimated coefficient 
on the treatment indicator decreased to  0.030 with a standard error o f 0.034, suggesting that 
there were no returns to early job  mobility. For the second instrument, the estimated returns 
increase to 0.165 (0.048). Both results, although no formal proof, are at least qualitatively in 
line with the results suggested by the LATE-IV estimation results.
A second approach to the identification o f compliers is based on the theoretical results 
obtained in chapter 2 where it was shown that compliers in case o f the first instrument are 
likely to be LW-individucds (individuals with low ability or weak networks) while compliers in 
the case of the second instrument tend to be HS-individuals (individuals with high ability or 
strong networks). It tries to identify compliers on the basis o f a range of exogenous variables 
which might somehow be related to unobservable characteristics that are correlated to job  
mobility behaviour early in transition like ability and /  or network access. One set o f covariates 
that might be used in this context is self-reported job  m obility intentions at the beginning o f 
the transition process (cf. table 1.6). Individuals in firms that had announced mass layoffs 
in the beginning o f 1990 were more likely to fear the loss their jo b  than individuals in firms 
that had not yet announced mass layoffs (54% compared to 32%) but also more likely to  quit 
their current job  (30% compared to 15% ). This might explain partially why the self-declared 
intentions to quit the current job  were significantly higher for those individuals facing firm- 
level mass layoffs (but possibly without good outside options) than for those with good outside 
options, i.e. those who would not have had any difficulties in finding an equivalent job  (25% 
compared to 15%).
Those movers who initially reported a low probability o f quitting - possibly in combination 
with a low perceived probability o f individual job  loss - could be characterised as “forced 
movers” . On the other hand, those movers who initially reported a high probability o f quitting 
despite a low probability o f job  loss are more likely to be “voluntary movers” . OLS regressions
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m n i a  i
on various subsamples defined by different com binations o f self-reported probabilities o f job  loss 
and quit at the beginning of transition yield indeed very different results: The estimated returns 
to early job mobility are found insignificant for the first group o f  “forced movers” declaring both 
a low probability of job  loss and a low probability o f quitting the job . On the contrary, the 
returns to ‘Voluntary movers” as defined above amount to around 40% (cf. table 4.16). Again, 
while not providing any formal proof o f the validity or relevance o f the above instruments and 
IV estimates o f the returns to early job  mobility, these results seem to support the qualitative 
results based on the above LATE-IV estimation.
4.6 Sensitivity analyses
So far, the estimation results have been proven robust with respect to alternative regression 
specifications and information sets. This section discusses the robustness o f the estimation 
results with respect to changes in the sample definitions and control groups, changes in the 
definition of the treatment variable and changes in the definition o f the outcome variable. It 
also discusses some results for the restricted estim ation o f the full outcom e distributions for the 
subpopulation o f compliers when imposing nonnegativity.
4.6 .1  Alternative sample definitions and control groups
Table 4.17 contains the estimated returns to early jo b  m obility for various restrictions o f the 
control group. Results in columns (3) o f the table are based on  samples further excluding all 
those individuals who were laid off in 1990 or 1991 from  both  treatment and control groups. 
As can be seen, the results seem robust with respect to the definition c f the control group 
and generally confirm those obtained above, except probably for IV  estimates based on weak 
instruments.19
Excluding further all migrants to the Western part o f the country from the sample, however, 
does only lead to minor changes in the estimated returns.
19As discussed above, first-stage F-statistics and partial R2 measures are considered diagnostic tools in assessing 
the instrument relevance. As is clear from table 4.17, the instrument relevance differs according to the chosen 
sample definition and control group. In particular when restricting the control group to ’’ comparable stayers", 
the "quality" of the various instruments seems problematic.
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Table 4.16: OLS estimates o f the returns to early (1990-91) job  m obility on selected subsamples 
o f ” presumed compliers” : Overview
self-reported probability o f ... (1) (2) (3) (4) estimated returns
job loss: high 0.187 0.207 0.205 0.231 20.6 % - -26.0 %
R2
(0.039)
0.359
(0.038)
0.395
(0.040)
0.408
(0.040)
0.414
N 545 545 545 545
job loss: low 0.017 0.034 0.019 0.042 0%
R2
(0.036)
0.412
(0.036)
0.5
(0.035)
0.513
(0.036)
0.511
N 728 728 728 728
quitting job: high 0.275 0.281 0.277 0.298 31.7 % - 34.7 %
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
R2 0.355 0.384 0.395 0.408
N 294 294 294 294
quitting job: low
R2
N
0.030
(0.031)
0.416
981
0.056
(0.031)
0.485
981
0.042
(0.031)
0.499
981
0.067
(0.031)
0.501
981
0 % - 7.0 %
job loss low and quit high 0.337 0.307 0.363 na 35.9 % - 43.8 %
(0.105) (0.109) (0.126) (na)
R2 0.547 0.593 0.618 na
N 67 67 67 67
job loss low and quit low -0.010 0.010 -0.014 na 0 %
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (na)
R2 0.416 0.509 0.525 na
N 661 661 661 661
t
i‘!
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of labour income 1990-96; treatment variable: 
early job-to-job mobility (1990-91); results for model specification (3), including firm-size dummies, 
monthly income 1989 and occupation dummies among the regressors; robust standard error estimates 
in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Table 4.17: Estimates of the returns to early (1990-91) jo b  m obility with respect to various
control groups: Overview
control group OLSEi OLSE2 IVEi IVE2 IVE3 IVE4 IVE5
early non-movers 0.090 0.124 -0.937 0.435 0.069 -0.546 -0.326
R2/  1st stage F
(0.026) (0.034) (0.304) (0.242) (0.276) (0.191) (0.169)
0.452 0.503 21.12 14.18 10.82 36.44 20.04
N 1284 1019 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284
early stayers 0.028 0.106 -0.608 0.411 0.197 -0.370 -0.211
(0.025) (0.034) (0.189) (0.197) (0.191) (0.132) (0.117)
R2/  1st stage F 0.450 0.480 29.69 18.26 17.78 43.06 26.07
N 1055 922 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055
“comparable stayers” 0.004 0.054 -0.003 0.660 0.729 0.048 0.325
R2/  1st stage F
(0.046) (0.056) (0.426) (0.560) (0.517) (0.353) (0.310)
0.423 0.513 3.32 3.23 3.78 5.38 3.89
N 336 186 336 336 336 336 336
late or other movers 0.101 0.139 -0.578 0.363 0.323 -0.226 0.088
R2/  1st stage F
(0.027) (0.035) (0.372) (0.179) (0.245) (0.185) (0.144)
0.447 0.501 7.45 19.42 10.57 19.21 14.46
N 860 619 860 860 860 860 860
late movers 0.132 0.162 -0.529 0.445 0.530 -0.024 0.355
R2/  1st stage F
(0.030) (0.037) (0.871) (0.187) (0.277) (0.258) (0.169)
0.459 0.540 1.12 15.49 7.76 7.14 8.92
N 541 345 541 541 541 541 541
overall job stayers -0.106 -0.030 -0.257 0.157 0.082 -0.204 -0.172
R2/  1st stage F
(0.027) (0.036) (0 .100) (0.205) (0.191) (0.087) (0.087)
0.436 0.480 43.38 9.87 13.02 51.78 28.64
N 615 482 615 615 615 615 615
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of total income 1990*96; sample restriction to 
treatment and control groups as defined in the table; treatment variable: early job-to-job mobility 
(1990-91); OLS estimation results in column (3 ),denoted OLSE2 , are based on samples excluding all 
those individuals laid off in 1990 or 1991; results for model specification (3), including firm-size 
dummies, monthly income 1989 and occupation dummies among the regressors; robust standard error 
estimates in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany) (N=1284)
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Table 4.18: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics: Labour incom e throughout transition
variable d escrip tion m ean st. d e v . m in m ax
TYL90 labour income 1990 12.669,53 6.008,06 0 65.100
TYL91 labour income 1991 20.755,55 10.893,23 0 99.519
TYL92 labour income 1992 21.846,64 12.495,48 0 108.134
TYL93 labour income 1993 23.107,04 14.472,80 0 125.859
TYL94 labour income 1994 24.204,09 15.827,44 0 138.667
TYL95 labour income 1995 24.011,38 17.765,65 0 210.342
TYL96 labour income 1996 23.307,84 17.460,35 0 113.695
PDVTYL06 discounted sum 1990-96 149.902,10 81.753,93 900 735.310
NOTES: All income values gross in 1991 DM. The number of observations differs slightly from that 
with total income due to zero observations on labour income.; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14,
subsample C (N=1280)
4 .6 .2  Alternative outcom e measures
The above results are also qualitatively robust with respect to changes in the definition of 
the outcome variable. As alternative outcom e variables, the following variables have been 
considered: (1) total income for the period 1992-96, (2) aggregate labour income throughout 
transition (cf. descriptive statistics in table 4.18) and (3) yearly total income measures.
Average total income “late” in transition (1992-96) amounts to 139.085,20 DM (with a 
standard deviation o f 74.577,70 DM ) for the treated com pared to 120.777,40 DM (60.821,40 
DM ) for the control group. Average total labour income 1990-96 amounts to 173.102,90 DM 
(with a standard deviation o f 88.449,50 DM ) for the treated, compared to 141.644,20 DM 
(77.626,60) for the control group.
In both cases, the null o f equal means or equal income distributions across treatment status 
is clearly rejected. Similar differences in the outcome variable by treatment status are obtained 
in the case of total yearly incomes as illustrated in table 4.19.
The estimation results on the basis o f these different outcom e measures (cf. tables 4.20 
and 4.21) confirm the findings above. They suggest even bigger returns to early job mobility 
in terms o f labour income and suggest, moreover, stronger incom e effects in early years that 
diminish over time. In the case of total labour income as outcom e variable, it is important to
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Table 4.19: Alternative outcome measures by treatment status: Yearly income measures
trea tm en t g rou p E [Y |D = 1 ] E[Y|D =0] t-te s t K S -test
TYI91 24.902,23 20.254,67 -5.307 0.153
(13.284,65) (9.369,08) (0.000) (0.000)
TYI92 26.395,81 22.033,55 -4.829 0.134
(13.516,08) (10.659,18) (0.000) (0.001)
TY194 28.508,08 24.894,74 -3.175 0.149
(16.942,18) (13.852,30) (0.002) (0.000)
TYI96 27.802,24 24.902,95 -2.591 0.136
(16.258,03) (15.411,72) (0.010) (0.001)
NOTES: D—early job-to-job movers (1990-91); standard deviations in parentheses; t-test refers to the 
one-sided two-sample t-test of equal means allowing for unequal variances with alternative 
H\ : E [Y  \D =  1] >  E [Y  \D =■ 0 ;KS-test refers to the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smimov test statistic 
of equal outcome distributions for treatment and control group with alternative 
: iV|D=i <  iV p = 0  tf°r both tests p-values in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, wave
7, subsample C, N=1284
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note that it does not contain any transfer income which could help to mitigate the financial 
consequences of periods o f non-employment. The results thus suggest that the potential losses 
or gains from job  m obility might partly be due to differences in the incidence and duration o f 
such spells o f non-employment across treatment and control groups. This issue will be discussed 
in the section 4.7 below.
4 .6 .3  Alternative treatm ent variables
As alternative treatment variables, an indicator o f job  m obility in the first (1990) resp. the first 
three (1990-92) years o f transition has been considered. Information on the treatment probabil­
ities by assignment status for these alternative definitions is summarised in tables 4.38 and 4.41, 
and estimation results for these cases in tables 4.39 and 4.42 in the appendix. Furthermore, 
multivariate treatment variables have been considered which distinguish between (only) early 
movers, (only) late movers and frequent movers or between the time o f the first job  changes 
respectively. As control group, never-movers (including job  losers) or job  stayers (excluding job  
losers) were chosen.
Regression results indicate gains for early movers compared to  never-movers (0.085 (0.032)), 
no gains for frequent movers (0.036 (0.042)), and losses for late movers (-0.070 (0.024)). These 
results are found to  be qualitatively robust when focussing on m obility without layoffs by 
excluding those individuals from  the sample who were laid off at some point in time between 
1990 and 1996. W hen restricting the control group to job  stayers (1990-96), any form o f job  
m obility throughout transition is found to have a negative impact on earnings, less so for early 
movers (-0.096 (0.031)) and strongly for frequent movers (-0.148 (0.040)) and, in particular, for 
late movers (-0.247 (0.024)). Restricting the analysis further to individuals never laid off, we 
find that the effects remain strongly negative for late movers (-0.148 (0.036)) while becom ing 
insignificantly different from 0 for either early or frequent movers.
Allowing for multivariate treatments according to the timing o f the first job-to-job  move, 
regression results indicate strong gains for those switching job  in 1990 (0.19 (0.04)) as opposed 
to losses for those with first job -to-job  shifts in 1993 or later. The results remain virtually 
unchanged when restricting the analysis to individuals never laid off. W hen restricting the 
control group to job  stayers (1990-96), any form o f job m obility throughout transition is found
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Table 4.20: Estimates o f the returns to  early (1990-91) jo b  m obility with labour income as
dependent variable: Overview
(1) (2) (3) (4) estimated returns
OLSE
R2
0.162
(0.033)
0.300
0.194
(0.033)
0.350
0.177
(0.033)
0.349
0 .2 10
(0.035)
0.361
17.6 % - 23.4 %
IVEi
1st stage F 
partial R2
-1.268
(0.480)
18.22
0.0146
-1.131
(0.511)
14.47
0 .0 1 2 0
-1.277
(0.447)
21.04
0.0172
-1.082
(0.531)
12.80
0.0106
-72.1 % - -66.1 %
IVE2 0.837 0.664 0.785 0.601 82.4 % -130.9 %
(0.418) (0.365) (0.384) (0.376)
1st stage F 12.38 14.51 14.24 13.59
partial R2 0.0121 0.0140 0.0137 0.0134
IVE3
1st stage F 
partial R2
0.116
(0.480)
9.59
0.0107
0.028
(0.487)
9.90
0 .0 1 1 0
0.030
(0.461)
10.81
0 .0120
0.119
(0.516)
8.11
0.0093
0 .0  % - 12 .6  %
IVE4 -0.614 -0.442 -0.615 -0.448 -45.9 % - -35.7 %
(0.301) (0.295) (0.279) (0.307)
1st stage F 32.08 27.34 36.42 25.40
partial R2 0.0230 0.0207 0.0267 0.0194
IVE5 -0.310 -0.167 -0.353 -0.147 -29.7 % - -13.7 %
(0.274) (0.265) (0.256) (0.279)
1st stage F 17.50 15.92 20 .02 14.33
partial R2
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of labour income 1990*96; treatment variable: 
early job-to-job mobility (1990-91); model specifications (1) to (4) as defined above; robust standard 
error estimates in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, wave 7, subsample C, N=1284
Table 4.21: Estimates of the returns to early (1990-91) job  m obility with alternative'outcom e 
measures: Overview
TYI91 TYI92 TYI94 TYI96 estimated returns
OLSE 0.149 0.121 0.059 0.018 0.0 % - 16.1 %
R2
(0.030) (0.029) (0.037) (0.044)
0.297 0.349 0.297 0.279
IVEi -0.903 -0.998 -0.774 -0.585 -63.1 % - -44.3 %
(0.330) (0.347) (0.317) (0.325)
iv e 2 0.531 0.365 0.760 0.053 0.1 % - 113.8 %
(0.284) (0.263) (0.337) (0.344)
iv e 3 0.257 0.128 0.372 -0.095 -0.1 % - 45.1 %
(0.300) (0.300) (0.303) (0.355)
iv e 4 -0.532 -0.649 -0.367 -0.411 -47,7 % --30 .7  %
(0.211) (0.225) (0.226) (0.256)
IVEs -0.257 -0.382 -0.133 -0.295 -31.8 % - -12.5 %
(0.177) (0.191) (0.198) (0.224)
N 1283 1277 1259 1223
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the yearly total income of given year; specification 3 (occupation 
dummies); treatment variable: early job-to-job mobility (1990-91); results for model specification (3), 
including firm-size dummies, monthly income 1989 and occupation dummies among the regressors; 
robust standard error estimates in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East
Germany, N—1284)
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to have a negative impact on earnings w ith the exception o f jo b  changes in 1990 with insignificant 
coefficient. The coefficients on m obility indicators for later jo b  changes range from -0.10 to - 
0.35. Restricting the analysis further to individuals never laid off, the effect of jo b  changes in 
1990 becomes positive 0.12 (0.05) while remaining negative for later job  changes.
4 .6 .4  Estim ation o f full outcom e distributions for compliers
Following findings in Imbens and R ubin (1997) that IV  estim ation results o f causal effects 
might be flawed due to the negativity o f the im plicitly estim ated outcome distributions for 
compliers, this section presents some results based on an explicit estimation of these outcome 
distributions imposing non-negativity. A s discussed in Imbens and Rubin (1997), the estimates 
o f local average treatment effects may alter substantially when imposing nonnegativity o f the 
underlying density estimate. In this application, however, the qualitative nature o f the above 
IV estimation results is confirmed, although the estimated causal effects turn out to be slightly 
different from the simple (unconditional) W ald estimates as well as the standard IV  estimates 
conditional on observables.
In the case o f the first instrument, firm-level announced layoffs, the nonnegative IV point 
estimate of the returns to early job  m obility remains negative, but smaller in absolute value 
than either the simple (unconditional) W ald estimate or the standard IV estimate conditional 
on observables. In the case o f the second instrument, occupation-specific job  opportunities, and 
the third instrument, the nonnegative IV  point estimate o f the returns to early job.m obility 
is found to be even bigger than suggested by either the sim ple (unconditional) W ald estimate 
or the standard IVE conditional on observables. W hen im posing nonnegativity o f the outcome 
distributions, in the case of all instruments the mean o f the respective outcome distribution 
Y (0 ) for compliers is found to be smaller than the unrestricted estimate.
As can be seen from table 4.22, only in the case o f  the second instrument the mean o f the 
outcome distribution Y (0) for com pliers is found to  be smaller for compliers than for never- 
takers. In the case o f the first instrument, the mean o f the outcome distribution Y (0) for 
compilers is found to exceed not only the mean o f the outcom e distribution Y (0 ) for never- 
takers but also that o f the outcom e distribution Y ( l )  for com pliers, thus leading to a negative 
causal effect. Figures 4-2 to 4-5 below display the estimated nonnegative outcome distributions
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Table 4.22: Mean e s tim a tes  o f potential outcomes by subpopulation
NT
n  o)
AT
y(i)
c
y(0)
c
r(D
c
y (D -y (o )
Zi
simple IVE 11.78 11.94 12.39 12.13 -0.26
nonnegative IVE 11.78 11.94 12.14 12.07 -0.07
3*
simple IVE 11.86 11.97 11.61 12.17 0.56
nonnegative IVE 11.86 11.97 11.49 12.12 0.63
Zz
simple IVE 11.78 11.96 11.99 12.39 0.40
nonnegative IVE 11.78 11.96 11.86 12.32 0.46
4^
simple IVE 11.80 11.95 12.11 12.05 -0.06
nonnegative IVE 11.80 11.95 12.02 12.03 0.01
NOTES: dependent variable: log o f the total income 1990-96; treatment variable: early job-to-job 
mobility (1990-91); results for simple model without covariates; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14,
subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Figure 4-2: Nonnegative outcom e distributions Y (0 ) and Y ( l )  f° r compliers (instr. Z l)
o Y ( 0 ) ; o Y ( l )
for compliers when imposing nonnegativity.
W hile this section has only illustrated the simple case without covariates, the above qualita­
tive IV  estimates o f the returns to early jo b  m obility - negative in the case o f “forced mobility” 
and positive in the case o f “voluntary m obility” - are corroborated when imposing nonnegativity 
of the implicit estimates o f the full outcom e distributions for compliers. In order to integrate 
covariates into this approach, distributional assumptions are needed for the estimation of the 
observable outcome distributions by assignment and treatment status. Further research in this 
direction is necessary to assess the im pact o f the nonnegativity restriction in this case with 
covariates.
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Figure 4-3: Nonnegative outcome distributions Y (0) and Y ( l )  for compilers (instr. Z2)
nonnegative outcome distributions Y (1 ) and Y(O ) for compilers
o Y ( 0 ) ; o Y ( l )
Figure 4-4: Nonnegative outcome distributions Y (0) and Y ( l )  for compilers (instr. Z3)
nonnegative outcome distributions Y (1 ) and Y (0 ) for compilers
o Y ( 0 ) ; o Y ( l )
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Figure 4-5: Nonnegative outcom e distributions Y (0 ) and Y ( l )  for compilers (instr. Z4)
nonnegative outcome distributions Y(1) and Y(O) for compliers
o Y ( 0 ) ; o Y ( l )
4.7 Employment effects of early job mobility
In the previous sections, it has been shown that the returns to  early job  mobility in transition are 
heterogeneous across different subpopulations. The returns to  early job  mobility for voluntary 
movers were seen to be positive and marginally significant while those for forced movers were 
found to be strongly negative. Given that aggregate income information for the whole transition 
period 1990-96 has been used as outcom e measure in the previous analysis, it is clear that the 
individuals’ employment histories themselves are an important determinant, o f total income and 
hence o f the returns to job  m obility in terms o f this income.
The differences in the returns to jo b  m obility with respect to  total income and labour income 
that were estimated above suggest indeed that the potential losses or gains from jo b  m obility 
might partly be due to differences in the incidence and duration o f spells o f employment and 
non-employment across treatment and control groups. It is therefore important to recognise 
that these estimated causal effects each are a combined effect o f job  mobility on incom e, on the 
one hand, and on employment probabilities, on the other, and that, consequently, the “estimates
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of treatment effects for (income) conditional on employment status do not necessarily have a 
causal interpretation, even when the unconditional estimates d o” (Angrist (1998)). The effect 
o f job  mobility on aggregate income throughout the transition process should therefore be 
decomposed into, first, a direct effect on  the employment history throughout transition and, 
second, an indirect effect on the level o f income conditional on the labour market status.
This section tries to separate the unconditional effect o f early job  mobility on employment 
histories and employment probabilities throughout transition from  the effect o f job  m obility 
on income conditional on employment. To this aim, after describing the overall employment 
histories and the evolution o f employment states, it has a closer look at the incidence and 
duration o f employment and non-employment spells by job  m obility status. It presents the 
estimation results for the effect o f early job -to-job  m obility on employment probabilities on 
the basis of, first, simple treatment control comparisons, second, exact match comparisons 
and nonlinear probability models following Card and Sullivan (1988) and Angrist (1998,2000), 
and third, instrumental variable estimates. The latter axe based on the method applied in the 
previous chapter which also allows the identification o f the causal effects o f a bivariate treatment 
variable on the incidence (bivariate outcom e) o f employment an d /or non-employment spells as 
outcome variable. Finally, potential extensions to the analysis o f the returns to  job  m obility 
are discussed.
4 .7 .1  Incidence and duration o f employment and non-em ploym ent spells by  
treatm ent status
This section provides a descriptive analysis o f employment probabilities and labour market 
transitions by treatment status. As above, attention is restricted to  early job  m obility "through­
out the first two years o f transition (1990-91) as treatment, and complementary evidence for 
the case o f early (1990-92) job  m obility as treatment is presented in the annex.
Tables 4.33 to 4.36 in the appendix present the employment evolution during transition 
by treatment status, and figure 4-6 below compares in particular the evolution o f employment 
and unemployment probabilities during transition by treatment status. Both show that, as 
conjectured informally by Hunt (1999), “being flexible enough to change (jobs) may have played 
an important role in remaining employed at all.” The results o f tests for differences in future
Figure 4-6: Employment and unemployment rates 1990-96 by treatment status
«•treatment group; o control group
employment probabilities, transition rates and average durations by treatment status presented 
in tables 4.23 to 4.26 below seem to confirm  this conjecture.
Employment rates, unemployment rates and transition (retention or accession) rates clearly 
differ by treatment status. Both transition rates and employment rates are found to be sig­
nificantly higher for early (1990-91) jo b  movers. W hile the average employment rates in the 
treatment group exceeded that o f the control group by around 10% in the period 1991-97, rates 
o f unemployment and inactivity were significantly lower in the treatment group. Differences in 
retention and accession probabilities, however, were only significant in 1991/92 and 1994/95. 
In other years, there do not seem to be any significant differences between the treatment and 
control group in labour market transitions.20
W hile more individuals in the control group were actually subject to unemployment when 
looking at the labour market state at the time o f the survey, it is interesting to note that there
20These differences in employment, unemployment or transition rates can be roughly interpreted as difference- 
in-difference estimates of the effect of early job mobility, given that all individuals in the sample were employed 
at the beginning of transition and that labour market dynamics was relatively weak before 1990.
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Table 4.23: Employment rates 1990-97 by treatment status
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Pr(E|D=l) : Pr(E(D=0) 
Pr(U[D—1) : Pr(UJD=0) 
Pr(0|D=l) : Pr(O|D=0)
0.97:0.91**
0.03:0.06*
0.00:0.03**
0.96:0.82**
0.02:0.12**
0.01:0.05**
0.88:0.77**
0.09:0.15**
0.03:0.08**
0.85:0.76**
0.10:0.16**
0.04:0.08**
0.88:0.75**
0.08:0.16**
0.04:0.09**
0.84:0.72**
0.12:0.17*
0.05:0.11**
NOTES: D=early (1990-91) job-tojob  mobility; Pr(E|D=.), Pr(U|D=.), and Pr(0|D=.) denote the 
probability of being in employment, in unemployment and out o f the labour force respectively 
conditional on the treatment status D; * denotes significant t-statistic at the 5%-level for a one-sided 
two-sample t-test of equal means allowing for unequal variances; ** denotes significant t-statistic at the 
1%-level for a one-sided two-sample t-test of equal means allowing for unequal variances; SOURCE: 
GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
Table 4.24: Transition rates 1990-97 by treatment status
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
Pr(E|E;D=l) : Pr(E|E;D=0) 0.96:0.87** 0.90:0.87 0.93:0.91 0.95:0.90** 0.91:0.89 0.93:0.92
Pr(U|E;D=l) : Pr(U|E;D=0) 0.02:0.10** 0.08:0.10 0.07:0.07 0.04:0.08* 0.07:0.10 0.06:0.07
Pr(0|E;D=l) : Pr(OJE;D=0) 0.01:0.03** 0.03:0.04 0.00:0.02* 0.00:0.02** 0.02:0.02 0.01:0.01
Pr(E|U;D=l) : Pr(E|U;D=0) 1.00:0.38** 0.33:0.39 0.39:0.35 0.60:0.35* 0.38:0.28 0.23:0.28
Pr(E|0;D=l) : Pr(E|O;D=0) 0.50:0.15 0.13:0.51 0.18:0.11 0.10:0.09 0.33:0.08
NOTES: D=early (1990-91) job-to-job mobility; Pr(E|E;D=.), Pr(U(E;D=.), and Pr(0|E;D=.) denote 
the probability of staying in employment, moving into unemployment and moving into inactivity 
respectively conditional on the treatment status D; Pr(E|U;D=.) and Pr(E|0;D=.) denote the 
probability of moving into employment out o f unemployment and inactivity, respectively, conditional 
on the treatment status D; * denotes significant t-statistic at the 5%-level for a one-sided two-sample 
t-test of equal means allowing for unequal variances; ** denotes significant t-statistic at the 1%-level 
for a one-sided two-sample t-test of equal means allowing for unequal variances; SOURCE: GSOEP, 
waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Table 4.25: Cumulative non-employment experience by treatment status
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
not employed 
total 0.03:0.09** 0.06:0.21** 0.15:0.32** 0.22:0.36** 0.25:0.41** 0.31:0.46**
unemployed 0.03:0.06* 0.05:0.15** 0.12:0.24** 0.18:0.28** 0.22:0.32** 0.26:0.38**
out of the LF 0.00:0.03** 0.01:0.07** 0.03:0.11** 0.05:0.13** 0.06:0.16** 0.08:0.18**
calendar inform, 
unemployed 0.10:0.07 0.17:0.12* 0.23:0.23 0.30:0.30 0.32:0.33 0.37:0.38
out of the LF 0.11:0.07* 0.13:0.11 0.16:0.15 0.17:0.18 0.19:0.21 0.22:0.23
NOTES: in % of restricted sample (N=1284); percentage of individuals who were in the respective 
non-employment state at least at one survey date up to the respective year; calendar information 
reports the percentage of individuals who were either in unemployment or out of the labour force 
(vocational training) for at least one month up to the respective year and is based on monthly calendar 
information; SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, waves 7-14, subsample C
Table 4.26: Average duration o f employment and non-employment spells by treatment status
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
av. duration in 
employment 11.2:11.2 10.9:10.5** 11.4:10.9** 11.2:10.8** 11.4:11.1** 11.4:11.1* 11.2:11.2
unemployment 2.4:3.0 2.6:5.7** 4.2:6.0** 5.3:6.7* 6.0:6.6 5.2:6.8* 5.5:6.5
out of the LF 41:3.2 2.8:5.1* 3.7:6.3** 44:6.1 6.L5.7 6.7:6.0 6.6:6.7
NOTES: in % o f restricted sample (N=1284); average duration (in months) in the respective labour 
market state; SOURCE: GSOEP public-use file, waves 7-14, subsample C
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were no differences in the incidence of intervening unemployment spells (on the basis o f the 
calendar information) between the treatment and control group. In 1992, interestingly, those 
in the treatment group were more likely to have experienced unemployment than those in the 
control group, while those in the control group were initially slightly more likely to leave the 
labour force. Furthermore, those in the control group had on average shorter employment 
and longer unemployment spells up to 1993: After that, differences in the average duration of 
unemployment spells between treatment and control group vanished.
4 .7 .2  Selection on covariates
As in the case o f income effects of early job mobility, however, given the potential non­
randomness of the treatment group, one has to ask again whether these differences in the 
employment histories by treatment status are caused by the respective mobility behaviour. 
Since the transition and employment probabilities themselves are potentially causal outcomes 
o f job  mobility, neither controlling for intervening unemployment spells in the estimation pro­
cedure employed in the previous chapter nor comparing employment outcomes by nature o f jo b  
separations (layoffs or quits) would be valid approaches to estimate the causal effects o f job  
m obility on either income or employment.
Card and Sullivan (1988) propose two approaches to the estimation of the effect o f treat­
ment - training in their case, early job mobility here - on employment and transition proba­
bilities: first, exact-match comparisons of employment outcomes for individuals with identical 
pre-treatment employment histories (so-called “exact matches” or “controlled contrasts” ), and 
second, an estimation o f non-linear probability models with employment as bivariate, outcom e 
variable. Results from  these approaches are summarised below and will be contrasted with 
instrumental variables estimates using the instruments suggested in section 4.5.
C om parison  o f  e x a ct m atches
In the context of this study, “pre-treatment” employment histories - i.e. employment histories 
before 1990 - are unknown. Given the sample selection, all individuals were further employed 
at the time of the survey in 1990. The employment histories as from 1990, finally, are already 
part o f the outcome. The proposal to estimate the employment effects for the period after 1991
by conditioning on the employment history up to that time does therefore not seem promising. 
Instead, similar to the approach taken in section 4.6, one could argue that individuals might be 
matched according to their job  m obility intentions at the beginning o f transition, namely their 
perceptions regarding the probability o f losing their job , quitting their job , searching actively 
a new job  or becoming self-employed. Individuals w ith similar self-declared job  m obility inten­
tions can be considered more com parable than all individuals. After “matching” individuals 
by their job  m obility intentions at the beginning o f transition, the average employment and 
unemployment rates are calculated for each type o f match for both treated and controls. Over­
all estimates o f the effect o f jo b  m obility on employment and transition rates are obtained by 
weighting the results for the single matches by the sample fractions o f early job -to-job  movers 
- the treated - for each type o f m atch.21
As can be seen from tables 4.27 and 4.28 below, early jo b  movers seem to benefit from  
both higher employment and lower unemployment probabilities throughout transition. W hile 
the effect on employment probability seems to last over the whole period 1991-97, the effect 
on unemployment probabilities is found to  decline over time. These results from exact match 
comparisons are thus similar to  those obtained when comparing mean employment or unem­
ployment rates by treatment status. Interestingly, when analyzing the group-specific controlled 
contrasts, the effects o f early job -to -job  m obility on both employment and unemployment prob­
abilities are strongest for those individuals who had announced a high likelihood o f either jo b  
loss or job  search, or both, at the beginning of the transition process. They are insignificant, 
on the other hand, for those who had announced that they were unlikely to lose their job , the 
more so when they were also unlikely to  search for a new job . This finding corroborates the 
above hypothesis that “forced movers” - those who had to change job  although they neither 
intended nor expected to have to do so -  seemingly had to incur substantial losses in terms o f 
employment probabilities throughout transition.
21 Propensity score estimation represents an extension to this simple but intuitive method, defining “matches” 
on the model-based estimates of the individual-specific treatment probabilities. Self-declared job mobility inten­
tions might be included in the underlying model to estimate these propensities.
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Probability models
Estimation results for a simple (bivariate probit) employment probability m odel show further 
that men and younger people, individuals with vocational training or an engineering or univer­
sity diploma, those with relatively high monthly earnings already in 1989, white collar workers 
and those working in the public sector in 1990 benefitted from significantly higher em ploy­
ment probabilities in the period 1990-97. On the contrary, women, older people, those w ithout 
vocational training and those in low hierarchical positions in 1990 had significantly lower em­
ployment probabilities in the same period. People working in the energy, trade, transport or 
public sectors in 1990 had further significantly higher employment rates throughout 1990-97 
than those in manufacturing, mining or agriculture. The estimation results suggest returns 
to early job -to-job  mobility in terms o f an increase in the average employment probability by 
7-8%.
Estimation results from a similar model for the probability o f unemployment show that, sim­
ilarly, unemployment rates throughout 1990-97 were significantly higher for women, individuals 
without vocational training and those in low hierarchical positions in 1990, while significantly 
lower for those with engineering or university diploma and those working in the transport or 
public sector in 1990. The estimation results further suggest returns to early job -to-job  m obility 
through a reduction in the probability o f unemployment o f around 3%. The estim ation results 
on the effect o f the treatment on unemployment probabilities year by year, some doubts arise as 
to  whether early job  mobility was effective in reducing the probability o f becoming unemployed 
later in transition. In fact, the estimated returns for the years 1994 and 1996-97 are found to 
be insignificant.
4 .7 .3  Instrum ental variables estimation
The results presented above cannot necessarily be interpreted as causal effects o f early jo b  
m obility on employment outcomes throughout transition.22 Instead o f aiming at an im proved
22 As Card and Sullivan (1988) mention in the context of estimating the employment effects of training: “If the 
probability of remaining employed from one year to the next (the retention probability) and the probability of 
moving from unemployment to employment (the accession probability) are the same for a given individual, then 
a simple comparison of relative changes in employment probabilities among the trainees and controls provides 
a consistent estimate of the training effect in the context of a linear probability model. With state dependence
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panel data m odel o f employment probabilities, allowing explicitly for state dependence and 
nonlinealities, as suggested by Card and Sullivan (1988), a different solution is chosen here 
following Angrist (2000). Instrumental variables estimates are obtained by standard two-stage 
least squares methods. The estimation results o f the first stage are equivalent to  those in the 
previous chapter and are therefore not repeated here. The second stage results are based on a 
simple linear probability model and are presented in the last two columns o f tables 4.27 and 
4.28. Second stage estimation based on nonlinear probability models led’ to almost identical 
results which are not reported here.
Not surprisingly, instrumental variables estimates o f the returns to early jo b  mobility are 
also found to differ substantially from the results above. In the case o f the first instrument, 
firm-level announced layoffs, early job -to-job  m obility is found to have a strong negative im­
pact on employment probabilities only in the beginning o f the transition process and at the 
same time a strong positive im pact on the probability o f becom ing unemployed throughout the 
whole transition process. The effects were generally strongest in 1992/93 and have since then 
declined. On the contrary, in the case o f the second instrument, occupation-specific labour 
market opportunities, early jo b  m obility is found to  have a positive impact on the probability 
o f employment and a negative impact on the probability o f unemployment in particular in the 
years 1993-95.
The interpretation o f the IV  estimates o f the returns to early job -to-job  m obility in terms o f 
employment probabilities follows that o f section 4.5: W hile “forced movers” seem to  have lost 
in particular due to the fact that early job  m obility has in many cases not led to  job  stability 
later in transition, ‘Voluntary movers” seem to have benefitted from an increased employment 
probability throughout the whole transition period. This difference is most obvious in the 
years 1994-95 that are marked by a slowdown in the economic activity in Germany in general 
and in East Germany in particular. Contrary to “voluntary movers” , “forced movers” seem 
disproportionately affected by this slowdown.
For “voluntary movers” , the employment effect o f early jo b  m obility seems to explain entirely 
the positive effect o f early job  m obility on total income. For “forced movers” , too, the effect on
or with nonlinear probability specifications, this technique will not necessarily eliminate permanent differences 
between trainees and controls.”
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ITable 4.27: Estimated effects o f early (1990-91) job  m obility on  employment: Overview
Difference in means Exact matches Probit IVEa IVE2
1991 0.059 0.072 0.047 -0.274 0.108
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.166) (0.153)
1992 0.138 0.124 0.110 -0.525 0.191
(0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.234) (0.192)
1993 0.112 0.095 0.075 -0.478 0.422
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.237) (0.223)
1994 0.094 0.081 0.048 -0.311 0.535
(0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.224) (0.242)
1995 0.133 0.122 0.104 -0.420 0.572
(0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.234) (0.237)
1996 0.123 0.117 0.082 -0.404 0.292
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.239) (0.225)
1997 0.108 0.090 0.061 -0.432 0.482
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.237) (0.237)
NOTES: dependent variable: employment rate at the time of the survey; treatment variable: early 
job-to-job mobility (1990-91); results for model specification (3), including firm-size dummies, monthly 
income 1989 and occupation dummies among the regressors; standard error estimates in parentheses; 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
Table 4.28: Estimated effects o f early (1990-91) jo b  m obility on unemployment: Overview
Difference in means Exact matches Probit IVEi IVE2
1991 -0.026 -0.039 -0.022 0.345 -0.223
(0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.149) (0.135)
1992 -0.100 -0.090 -0.084 0.527 -0.259
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.216) (0.176)
1993 -0.064 -0.054 -0.043 0.759 -0.517
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.261) (0.222)
1994 -0.061 -0.056 -0.035 0.562 -0.471
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.235) (0.221)
1995 -0.076 -0.075 -0.055 0.599 -0.615
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.239) (0.233)
1996 -0.053 -0.055 -0.031 0.380 -0.118
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.220) (0.206)
1997 -0.042 -0.027 -0.015 0.449 -0.114
(0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.221) (0.201)
NOTES: dependent variable: unemployment rate at the time of the survey; treatment variable: early 
job-to-job mobility (1990-91); results for model specification (3), including firm-size dummies, monthly 
income 1989 and occupation dummies among the regressors; standard error estimates in parentheses; 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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employment probabilities explains a substantial part of the negative impact o f early job  m obility 
on total income throughout transition. Given the difference in the size of the estimated effects on 
total income, on the one hand, and on employment probabilities, on the other, however, there 
seems further a negative income effect of early job mobility conditional on the employment 
status. Future work will be necessary to model explicitly the level o f income conditional on 
employment, allowing for endogeneity o f the job mobility status.
4.8 Some frequently asked questions
Given that the assumptions underlying instrumental variables methods are generally untest able 
and that, moreover, the subgroup of compilers is not identifiable by definition, results based 
on these methods are usually greeted with some scepticism in the economics profession. This 
section tries to assuage some of the most prominent doubts arising in the discussion o f the 
above presented results.
4 .8 .1  Lack of theory
Wouldn’t it be more adequate to estimate the returns to job mobility on the basis o f som e explicit 
latent index form ulation o f the underlying decision-making problem?
As shown in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999), such an approach is not necessarily opposite 
to the one used in this chapter since the LATE has an interpretation within a latent variable 
m odel as some appropriately weighted average of the so-called local instrumental variable.
4 .8 .2  Lack o f m odel evaluation
Wouldn’t it be more adequate to employ more than one instrument and test fo r  overidentifying 
restrictions instead o f  rising only one instrument?
It is certainly possible to use more than one instrument and test for overidentifying re­
strictions. It is, however, not at all clear whether the estimates could still be interpreted in 
a quasi-experimental framework. In addition, the most important tool for evaluation in this 
kind o f study is the detailed discussion of the inherently untestable assumptions underlying 
AIR(1996)’s theorem o f the interpretability of instrumental variables estimates as local aver-
147
age treatment effects. Hence, for a final answer to the above question, one has to  weigh the 
advantages o f interpretability o f the estimates as causal effects against the lack o f formal tests 
o f overidentifying restrictions.
4.8 .3  Im plausibility o f the estim ates
Aren’t the estimated returns just im precisely estimated “unbelievable numbers"9
It is certainly fair to say that the estimates presented above are rather imprecise. Given the 
counterfactual interpretation o f the estim ated returns as well as the consideration o f potential 
unemployment spells in the aggregate outcom e measure, however, the estimated numbers are 
not necessarily implausible. Assuming for simplicity that m onthly labour income is the only 
invariable potential source of income over the whole period 1990-96, one easily calculates that an 
individual who has changed to a new jo b  before the end o f 1992, who is laid o ff from this new job  
after only a short time, and who subsequently remains without jo b  would incur (counterfactual) 
losses o f more than 50% of his potential income for the whole period 1990-96 in case he would 
have remained employed at his initial firm  over the whole period had he not changed to a new 
job . Clearly, these losses could even be higher when taking into account income growth over 
time, tenure effects, seniority pay etc..
4 .8 .4  Restriction to compliers
Given that the LATE applies exclusively to the group o f compliers, why should the LATE be 
considered an economically interesting param eter?
The economic interest in the LATE  for a subgroup o f compliers is based on recognising that, 
first, treatment effects are heterogeneous in the population, and second, that the compliers are 
considered a theoretically interesting subgroup. Not only in the context o f a transitional labour 
market there are strong theoretical reasons for heterogeneity o f the returns to jo b  m obility in 
the population. Moreover, the distinction between the returns to forced job  m obility and those 
to  voluntary job  mobility, as suggested by the instruments used in the above empirical analysis, 
is obviously o f interest. Consequently, the LATE  should be considered more interesting than 
the treatment effect on the treated also from  a policy point o f view.
148
4 .8 .5  Unidentifiability o f com pilers
Given that one cannot identify the group o f  compliers, why should the LATE be considered an 
economically interesting parameter?
In the case o f endogenous treatment status o f (early) job  m obility, the LATE  is actually the 
only causal effect that can be identified at all by instrumental variables techniques. Additionally, 
it has been shown in Siebem (1999) that the compliers can actually be characterised theoret­
ically in terms o f their unobservable characteristics on the basis o f a simple economic m odel 
o f individual decision-making. Therefore, the LATE is an important structural parameter of 
economic interest in the evaluation o f the returns to job  m obility during transition.
4 .8 .6  Characterisation o f com pliers
Isn’t the characterisation o f compliers on the basis o f the instrument as forced m overs and 
voluntary movers ju st arbitrary?
Maybe. But the alternative definition o f these two types o f movers on the basis o f survey 
information on the nature o f previous jo b  losses has to be considered as at least as arbitrary, the 
more so as e.g. individuals who have recently quit their job  due to a perceived high probability 
o f layoff cannot necessarily be considered as voluntary movers. Compliance with one o f the 
above suggested instruments should capture these subtleties much better.
4 .8 .7  Negative average returns
How can returns on average be negative i f  individuals act rationally?
Noting that the LATE estimates reported above are estimates o f the realised (ex post) 
returns to job  m obility and that the average is calculated for the subgroup o f compliers only, 
there are obviously a wealth o f possible reasons why it can be negative. Recall that, in the 
case of firm-level announced layoffs, the compliers can be shown theoretically to be individuals 
with either low ability or weal: networks. Given that these individuals might actually not 
improve upon the quality of their job  m atch or their employment prospects by switching to  a 
new employer early, it should not come as a surprise that they might fail to benefit from  their 
decision. Moreover, one should bear in mind that e.g. positive average returns to job  m obility 
for voluntary movers, i.e. for those individuals who only switch job  early due to the availability
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of equivalent outside options, imply, by definition, negative returns to staying on the job  for 
all those individuals who would have changed job  if there had been equivalent outside options. 
Hence, given the counterfactual definition o f the LATE , the motivations for the above question 
remain unclear.
4.8 .8  Bad assignment luck
Isn’t the LATE just measuring the effect o f bad luck, namely o f being in a firm that decides to 
announce mass layoffs early?
Considering individuals in “bad” firms or “bad” occupations as unlucky has no bearing at 
all on the interpretation of the above presented IV  estimates as causal effects o f (early) job  
mobility. Otherwise, one would logically also have to interpret the ineffectiveness (or,* in other 
words, the negative causal effect) of som e medicament in a clinical trial as bad luck instead, the 
more so as it might result e.g. in premature death o f the treated as opposed to the individuals 
in the control group.
4.9 Summary and conclusions
A  simple look at correlation measures between job  m obility indicators and earnings -  usually 
found to be significantly positive o f a magnitude around 10% - gives the misleading impression 
that job  m obility early in the transition process was advantageous. While this result might 
hold true on average in the whole population there is sufficient theoretical reason to  believe 
that returns to early job  mobility do actually vary considerably across individuals. The use 
of interaction terms o f the job  m obility indicator and the survey information on the reason 
for leaving the previous job allowed som e researchers to  recover such heterogeneity. However, 
in general these estimates cannot be interpreted as causal effects o f job  m obility on earnings. 
This chapter has tried to overcome this problem by analysing the returns to jo b  m obility in 
a quasi-experimental framework. The resulting instrumental variables estimates o f the cotisai 
effects to (early) job-to-job  m obility during the transition from  a centrally planned econom y to 
a market economy in this framework suggest that returns d o actually vary enormously in the 
population: while forced movers had to  incur substantial losses from changing their jo b  o f up
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to -60% in terms o f earnings, voluntary movers might have gained up to +60%  from moving.
A substantial part o f the differences in the returns to early jo b  m obility across different 
subgroups o f compliers can be explained by differences in employment probabilities throughout 
transition. These differences do not only occur at the beginning o f transition but are, in some 
cases, equally strong in later years. In particular “forced movers” have probably in many cases 
not been able to find a new job  which guarantees job  stability throughout the transition process 
and were adversely affected by either individual layoff or increased difficulties o f new companies 
later in the transition process.
Several extensions to the analysis presented in this chapter would be useful. Besides m od­
elling the effect o f early job  m obility on  income conditional on  employment, the above in­
strumental variables estimates based on standard 2SLS should be improved by applying more 
appropriate models such as the causal-IV methods proposed by Abadie (1999). Furthermore, 
the analysis could be extended to  other outcom e variables such as the count or the duration o f 
employment and unemployment spells. Finally, the analysis could be extended to the estimation 
o f distributional effects of job m obility such as quantile treatment effects.
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Table 4.29: Descriptive statistics: Exogenous variables
Variable mean st. dev. min m ax
Individual characteristics
sex (female—1) 0.48 0.50 0 1
age (in years) 38.7 9.5 20 55
8 years schooling 0.30 0.46 0 1
10 years schooling 0.53 0.50 0 1
12 years schooling 0.17 0.38 0 1
no vocational degree 0.03 0.17 0 1
vocational degree 0.61 0.49 0 1
masters degree 0.06 0.24 0 1
technical degree 0.19 0.39 0 1
university degree 0.11 0.32 0 1
Job /  firm characteristics
tenure (in months) 154 116 0 489
small firm (< 2 0 ) 0.09 0.29 0 1
medium firm 0.30 0.46 0 1
large firm (> 20 0 ) 0.61 0.49 0 1
public service 0.37 0.48 0 1
monthly income 1989 1092 436 150 4300
Occupation dummies
agriculture 0.10 0.29 0 1
blue collar 0.37 0.48 0 1
white collar 0.54 0.50 0 1
low position 0.18 0.38 0 1
medium position 0.56 0.50 0 1
leading position 0.27 0.44 0 1
Industry dummies
agriculture 0.11 0.32 0 1
energy 0.03 0.16 0 1
mining 0.03 0.17 0 1
manufacturing 0.28 0.45 0 1
construction 0.07 0.26 0 1
trade and retail 0.08 0.27 0 1
transport 0.08 0.27 0 1
finance/other services 0.05 0 .2 2 0 1
public service 0.27 0.44 0 1
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N—1284)
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Table 4.30: Descriptive statistics: Exogenous variables by treatment status
Variable D =0 D =1 t-statistic (p-value)
Individual characteristics
sex (female=l) 0.51 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 3.15 (0.002)
age (in years) 39.0 (9.6) 37.5 (9.0) 2.30 (0.022)
8 years schooling 0.32 (0.47) 0.22 (0.42) 3.16 (0.002)
10 years schooling 0.52 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) -0.56 (0.574)
12 years schooling 0.16 (0.36) 0.23 (0.42) -2.61 (0 .010)
no vocational degree 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 (0.14) 1.17 (0.241)
vocational degree 0.61 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.36 (0.719)
masters degree 0.06 (0.25) 0.05 (0.23) 0.64 (0.520)
technical degree 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38) 0.44 (0.663)
university degree 0.10 (0.31) 0.15 (0.36) -1.91 (0.057)
Job /  firm characteristics
tenure (in months) 161 (118) 125 (104) 4.84 (0.000)
small firm (< 20) 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.27) 0.87 (0.386)
medium firm 0.29 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) -0.50 (0.614)
large firm (>200) 0.61 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.05 (0.962)
public service 0.38 (0.49) 0.29 (0.45) 2.96 (0.003)
monthly income 1989 1091 (442) 1098 (415) -0.21 (0.834)
Occupation dummies
agriculture 0.09 (0.28) 0.14 (0.34) -2.14 (0.033)
blue collar 0.38 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 1.71 (0.088)
white collar 0.54 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) -0.23 (0.822)
low position 0.19 (0.39) 0.14 (0.35) 1.99 (0.047)
medium position 0.55 (0.50) 0.58 (0.50) -0.73 (0.468)
leading position 0.26 (0.44) 0.29 (0.45) -0.81 (0.421)
Industry dummies
agriculture 0.10 (0.30) 0.17 (0.38) -2.75 (0.006)
energy 0.03 (0.17) 0.01 (0 .11) 2.28 (0.023)
mining 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.16) 0.28 (0.778)
manufacturing 0.28 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46) -0.82 (0.413)
construction 0.07 (0.25) 0.08 (0.27) -0.68 (0.492)
trade and retail 0.07 (0.26) 0 .1 0  (0.30) -1.28 (0 .200)
transport 0.09 (0.29) 0.03 (0.17) 4.45 (0.000)
finance/other services 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.19) 1.22 (0.224)
public service 0.27 (0.44) 0.24 (0.43) 1.06 (0.289)
N 1025 259 1284
NOTES: D=early job-to-job mobility (1990-91); standard deviation and p-values in parentheses; 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Table 4.31: Descriptive statistics: Exogenous variables by assignment status (instr. Z l)
Variable CS3 II o Z i= l t-statistic (p-vaiue)
Individual characteristics
sex (female=l) 0-55 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 4.93 (0.000)
age (in years) 38.8 (9.5) 38.6 (9.4) 0.45 (0.650)
8 years schooling 0.30 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.21 (0.832)
10 years schooling 0.54 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.99 (0.324)
12 years schooling 0.16 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39) -1.56 (0.120)
no vocational degree 0.04 (0.21) 0.01  (0 .11 ) 3.59 (0.000)
vocational degree 0.58 (0.49) 0.64 (0.48) -1.89 (0.059)
masters degree 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25) -0.36 (0.720)
technical degree 0.21 (0.41) 0.16 (0.37) 1.93 (0.054)
university degree 0.11 (0.31) 0.12 (0.33) -0.99 (0.321)
Job /  firm characteristics
tenure (in months) 153 (115) 155 (118) -0.34 (0.738)
small firm (< 20) 0.13 (0.34) 0.04 (0.20) 5.75 (0.000)
medium firm 0.34 (0.47) 0.25 (0.43) 3.70 (0.000)
large firm (> 200) 0.52 (0.50) 0.71 (0.45) -7.15 (0.000)
public service 0.50 (0.50) 0.21 (0.41) 11.54 (0.000)
monthly income 1989 1049 (399) 1142 (470) -3.77 (0.000)
Occupation dummies •
agriculture 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29) 0.30 (0.765)
blue collar 0.32 (0.47) 0.42 (0.49) -3.78 (0.000)
white collar 0.58 (0.49) 0.49 (0.50) 3.54 (0.000)
low position 0.19 (0.39) 0.16 (0.37) 1.35 (0.178)
medium position 0.54 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) -0.82 (0.414)
leading position 0.26 (0.44) 0.27 (0.44) -0.18 (0.861)
Industry dummies
agriculture 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.33) -1.43 (0.153)
energy 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.14) 1.53 (0.126)
mining 0 .0 2  (0.16) 0.03 (0.18) -1.05 (0.294)
manufacturing 0.18 (0.38) 0.39 (0.49) -8.64 (0.000)
construction 0.06 (0.23) 0.09 (0.28) ' -2.24 (0.025)
trade and retail 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.28) -0.67 (0.503)
transport 0.12 (0.32) 0.04 (0.20) 5.26 (0.000)
fmance/other services 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.24) -1.40 (0.161)
public service 0.37 (0.48) 0.15 (0.36) 9.35 (0.000)
N 683 601 1284
NOTES:Z 1=  firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990; standard deviation and p-values in parentheses; 
SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Table 4,32: Descriptive statistics: Exogenous variables by assignment status (instr. Z2)
Variable Z2=0 Z2= l t-statistic (p-value)
Individual characteristics
sex (female=l) 0.50 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49) 3.38 (0.001)
age (in years) 39.5 (9.5) 35.0 (8 .6) 6.87 (0.000)
8 years schooling 0.31 (0.46) 0.24 (0.43) 2.20 (0.029)
10 years schooling 0.50 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47) -4.62 (0.000)
12 years schooling 0.19 (0.39) 0.09 (0.29) 4.02 (0.000)
no vocational degree 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0,17) 0.06 (0.950)
vocational degree 0.58 (0.49) 0.75 (0.44) -4.95 (0.000)
masters degree 0.07 (0.25) 0.04 (0.19) 1.96 (0.051)
technical degree 0.20 (0.40) 0.14 (0.35) 2.06 (0.040)
university degree 0.13 (0.33) 0.05 (0.21) 4.51 (0.000)
Job /  firm characteristics
tenure (in months) 162 (118) 117 (97) 5.83 (0.000)
small firm (< 20) 0.08 (0.27) 0.14 (0.35) -2.39 (0.017)
medium firm 0.30 (0.46) 0.25 (0.43) 1.72 (0.087)
large firm (> 200) 0.61 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.37 (0,715)
public service 0.36 (0.48) 0.40 (0.49) -1.26 (0 .210)
monthly income 1989 0.88 (0.377)
Occupation dummies
agriculture 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.26) 1.22 (0.223)
blue collar 0.34 (0.47) 0.51 (0.50) -4.71 (0.000)
white collar 0.56 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 4.04 (0.000)
low position 0.18 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39) -0.39 (0.699)
medium position 0.54 (0.50) 0.64 (0.48) -2.74 (0.006)
leading position 0.28 (0.45) 0.17 (0.38) 3.74 (0.000)
Industry dummies
agriculture 0.12 (0.32) 0.09 (0.29) 1.38 (0.168)
energy 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17) -0.09 (0.930)
mining 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 (0.15) 0.63 (0.530)
manufacturing 0.30 (0.46) 0.19 (0.39) 3.67 (0.000)
construction 0.06 (0.23) 0.14 (0.34) -3.18 (0.002)
trade and retail 0.07 (0.26) 0.11 (0.31) -1.50 (0.134)
transport 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.26) 0.35 (0.724)
fmance/other services 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.24) -0.60 (0.550)
public service 0.26 (0.44) 0.29 (0.46) -0.93 (0.354)
N 1071 213 1284
NOTES: Z2 — occupation-specific labour market opportunities as of 1990; standard deviation and 
p-values in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N—1284)
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Table 4.33: Labour market status 1990-97 in case o f non-treatment
D=0
LM status 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
employed 100.00 91.02 82.34 76.88 75.90 74.73 71.51
full-time 88 .10 82.44 75.90 70.05 67.90 66.83 63.12
part-time 11.90 8 .0 0 5.85 5.56 6.54 6.93 7.41
(re)training 0.39 0 .2 0 1.17 0.98 0.39 0.49
marginally 0 .2 0 0.39 0 .1 0 0.49 0.59 0.49
not empl. 8.98 17.66 23.12 24.10 25.27 28.49
unemployed 5.66 12.29 15.32 15.71 15.71 16.88
out of the LF 3.32 5.37 7.80 8.39 9.56 11.61
calendar inform.
employed 100.00 90.05 85.85 82.34 81.37 80.20 77.46
unemployed 6.73 10.63 18.05 21.17 19.22 19.51 20.78
out of the LF 6.73 6.93 7.71 7.51 6.63 6.44 5.27
NOTES: in % of restricted sample (N=1284); labour market status as of time of survey for all 
categories with, the exception of the calendar information which reports the percentage of individuals 
who were in the respective labour market state for at least one month up to the respective year and 
which is based on monthly calendar information; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C
Table 4.34: Labour market status 1990-97 in case o f treatment
D= 1
LM status 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
employed 100.00 96.91 96.14 88.03 85.33 88.03 83.78
full-time 88.80 89.58 90.73 82.63 80.69 79.15 73.36
part-time 11.20 6.95 5.02 4.63 4.63 7.72 8.49
(re) training 0.39 0.39 0.39 0 .0 0 1.16 1.93
marginally 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.39 0.30 0.00 0 .00
not empl. 3.09 3.86 11.97 14.67 11.97 16.22
unemployed 3.09 2.32 8.88 9.65 8.11 11.58
out of the LF 0 .0 0 1.54 3.09 5.02 3.86 4.63
calendar inform.
employed 100.00 99.23 97.68 91.89 91.51 91.12 89.58
unemployed 9.65 14.29 10.04 14.67 11.58 14.67 13.95
out of the LF 9.65 3.47 3.47 3.86 3.47 5.02 6.18
NOTES: in % of restricted sample (N=1284); labour market status as of time of survey for all 
categories with the exception of the calendar information which reports the percentage of individuals 
who were in the respective labour market state for at least one month up to the respective year and 
which is based on monthly calendar information; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C
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iTable 4.35: Labour market transitions in case of non-treatment
D=0
LM transitions 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96
employment to: 
employment 91.02 86.60 86.61 91.24 90.10 88.64
unemployment 5.66 9.97 9.83 7.23 7.71 9.53
out o f the labour force 3.32 3.43 3.55 1.52 2.19 1.83
unemployment .to: 
employment 37.93 38.89 35.03 34.78 27.95
unemployment 50.00 49.21 54.14 54.66 53.42
out of the labour force 12.07 11.90 10.83 10.56 18.63
out of the LF to: 
employment 41.18 14.55 5.00 10.47 9.18
unemployment 11.76 21.82 23.75 15.12 14.29
out of the labour force 47.06 63.64 71.25 74.42 76.53
NOTES: one-year transition probabilities between labour market states (N=1284); labour market 
states as of time of survey; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C
Table 4.36: Labour market transitions in case o f treatment
D= 1
LM transitions 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96
employment to: 
employment 96.91 96.02 89.56 92.54 95.48 91.23
unemployment 3.09 2.39 7.63 7.02 4.07 6.58
out of the labour force 0.00 1.59 2.81 0.44 0.45 2.19
unemployment.to:
employment 100.00 33.33 39.13 60.00 38.10
unemployment 0.00 66.67 39.13 32.00 57.14
out of the labour force 0.00 0.00 21.74 8.00 4.76
out of the LF to: 
employment 75.00 12.50 15.38 10.00
unemployment 0.00 0.00 30.77 30.00
out of the labour force 25.00 87.50 53.85 60.00
NOTES: one-year transition probabilities between labour market states (Ns=1284); labour market 
states as of time of survey; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C
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Table 4.37: OLS estimates o f the returns to early (1990) jo b  m obility following Mincer (1986):
Overview
(1) (2) (3) (4) estimated returns
control: movers in 1991-92 
G (m ) =  bt - b t +1 0.244 0.286 0.264 0.302 27.6 % - 35.3 %
coefficient on D 0.208 0.236 0.224 0.245
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
coefficient on D 0.036 0.050 0.040 0.057
R2
(0.027)
0.391
(0.026)
0.451
(0.026)
0.461
(0.026)
0.463
control: late movers in 1991-96 
G (m ) =  bt ~  bt+1 0.232 0.246 0.244 0.251 26.1 % - 28.5 %
coefficient on D 0.177 0.210 0.195 0.216
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
coefficient on D -0.055 -0.036 -0.049 -0.035
(0.023) (0.023) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.023)
R2 0.393 0.451 0.462 0.463
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of labour income 1990-96; D: early job-to-job 
mobility (1990); model specifications (1) to (4) as defined above;standard error estimates in 
parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
Table 4.38: Correlation measures and treatment probabilities
Corr(Zx,D) E[D|Zi=0j E[D|Z(=1] t-test
i= l 0.0929 5.86 (0.90) 10.98 (1.28) -3.283 (0.001)
i= 2 0.0945 7.10 (0.78) 14.08 (2.39) -2.779 (0.006)
i=3 0.0880 7.60 (0.77) 17.24 (4.07) -2.353 (0.022)
i—4 0.1198 4.49 (0.88) 11.14 (1.17) -4.554 (0.000)
NOTES: D=early (1990) job-to-job mobility; Zi = firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990; Z2 =  
occupation-specific labour market chances as of 1990; Z3 =  min(Zl,Z2); Z4 = max(Zl,Z2); average 
treatment effects in %\ standard errors in parentheses; t-values refer to two-sided test of equality of 
treatment probabilities for different assignment status allowing for unequal variance (p-values in 
parentheses); SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
Table 4.39: Estimates o f the returns to early (1990) job  mobility: Overview
(1) (2 ) (3) (4) estimated returns
OLSE
Rs
0 .2 00
(0.035)
0.390
0.225
(0.034)
0.450
0.215
(0.034)
0.461
0.232
(0.036)
0.462
18.1 % - 20.7 %
IVEi
1st stage F 
partial R2
-1.967
(0.918)
7.93
0.0064
-1.967
(1.061)
5.76
0.0051
-1.882
(0.764)
10.48
0.0091
-1.794
(1.0 0 0 )
5.71
0.0052
-86.0 % - -83.4 %
IVE2 0.872 0.685 0.862 0.536 70.9 % -139.2%
(0.553) (0.476) (0.509) (0.466)
1st stage F 6.03 6.73 6.45 6.41
partial R2 0.0070 0.0077 0.0074 0.0075
iv e 3 0.307 0.118 0.141 0.212 12.5 % - 35.9 %
(0.599) (0.608) (0.563) (0.614)
1st stage F 3.73 3.82 4.31 3.35
partial R2 0.0053 0.0055 0.0061 0.0050
IVE4 -1.099 -0.983 -1.080 -0.998 -66.7 % - -62.6 %
(0.497) (0.509) (0.430) (0.512)
1st stage F 15.95 11.25 18.96 10.94
partial R2 0 .0112 0.0098 0.0146 0 .0 1 0 0
IVE5 -0.491 -0.384 -0.643 -0.429 -47.4 % - -31.9 %
(0.394) (0.388) (0.366) (0.400)
1st stage F 7.76 6.65 9.21 6.25
partial R2
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of total income 1990-96; treatment variable: 
early job-to-job mobility (1990); model specifications (1) to (4) as defined above; robust standard error 
estimates in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Table 4.40: OLS estimates o f the returns to early (1990-92) job  mobility following Mincer 
(1986): Overview
(1) (2) (3) (4) estimated returns
control: late movers in 1993-96
G(m ) =  bt — bt+ 1 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.198 20.7% -21.9%
coefficient on D 0.059 0.080 0.068 0.087
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
coefficient on D -0.127 -0.108 -0.120 -0.111
(0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
R2 0.392 0.449 0.461 0.461
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of labour income 1990-96; D: early job-to-job 
mobility (1990-92); model specifications (1) to (4) as defined above; standard error estimates in 
parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
Table 4.41: Correlation measures and treatment probabilities
Corr(Zt-,D) E[D|Zj=0] E[D|Zi=l| t-test)
i= l 0.1304 20.79 (1.55) 32.38 (1.91) -4.668 (0.000)
i= 2 0.1203 23.81 (1.30) 38.03 (3.33) -3.972 (0.000)
i=3 0.1074 24.90(1.25) 43.68(5.35) -3.420 (0.001)
i=4 0.1672 17.77 (1.62) 32.60 (1.74) -6.235 (0.000)
NOTES: D=early (1990-92) job-to-job mobility; Zi = firm-level announced layoffs as of 1990; Z2 =  
occupation-specific labour market chances as of 1990; Z3 =  min(Zl,Z2); Z4 = max(Zl,Z2); average 
treatment effects in %; standard errors in parentheses; t-values refer to two-sided test of equality of 
treatment probabilities for different assignment status allowing for unequal variance (p-values in 
parentheses); SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Table 4.42: Estimates o f the returns to early (1990-92) job  mobility: Overview
1 2 3 4 estimated returns
OLSE
R2
0.089
(0.024)
0.385
0.107
(0.023)
0.443
0.097
(0.023)
0.454
0.114
(0.024)
0.456
9.3%-12.1%
IVEi
1st stage F 
partial R2
-0.864
(0.324)
16.83
0.0131
-0.878
(0.443)
12.99
0 .0 1 0 1
-0.906
(0.302)
19.97
0.0155
-0.883
(0.456)
10.87
0.0085
-59.6% - -57.8%
IVE2 0.468 0.361 0.447 0.304 35.5% - 59.7%
(0.277) (0.240) (0.248) (0.273)
1st stage F 12.22 14.10 13.94 11.82
partial R2 0.0095 0 .0 1 1 0 0.0109 0.0093
IVE3
1st stage F 
partial R2
0.167
(0.323)
7.28
0.0071
0.066
(0.336)
7.32
0.0071
0.077
(0.309)
8.17
0.0080
0.129
(0.372)
5.34
0.0054
6 .8% -18 .2%
IVE4 -0.503 -0.451 -0.519 -0.499 -40.5 % - -36.3%
(0.204) (0 .210 ) (0.184) (0.233)
1st stage F 28.94 23.82 34.10 20.46
partial R2 0 .0211 0.0183 0.0249 0.0159
IVE5 -0.296 -0.235 -0.341 -0.266 -28.9 % - -20.9 %
(0.186) (0.187) (0.171) (0.207)
1st stage F 15.36 13.50 18.06 11.11
partial R2
NOTES: dependent variable: log of the discounted sum of total income 1990-96; treatment variable: 
early job-to-job mobility (1990-92); model specifications (1) to  (4) as defined above; robust standard 
error estimates in parentheses; SOURCE: GSOEP, waves 7-14, subsample C (East Germany, N=1284)
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Chapter 5
In stru m e n ta l v a ria b le s  e s tim a tio n  o f  
th e  retu rn s to  e d u c a tio n  in  
G e rm a n y : A  v a ria b le  tr e a tm e n t  
in te n sity  a p p ro a c h 1
5.1 Introduction
The presence o f heterogeneity in returns to schooling is by now well established. Building 
on Gary Becker’s (1967) model o f optim al schooling according to which individuals choose 
their optimal schooling level by equating marginal benefits from  continuing in education with 
the related marginal costs, recent theoretical contributions by inter alia Card (1995a,1995b) 
and Lang (1993) argue that individuals with different unobservable characteristics like ability, 
liquidity constraints or discount rates are likely to incur different marginal costs and benefits 
o f further education and hence self-select into specific schooling levels. Such differences in the 
marginal costs and benefits of schooling im ply different returns to  schooling at different optimal 
schooling levels.
This in turn suggests the estimation o f the returns to schooling on the basis o f adequate
1 joint work with Sascha O. Becker
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instrumental variables and an interpretation o f these estimates as local average treatment effects 
(LATE) along the lines o f Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996): The estimated returns apply 
only to those individuals who are affected by the underlying instrument, i.e. those who only 
continue in school one more year because o f their being induced to it by the instrument. The 
instrument is interpreted as an assignment to treatment and one year more spent in schooling as 
treatment. Moreover, different instruments will naturally affect different subgroups and hence 
lead to varying estimates o f the returns to schooling.2
Several empirical studies on the returns to schooling in the US seem to corroborate the 
LATE interpretation o f instrumental variables estimates.3 Card (1995b) and Kling (2000) e.g. 
use an indicator o f the presence o f a college in the county o f residence at schooling age as 
instrument. They argue that this “college proximity” might allow individuals from low incom e 
(and probably liquidity constrained) families to attend college who otherwise (i.e. if they w ould 
have had to  move to another county in order to go to college) would not have done so.4
For Germany, Ichino and W inter-Ebmer (1999,2000)5 are the only authors we know o f th at 
provide LATE estimates o f the returns to schooling.6 IW E (1999) contrast estimates obtained 
on the basis o f two different instruments: first, parental educational background, and second, an  
indicator o f the father’s serving in the military during W orld War II. Since parental education as 
assignment mechanism is likely to affect less able children from  well-off families (IW E (1999) ca ll 
them the “stupid rich” ), the corresponding IV estimate is interpreted as a lower bound o f th e 
returns to schooling in Germany. On the other hand, “childhood during war” and particularly 
“father in war” are considered an extreme form o f liquidity constraints that might hinder highly 
talented children from poor families (the “smart poor” ) to  continue schooling. For this reason, 
the authors interpret the IV  estimate based on the “war instrument” as an upper bound o f th e
2 For authorative overviews of the recent literature on the identification and estimation of causal effects in 
economics cf. Angrist and Krueger (1999) and Card (1999).
^Further empirical studies on the returns to schooling in a LATE framework are e.g. Angrist (1990), Angrist 
and Krueger (1991), Angrist and Imbens (1995), and Kane and Rouse (1993).
4Cf. overview of IVE results by Card (1999).
8 IWE (1999) draws on IWE (2000) where in addition to the instrument ’father in war’ an indicator of the 
individual’s having been in the age group 9-15 during the Second World War is used as an instrument. The latter 
paper is more specifically concerned with the long-run educational cost of World War II, while the first paper is 
more methodological and aims at providing evidence for heterogeneity in the returns to schooling.
6Lauer and Steiner (2000), for Germany, and Pons and Gonzalo (2001), for Spain, do actually seem to follow 
a similar approach but they refrain from interpreting their estimates as local average treatment effects in a 
heterogenous treatment effect model.
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returns to schooling in Germany.
In this paper, we extend the IW E (1999)-study in several ways: First, we replicate the Card- 
and Kling-studies for Germany, making use o f an instrument similar to Card’s “college prox­
imity” . Second, following the discussion in chapter 3 above, we allow for a variable treatment 
intensity and try to  characterise both the affected subgroups as well as the response functions; 
and third, we com pare results for 1985 with those for 1995, thus testing indirectly for changes 
in the returns to schooling, in the instrument effectiveness, and in the response functions over 
time.
The results obtained on the basis o f GSOEP data suggest that, similar to  the US results 
by Card and Kling, IV  estimates of the returns to schooling are substantially higher than cor­
responding OLS estimates. We show that individuals from disadvantaged family backgrounds 
profit most from a better schooling infrastructure prevalent in urban areas.
The remainder o f this chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 presents a brief overview 
o f Becker’s (1964) well-known model o f optimal schooling. Section 5.3 discusses some basic evi­
dence on the relationship between educational attainment and college proximity using regional 
and GSOEP data. After a description o f the underlying data and the sample definitions in 
section 5.4, section 5.5 presents the instruments used in the empirical analysis and summarises 
the empirical results. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical considerations
In this section we shortly recall Becker’s (1964) model o f endogenous schooling in the version 
laid out by Card (1995b). It provides both the rationale for heterogeneous returns to  schooling 
and the basis for the LATE interpretation o f the final estimation results.
An individual maximises
U (y ,S ) =  lo g y - 0 ( 5 ) (5.1)
where y  is average earnings per year, S  is years o f schooling and <£(*) is the cost o f schooling.
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An individual’s opportunities are represented by y  =  9 (S ) 7 ^  order condition o f the
optimisation problem is
(5.2)
Now, assume for simplicity that
=  0 i(S ) =  b i -  h s  (fe, >  0) (5.3)
and
4> (5) =  ¿¿(S) =  n  +  k2S (fc2 > o) (5.4)
The optim al schooling level is then given by S* =  (bi — r j/ k ,  where k ~  k i+ k 2. Integrating 
out (5.3) yields
Equations (5.3) and (5.4) clearly state the reason for heterogeneous returns to schooling: 
Individuals are likely to differ in either marginal costs n  or marginal benefits 6* and are therefore 
likely to choose different optim al schooling levels.
This is exactly what is exploited by the LATE-IV approach. A  given instrument will affect 
different margins, i.e. different subpopulations at different schooling levels. As explained in  
detail in Angrist and Imbens (1995) we can hope to estimate only the average marginal return
7 There is considerable discussion in the literature as to which variable best describes the theoretical 
concept of human capital. Griliches (1977) points out that years of schooling is rather one of the inputs 
of the human capital production process than its outcome. To the extent that output measures are 
unavailable, years of schooling as a proxy for human capital is the best variable we can get to describe 
what is valued in the labor market.
log y  =  b{S — 0.5fciS2 (5.5)
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to schooling for a well-defined subgroup which is affected by the instrument. In the presence of 
heterogeneity, the notion of a unique return to schooling is hence nonsensical.
Estimation o f the returns to schooling will be based on the following system of equations:
=  X £  +  S7 +  ff (5.6)
=  XÔ + Za +  r} (5.7)
where Z  is an instrument or set of instruments. For the LATE interpretation of IV to apply to 
the estimate o f 7  in (5.6), the conditions in Imbens and Angrist (1994) have to apply.8 This 
approach thus makes a good out of the two main problems faced in a simple OLS regression
of (5.6): the problem of self-selection into schooling and heterogeneity in returns to schooling. |
r
The main problem in empirical applications is, of course, to find an adequate instrument as an 
exogenous source o f variation in education choices. j
¡11
;J
5.3 Educational outcomes and returns to schooling in Germany ■
In this section, we present descriptive evidence based on regional data for some recent years 
(1996-1998).9 We collected data about school completion rates and school infrastructure as 
well as some information about the state of the labor market at the level of counties (Krtise).
These data show, in particular, a huge variation in completion rates across counties as well as 
a positive correlation between completion rates and schooling infrastructure. j
SH
5.3 .1  Some background information using regional data
High school com pletion rates (Abitur) in Germany range from roughly 8% (in Sudwestpfalz) to 
52% (in Darmstadt) o f all school leavers across counties and hence show astonishingly strong
* Farther assumptions implicit in equations (5.6) and (5.7) are log-linearity of earnings in schooling 
and the absence of degree effects (sheepskin effects). On the basis of the GSOEP data, the latter 
assumption cannot be tested since years of schooling are calculated from survey responses to questions 
about educational attainment levels. See Card (1999), however, for empirical evidence on the absence 
of sheepskin effects in the US.
9The data were obtained from the various regional statistical offices (Statistische Landes&mter). To 
our knowledge, no consistent educational data base exists at the national level.
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Figure 5-1: Educational attainment as a function o f schooling infrastructure 
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regional variation. To see whether there is any system atic relationship between these high 
school com pletion rates, on the one hand, and the schooling infrastructure, on the other, we 
plotted the percentage of school leavers having Abitur against the log o f the number o f high 
schools per square kilometer as a measure o f schooling infrastructure. As can be seen from 
figure 5-1, the availability o f high schools is in fact seen to be highly correlated with high school 
completion rates.10
A  higher average distance to the nearest high school is likely to increase the costs o f edu­
cation. Apart from the (tim e) opportunity costs o f having to  travel more, direct costs involve 
additional transport costs. A ll other costs do a priori not differ by distance to school. They 
might differ, however, across the various German regions (Länder) which are solely responsible 
for educational matters. Although there are generally no school fees neither for primary and 
secondary schools nor for universities, regulations regarding the public provision o f books and 
other material used by students or subsidies for book  purchases to low income families as well as 
regarding transportation subsidies for students do actually differ significantly across the various 
Länder. In many regions subsidies to  either transport or book  purchase are limited to students
10 Of course, this is not necessarily a causal relationship driven by the supply of high schools. It could 
also be that lower demand for higher education causes less supply by the state.
Table 5.1: High school completion rates and average years of schooling by type of agglomeration
completion rates av. years of schooling
agglomeration type 1985 1995 1985 1995
city 18.49 25.00 12.01 12.42
big town 15.76 20.12 12.00 12.37
small town 10.94 18.70 11.28 11.97
in the countryside 8.58 12.97 11.10 11.63
NOTES: type o f agglomeration defined following classification in GSOEP; SOURCE: GSOEP (100% 
version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B (West Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and
N=3457 in 1995)
up to compulsory school age (i.e. 18 years old) or some other specific age (15 or 16 years old) 
and have to be borne fully by older students. Last but not least, the schooling years necessary 
for high school com pletion amount to 13 years in the West German Lander and Brandenburg 
as opposed to only 12 years in the remaining new German Lander. At university, the only fee 
to pay is for social security and health contributions.11
To sum up, using regional data we find lower high school completion rates in rural, less 
densely populated regions with a poorer schooling infrastructure. In addition, using microdata 
(GSOEP) we find lower high school completion rates for individuals who grew up in rural as 
opposed to urban areas. Average years of schooling by type of agglomeration show a similar 
pattern, (cf. table 5.1).12
Do these differences tell us something about regional variations in the quality of schools 
and/or high school degrees (as often suggested in the political debate) or are they indicative of 
regionally varying opportunity costs related to longer schooling? Our conjecture is that higher 
costs o f education in regions with ‘poor schooling infrastructure’ reduce private investments in 
schooling, at least among children from relatively low-income/high discount rate families. This 
is also suggested by existing empirical studies on the returns to schooling based on instrumental
11 In the later regressions, we try to capture differences in regulations across states by including a set 
of state dummies.
“ Using regional data and defining agglomerations by quartiles of population density - which obviously 
do not coincide with the GSOEP classification - we observe a similar pattern. Going from, the most 
densely to the least densely populated quartile, high schol completion rates in 1997 are 30.9%, 23.1%, 
18.9%, and 19.4%, respectively.
171
variable estimation (Card (1995b), K ling (2000)). Card finds that the IV estimates o f the 
earnings gain per year of additional schooling (10-14%) are substantially above the earnings 
gains estimated by a conventional OLS procedure (7.3% ). Kling (2000), using Card’s data, 
confirms Card’s results and further characterises the group o f students affected by differences 
in place o f childhood.
5 .3 .2  Previous studies
M ost previous results on returns to  education for Germany are based on OLS regressions o f  
earnings on schooling. Using data for the years 1984 and 1985 o f the German Socioeconom ic 
Panel (G SO EP), Wagner and Lorenz (1989) estimate returns to schooling of 6.5%. In a further 
study, Lorenz and Wagner (1993) give a range o f 6.2-7.0% based on the Luxemburg Incom e 
Study (LIS 1981) and of 4.0-4.9% using data o f the International Social Survey Program (IS S P  
1987).
To our knowledge, the only studies applying IV  estimation to infer returns to education  
in Germany are Ichino and W inter-Ebm er (1999,2000) and Lauer and Steiner (2000). T h e  
former authors exploit three different instruments: first, an indicator o f father’s education, 
second, an indicator of whether an individual was 10 years old during W orld War II, and th ird , 
an indicator o f whether their father was in war during this period. Based on GSOEP d a ta  
for 1986, the authors conclude that there is a lower bound o f 4.8% and an upper bound o f  
14% to the returns to schooling for those subpopulations that are affected by the respective 
instruments. Lauer and Steiner (2000), on the other hand, not only estimate the returns t o  
schooling using various estimation methods but also em ploy IV estimators on the basis o f  a  
long list o f various instruments. They are mainly interested in an analysis o f the robustness o f  
the estimated returns to schooling w ith respect to the various estimation methods and do n o t 
provide any LATE interpretation o f the obtained IV  estimation results. Moreover, the authors 
conclude that there is no statistical evidence for heterogeneous returns to schooling with respect 
to  unobservable characteristics.
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5.4 Database and sample selection
As in the previous chapter, the empirical analysis is based on  data from the richest German 
micro data set, the German Socioeconom ic Panel. The sample is chosen to comprise all full­
time employed in 1985 or 1995 who have no missing information on the variables of interest, in 
particular data on current earnings at the time o f the survey and information on the educational 
background. Years o f schooling is chosen as mulivalued treatment variable. Further information 
on - schooling or vocational - degrees obtained is also presented. Exogenous variables to be 
included into the analysis are gender, age, experience and tenure, as well as information on 
changes in the place o f residence since childhood. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 in the appendix, contain 
the descriptive statistics for these variables.
5.5 Instrumental variables estimation of the returns to educa­
tion
5 .5 .1  Choice o f instrument
Previous studies have used a broad range o f instruments to establish causality in the returns to 
schooling (see Card (1999) and the references therein). The choice o f an instrument has several 
important aspects. First, econometrically speaking the instrument should fulfill the exclusion 
restriction, i.e. have an effect on earnings only via the schooling channel but no direct effect 
on earnings. Second, heterogeneity in marginal costs and benefits o f schooling and therefore 
the absence o f a unique return to schooling for the population as a whole can be exploited by 
choosing an instrument which describes a quasi-experiment o f im portant policy interest. So, IV 
estimation is not just a solution to the econometric problem o f  endogeneity bias but also allows 
to analyze interesting policy questions. On the basis o f these tw o considerations, we choose our 
instrument ‘place o f childhood’ which is similar to Card’s (1995b) college proximity indicator. 
It has not yet been used in studies for Germany and allows us to  address the question as to  who 
profits how from differences in schooling infrastructure across different places o f childhood.
On place of childhood, the GSOEP questionnaire contains the question: “Did you spend the 
major portion o f your childhood up to age 15 in a) a city, b) a big town, c) a small town, or d)
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Table 5.2: Percentage o f sample w ith given instrument status
individual grew up in ... 1985 1995
pci ... a city 21.90 19.09
pc2 ... a city or a big town 36.28 33.27
pc3 ... some urban area 58.74 54.12
SOURCE: GSOEP (100% version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B (West 
Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and Ns=3457 in 1995)
in the countryside ? ” In the sequel, we are going to use three different binary indicators based 
on this question: ‘spent childhood in a city ’ (p c l), ‘spent childhood in a city or big town’ (pc2), 
and ‘spent childhood in an urban area’ (pc3), i.e. in a city, or in a small or big town. Table 5.2 
shows the percentage of the sample w ith given instrument status.
5.5.2 Variable treatment intensity approach to  the estim ation o f returns to  
schooling
The natural experiment implied by the above instrument is described by place o f childhood as 
assignment to treatment (Z ), the schooling level as treatment (5 ), and log(m onthly earnings) 
as outcome (V ). In this framework, individual-level potential schooling levels and potential 
outcomes can be defined - at least conceptually - for all values o f the instrument (e.g. “grown 
up in the countryside” , “grown up in a small town” or “grown up in a big city” ).
Given that schooling is a multivalued treatment variable, it follows from theorem 13 in 
chapter 3 that the IV estimate o f the returns to schooling based on ‘place o f childhood* as 
an instrument identifies a causal effect for well-defined subpopulations and schooling levels i f  
the conditions “independence” and “strong monotonicity** as stated in that theorem are m et. 
In this case, IV  generates an estimate o f the average causal effect among individuals w ith 
different marginal benefits from schooling. This estimate is equal to a weighted average causal 
response, allowing for several particularities: first, different subgroups are affected by different 
instruments; second, individuals in these subgroups are affected by the respective instrument 
in different ways; and third, the instrument may induce changes o f behavior at different levels 
o f schooling.
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In the empirical part, we present both  the weighting function and the response function 
for the given choice o f instrument and thereby try to  characterise the affected subgroups and 
schooling levels. The plausibility o f the assumptions underlying theorem 13 will be discussed 
below.
5.5 .3  IV  Estim ation results
We started by estimating an OLS regression o f earnings on years o f schooling controlling for 
sex, experience and tenure on the job  polynom ials, yielding estimates in the usual range o f 6.5% 
to 6.7% for both years, 1985 and 1995.
For the reasons given above, these estimates are probably not amenable to an interpretation 
as the causal effect o f schooling on earnings. We therefore performed an IV  estimation of 
the returns to education on the basis o f the instruments suggested above. The instrumental 
variables estimates o f the returns to schooling on the basis o f the chosen instrument have been 
computed using the two-stage least squares procedure: in the first stage, the years o f schooling 
are regressed on the whole list o f exogenous variables augmented by the respective instrumental 
variable using a simple linear probability model; in the second stage, the predicted value o f the 
dependent variable from the first stage regression is then used as additional regressor in the 
outcome equation instead of the schooling years itself. Table 5.3 contains the IV  estimation 
results for the various chosen instrumental variables. Further, first-stage i-statistics and partial 
R 2 measures are reported as a diagnostic tool following the suggestions o f Bound et al. (1995) 
and Staiger and Stock (1997). In all cases, the instrument quality seems reasonable as suggested 
by these measures.
The returns estimated using either o f these instruments are considerably higher than the 
OLS estimates. In 1985, the point estimates are 12.6%, 12.5% and 13.3% for the binary instru­
ments ‘spent childhood in a city’ , ‘spent childhood in a city or big town’, and ‘spent childhood 
in an urban area’ , respectively. A  similar picture arises for the 1995 data. Throughout, the 
IV  estimates are nearly double the size o f the OLS estimates. In the light o f the LATE frame­
work, these results can be interpreted as the returns to  education for those who acquired more 
education because they are living in an area with a good schooling infrastructure.
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Table 5.3: Estimates o f the returns to education: Overview
1985 1995
OLSE 6.71 6.54
(6.31;7.11) (6.12;6.96)
IVE (p ci) 12.63 12.58
(7.89; 17.39) (8.45;16.70)
1st stage t 6.737 7.087
partial R2 0.0098 0.0141
IVE (pc2) 12.49 9.67
(9.00;15.98) (6.91; 12.45)
1st stage t 9.247 9.691
partial R2 0.0183 0.0265
IVE (pc3) 13.28 9.22
(7.94;18.63) (6.95; 11.48)
1st stage t 6.131 11.387
partial R2 0.0081 0.0362
IVE (pci*(poor fbq)) 10.65 11.17
(6.76;14.55) (7.57; 14.77)
1st stage t -7.848 -7.361
partial R2 0.0075 0.0105
IVE (pc2*(poor fbq)) 9.86 11.29
(7.44;12.28) (8.34;14.25)
1st stage t -11.721 -9.512
partial R2 0.0142 0.0176
IVE (pc3*(poor fbq)) 9.33 9.68
(7.58;11.08) (7.77;11.60)
1st stage t -15.795 -13.845
partial R2 0.0219 0.0273
NOTES: The estimates denoted IVE (pc*), i=l,2,3, denote the IV estimates when using place of 
childhood as instrument (pcl=city; pc2=city or big town; pc3=urban); The estimates denoted IVE 
(pCj*(poor fbq)), i=l,2,3, denote the IV estimates when using place of childhood interacted with poor 
family background as instrument; confidence intervals in parentheses SOURCE: GSOEP (100% 
version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B (West Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and
N=3457 in 1995)
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5.5.4  Internal validity o f the instruments
To check the internal validity o f the instrument for identification of the LATE parameter, the 
assumptions underlying theorem 12 in chapter 3 have to be verified:
We can be quite confident that the SUTVA assumption is satisfied in our sample. It requires 
potential earnings to be unrelated to the amount of schooling taken by other individuals in the 
sample. This assumption is more likely to be violated in clustered samples.
Strongly ignorable assignment to treatment requires that after controlling for observable 
characteristics, unobservables like ability should be randomly distributed across different places 
o f childhood. This assumption could be violated if parents endogenously choose to five in an 
urban area because o f better schooling infrastructure. Most of this potential selection into 
places of living is probably controlled for by observables. In any case, geographical mobility 
in Germany is quite low by international standards. While Germany has 16 states and about 
80 million inhabitants, the US have 51 states and about 250 million inhabitants, so average 
population per state is relatively similar, the US states being bigger in size, however. While in 
the US, 3% o f the population move across state borders every year, in Germany only 1% of the 
population move across state borders.13 Not only are mobility rates low anyway, but the reasons 
for moving axe very unlikely to be related to schooling infrastructure as well. The GSOEP data 
contain a question on reasons for move. In 1997, respondents could give a maximum of three 
(out of a list o f 15) possible reasons. Overall, 8.6% of the movers give “other family reasons” 
(i.e. family reasons other than divorce, marriage and leaving parent’s home) as the reason 
for moving. If at all, families that move to give their children access to a better schooling 
infrastructure might show up in this group. For families with children under age 18 (l.e. those 
families for whom schooling infrastructure might play a roll), the percentage moving for “other 
family reasons” is even lower (5.2%), thus making “better schooling infrastructure” an even 
more unlikely reason for moving. We conclude that our estimates are very unlikely to suffer 
from violation of the strongly ignorable assignment to treatment assumption.
Strong monotonicity compares again two counterfactual situations: an individual growing
13 Data come from the websites of the US Census Bureau and the German National Statistical Office, 
respectively:
http: / / www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/ tab-a-l.txt 
http://www.statistik-bvmd.de/jahrbuch/jahrtab5.htm
177
up in a city (i.e. in region with good schooling infrastructure) takes at least as much schooling 
as if he had grown up in the countryside (i.e. in a region with a worse infrastructure). This 
assumption rules out defiers, i.e. individuals who, if growing up in a city, take less schooling 
than if growing up in the countryside. In theory, there might be individuals who take less 
schooling growing up in an urban area due to various “outside attractions” such as drugs and 
delinquency, but would have obtained m ore schooling if growing up in a rural area. In a similar 
way, labor demand in cities might be higher and therefore students might have more outside 
options in a city as compared to an urban area and for some individuals these outside options 
might lead to  a lower schooling level. W hile we cannot really rule out that there are some cases 
like this, for the reliability and interpretability of our estimates it is important that the fraction 
o f defiers is nevertheless very small. One testable im plication o f strong m onotonicity is that 
the cumulative density functions o f schooling by instrument status do not cross. As we w ill 
show, this holds in our data and makes us confident that violation o f the strong m onotonicity 
assumption is not a serious issue here.
The exclusion restriction, finally, would be violated if  there existed a direct effect o f the 
suggested instrument on earnings, e.g. in the form o f an ‘urban wage premium’ . W e are in the 
fortunate situation to have some inform ation about the current place o f living. The GSOEP 
data contain both current state (Bundesland) o f residence as well as the so-called Boustedt 
regions.14 W e find that by including these as additional controls, in 1985 the estimated returns 
to schooling do not change and in 1995 they even go slightly up. When controlling for state 
dummies, the coefficients on the Boustedt dummies are found to be statistically insignificant. 
W e might therefore conclude that there is no violation o f the exclusion restriction through an 
urban wage premium.
Another reason why the exclusion restriction might be violated is that school quality might 
vary by place o f childhood. In this case, controlling for characteristics o f the current place 
o f living is not sufficient because people might have moved and the decision to  take further 
schooling depended on their place o f childhood and not on their current place o f living. To see 
if this is a valid objection, we follow an idea similar to Card (1995b) and Kling (2000). They
14Boustedt (1970) classifies urban regions into seven categories, assigns the neighbouring communities 
of an urban center to four different sub-categories from “rural” to “urban center” .
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propose to define family background quartiles across which the returns to schooling will vary. 
In order to test whether college proximity is a legitimate instrument, they use the interaction of 
college proximity with an indicator for low parental background as an instrument and control 
for the main effect o f college proximity. Translated to our setup, the idea is that our instrument 
is unlikely to affect individuals from higher family background quartiles because they have the 
necessary support by their family to pursue further education even if the respective schools 
axe not nearby. So, using the instrument as such or using the instrument interacted with an 
indicator o f low family background is the same, and gives us one more degree of freedom by 
allowing us to control for the main effect of the ‘place of childhood’ indicator. We will further 
discuss the construction o f the family background quartiles in the following section. There, we 
also use them to characterise the subgroup of compilers, so they serve a double purpose.
Let us shortly summarise the results o f the estimation using the interacted instruments. We 
find that indeed the main effect o f ‘growing up in an urban area’ is small in size and statistically 
insignificant.15 The lower panel of table 5.3 shows that the point estimates are lower than the 
ones where we do not control for the main effect of ‘growing up in an urban area’, but that they 
are still considerably higher than the OLS estimates. On the bans of this evidence in favor of 
both the absence o f urban wage premia and the validity of the exclusion restriction, we conclude 
that the returns to education for the subgroups of compilers, i,e. those individuals who only 
acquire more schooling when enjoying a good schooling infrastructure, are significantly and 
substantially higher than the simple OLS estimates. In the following section, we turn to the 
characterisation o f the subgroups affected by our instrument.
5.5 .5  External validity o f the instruments
If we want to generalise our estimates to some larger populations ( “external to the sample” ), 
we have to characterise as closely as possible the subgroups affected by our instrument and the 
size o f the effect on them. We suggested above that the effect of schooling infrastructure is more 
important for children from less advantaged family backgrounds. We follow Card (1995b) and 
Kling (2000) in defining family background quartiles in the following way: First, we perform a
15The coefficients on the main effect pci is 0.012 with a standard error of 0-019 in 1985, and 0.011 
with a s.e. o f 0.020 in 1995.
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regression o f years o f schooling on the subgroup o f people who spent their childhood in a rural 
area. Then, based on the parameter estimates obtained, we predict - for all individuals - their 
‘counterfactual schooling level if they had grown up in a rural area’ and split the sample into 
four quartiles, from the lowest (fb q l) to  highest (fbq4).
Table 5.4 presents some summary statistics on average years o f schooling by instrument 
status and fam ily background quartile for the years 1985 and 1995. Apart from  the fact that 
average years o f schooling are higher for those who grew up in urban areas, the table clearly 
shows that for those who have a higher predicted (counterfactual) schooling level, also actual 
schooling attainment is higher.
Table 5.5 further shows the distribution o f fam ily background and individual variables across 
these ‘counterfactual schooling quartiles’ .16 There is no single individual in the lowest three 
family background quartiles whose father has a university degree. Conversely, there is virtually 
no individual in the two highest background quartiles who has a father without a schooling 
degree. We also see that a higher percentage o f those in the upper family background quartiles 
did actually grow up in a city.
The IV estimate of the returns to  schooling can be interpreted as a weighted average o f the 
potentially differing treatment effects across the four background quartiles, 7 g, with the weight 
given to each quartile q by the product o f the proportion o f the population in that subgroup 
(wq) and the impact on schooling for that subgroup (ASq). This allows us to write
4
7 =  E
?=1
W q & . S q * ) q
A S
The observed weights wq by family background are given in table 5.6.
Table 5.7 shows the differences in schooling levels by instrument status for the population 
as a whole (A S ).
Figures 5-2 and 5-3 further split up the information o f table 5.6 by family background 
quartiles for 1985 and 1995 respectively. In 1985, the actual average education difference by
16It is interesting to note that in the lowest background quartile, none of individuals report that either 
their father or mother graduated from high school.
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Table 5.4: Average years o f schooling by instrument status and family background quartile
fbql fbq2 fbq3 fbq4
1985
City 10.79 11.45 12.23 13.36
City or big town 10.66 11.36 12.19 13.54
Urban area 10.44 11.05 12.11 13.28
1995
City 11.46 11.64 12.48 14.13
City or big town 11.59 11.57 12.49 13.97
Urban area 11.18 11.44 12.49 13.88
NOTES: /tx jj, j—1,2,3,4, denotes the family background; definition of quartiles based on regression of 
schooling level on family background variables (and age) for individuals from rural background and subsequent 
predictions for all observations as ‘counterfactual schooling level if individual had grown up in a rural area*; 
SOURCE: GSOEP (100% version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B (West 
Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and N=3457 in 1995)
instrumental status is much larger for the two lower background quartiles, supporting the 
suggestion that instead of our indicator for ‘growing up in an urban area’ we can equally well 
use this indicator interacted with poor fam ily background. This allows us to use the main effect 
o f ‘growing up in an urban area’ in the estimation and thereby control for there being an urban 
wage premium. We already reported the results of this exercise in the previous subsection.
5.5.6 Characterizing the response function
The response function can be estimated from  the cumulative distribution functions (CD F) o f 
schooling at different values o f the instrument. The difference in the CDFs is equivalent to 
the fraction o f the population who received at least one more year o f schooling due to  the 
instrument. Figure 5-4 shows the difference in the CDFs for the 1985 sample using p c i as 
an instrument.17 It indicates that schooling infrastructure has its largest effect at 11 years o f 
schooling. More specifically we interpret the estimates to indicate that around 10 percent o f 
individuals with similar demographics are induced to  obtain m ore years o f schooling due to
17 Figures based on the instruments pc2 and pc3 show a similar pattern and are therefore not shown 
here.
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Table 5.5: Distribution o f family background and individual variables across ’counterfactual 
schooling quartiles’
variable fbqi fbq2 fbq3 fbq4 mean
father’s education
high school degree 0.00 0.26 2.43 20.85 5.76
vocational degree 0.25 2.35 4.59 23.34 7.59
university degree 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.68 4.07
no schooling degree 35.30 23.67 0.09 0.09 15.01
Mother’s education 
high school degree 0.00 0.00 0.35 6.83 1.75
vocational degree 0.25 1.65 3.47 12.87 4.48
university degree 0.00 0.09 0.09 3.11 0.80
no schooling degree 42.29 30.72 0.87 0.80 18.93
parental presence 0.00 30.64 96.01 95.21 54.86
place of childhood 
city 19.63 20.19 22.36 25.55 21.90
city or big town 33.87 33.86 35.44 42.15 36.28
urban 56.11 59.18 56.93 62.91 58.74
change of place 55.46 61.74 62.02 58.86 60.14
female 
mean age
48.19
40.59
25.76
35.90
30.59
38.04
11.36
34.00
29.22
37.18
NOTES: frequency of respective characteristic by family background quartile; definition of quartiles based on 
regression of schooling level on family background variables (and age) for individuals from rural background 
and subsequent predictions for all observations as ‘counterfactual schooling level if individual had grown up in a 
rural area’; SOURCE: GSOEP (100% version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B 
(West Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and N=3457 in 1995)
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Table 5.6: Covariate weights
fbqi fbq2 fbq3 fbq4
1985
city 23.05 22.95 25.52 28.49
city or big town 24.00 23.22 24.42 28.36
urban area 24.56 25.07 24.23 26.14
1995
city 16.21 26.06 27.88 29.85
city or big town 18.00 25.91 26.61 29.48
urban area 19.99 25.28 26.19 28.54
NOTES: Wq is the fraction in each family background quartile; definition of quartiles based on regression of 
schooling level on family background variables (and age) for individuals from rural background and subsequent 
predictions for all observations as ‘ counterf&ctual schooling level if individual had grown up in a rural area'; 
SOURCE: GSOEP (100% version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B (West 
Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and N=3457 in 1995)
Table 5.7: Differences in schooling by instrument status
1985 1995
is il S? II 1 0 1 0 1
city 11.32 12.04 11.85 12.59
city or big town 11.17 12.01 11.73 12.53
urban area 11.10 11.74 11.56 12.36
SOURCE: GSOEP (100% version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B 0 '«*  
Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and N=3457 in 1995)
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Figure 5-2: Actual average education difference by instrumental status (p c i) 1985
o avscIO ù. avsc11
Figure 5-3: Actual average education difference by instrumental status (p c i) 1995
o avscIO ¿ avsc11
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Figure 5-4: CDF difference 1985 using p c i as instrument
Instrument pel
better schooling infrastructure.
It is even more interesting to break down the response function by background quartiles. 
Figure 5-5 shows that the response function of the two lower background quartiles peaks at 10 
years of schooling while the response o f the two upper quartiles is concentrated among those 
with 13 or more years o f schooling. Furthermore, the fraction o f ‘compilers’ in the two upper 
quartiles is overall much lower, again showing that the instrument affects mainly the two lower 
family background quartiles.
From a policy point of view', this result suggests that the provision of schools beyond 10th 
grade, i.e. basically the provision o f (senior) high schools ( Gymnasien), can considerably in­
crease the fraction o f youths from disadvantaged backgrounds who obtain more schooling.
For 1995. the picture is slightly different. First, figure 5-6 suggests that for this later cohort, 
schooling infrastructure increased educational attainment at a later stage in educational careers.
Overall, in 1995 the response function is flatter and takes on lower values than in 1985. 
Second, breaking down by background quartiles, we find that the point of maximum response 
has moved to the right for all subgroups. Also has the fraction o f the population in all subgroups 
who respond to our instrument decreased (cf. figure 5-7)
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Figure 5-5: CDF difference 1985 by family background quartile using p c i as instrument
o scd flq l l  scdf1q2
□ sedfl q3 scdf1q4
Figure 5-6: CDF difference 1995 using p c i as instrument 
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Figure 5-7: CDF difference 1995 by fam ily background quartile using p c i as instrument 
o scdflql a scdf1q2
o scdf1q3 • scdfl q4
The fact that figures 5-4 and 5-6 display only non-negative values is equivalent to saying 
that the CDFs for Z  =  1 and Z  =  0 don’t cross, a finding that supports the strong m onotonidty 
assumption laid out in theorem 13 o f chapter 3.
To sum up, there seems to be a decreasing effect o f our instrument on lower schooling levels 
and/or an increasing effect o f the instrument on higher schooling levels. This also explains why 
returns to education seem to have decreased between 1985 and 1995.
5.6 Summary and conclusions
This study corroborates the general finding o f other studies based on IV estimation that OLS 
estimates are downward biased. It confirms the empirical evidence that different instruments 
lead to different estimates of the schooling coefficient, underlining the fact that returns to 
schooling are heterogeneous. Our estimates remain within the bounds given by IW E (1999). 
We find that individuals from ‘poor fam ily background’ respond most strongly to the instrument 
‘place o f childhood’ . Their response is further most pronounced at low schooling levels whereas 
the response of individuals with ‘rich fam ily background’ is m ost pronounced at higher schooling 
levels. Finally, this approach allows us to  detect changes in the response function over time.
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The tem poral variation o f returns to schooling operates through two different channels. 
First, tem poral variation in the covariate weights leads to  a reweighting o f the returns for 
different subgroups. We conjecture that there is a decreasing fraction o f compliers from a poor 
family background and/or an increasing fraction o f com pliers from a rich family background. 
Second, tem poral variation o f returns to schooling is also due to temporal variation in the 
response functions. There seems to be a decreasing effect o f our instrument on lower schooling 
levels and/or an increasing effect o f instrument on higher schooling levels.
The finding that educational attainment crucially depends on the provision o f post-compulsory 
schooling in proxim ity to the place o f living, has im portant policy implications. Consider the 
case o f a regional government that has decided to  devote a certain amount o f money to the 
improvement o f upper secondary schooling infrastructure.18 It then faces the decision where 
to build the school, in an urban area or in a rural area, or similarly whether to build one big 
school in a city  or some smaller schools in the countryside. If the per student cost o f pro­
viding further places at school is constant independent o f where schools are built, our results 
clearly indicate that students living in areas with a less favourable schooling infrastructure 
would probably benefit most from  such an investment because o f their above average marginal 
returns to education. To the extent that schooling infrastructure is correlated with the degree 
o f urbanisation, providing a better schooling infrastructure especially in rural areas could thus 
considerably increase the incentives for individuals from disadvantaged family background to  
acquire more education and thus im prove their long-run prospects in the labor market.
It is im portant to note, though, that the policy im plications might be quite different for the 
case in which the federal government increases schooling infrastructure in the country as a whole. 
In this case there might be general equilibrium effects that decrease the return to education in 
the long run due to an overall higher supply of better-educated individuals (see Heckman et 
al., 1999). The policy implications o f this paper do therefore refer to the optimal allocation o f 
schools but not necessarily to  the optim al overall spending on schooling infrastructure.
1 * We do not address the cost-benefit issue here, i.e. we do not ask whether for the region as a whole 
investing in schooling infrastructure is beneficial. In contrast, we take an individual-level perspective 
and take the provision of funds by the government as given in this thought experiment.
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5.8 Appendix
Table 5.8: Summary statistics on education and outcom e variables
variable mean st. dev min max
1985
years of schooling 11.47 2.78 7 19.5
Hauptschule 0.43 0.50 0 1
Realschule 0.34 0.48 0 1
Fachhochschulreife 0.03 0.18 0 1
Abitur 0.09 0.29 0 1
Apprenticeship 0.64 0.48 0 1
University degree 0.10 0.30 0 1
gross monthly income 2983.33 1382.73 0 19000
net monthly income 2029.74 959.23 0 13000
1995
years of schooling 12.00 2.87 7 19.5
Hauptschule 0.40 0.49 0 1
Realschule 0.34 0.47 0 1
Fachhochschulreife 0.05 0.23 0 1
Abitur 0.13 0.34 0 1
Apprenticeship 0.69 0.46 0 1
University degree 0.14 0.34 0 1
gross monthly income 4524.49 3038.21 0 99999
net monthly income 2984.71 1845.25 0 50000
SOURCE: GSOEP (100% version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B (West 
Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and N=3457 in 1995)
Table 5.9: Summary statistics on exogenous variables
Variable mean dt. dev min max N
1985
sex 0.29 0.45 0 1 4617
age 37.18 10.06 20 55 4617
experience 20.70 10.54 0 43 4617
tenure 9.74 8.06 0 56.6 4606
changed place 
since childhood 0.60
0.49 0 1 3181
1995
sex 0.31 0.46 0 1 3457
age 37.00 9.70 20 55 3457
experience 20.00 9.99 1 43 3457
tenure 9.74 8.77 0 41.3 3457
changed place 
since childhood
0.64 0.48 0 1 2274
SOURCE: GSOEP (100% version), waves 2 (1985) and 12 (1995), subsamples A and B (West 
Germany; N=4617 in 1985 and N=3457 in 1995)
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Chapter 6
S u m m a ry  a n d  c o n c lu d in g  re m a rk s
As discussed in detail in the introductory ch apter 1, the assessment of the individual-level costs 
and benefits o f job  mobility behaviour throughout the transition from a centrally planned to a 
market economy in terms o f both incom e streams and employment histories in the transition 
process is above all an empirical problem . Solving this empirical problem requires address­
ing two prominent issues: First, individuals self-select into different job  m obility patterns on 
the basis o f their unobservable characteristics. Second, returns to job  m obility are likely to 
be heterogeneous across different subgroups of the population. Solving these issues, in turn, 
calls for adequate though possibly unconventional identification strategies and econometric 
methods. This thesis presented: in chapter 2 a theoretical model o f individual jo b  mobility 
decision-making in a transitional labour market; in chapter 3 a quasi-experimental framework 
appropriate for the identification and estimation o f causal effects of individual behaviour in 
which the two issues mentioned above can be addressed explicitly; in chapter 4 the empirical 
results o f the returns to early job  m obility in transition; and in chapter 5 empirical results on 
the returns to education in Germany, equally obtained a quasi-experimental framework.
The model in chapter 2 helped to  clarify the role o f unobservable characteristics in job  
mobility decision making and rationalised the endogeneity status o f job  mobility. Under the 
model assumptions, it was shown that mainly individuals w ith either relatively low levels of 
ability and network access or with relatively high levels o f ability and good access to networks 
do self-select into early job  mobility. The model was further shown to be amenable to an 
interpretation in a quasi-experimental framework in which the subgroups o f interest - always-
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takers, never-tahers and compliers - could be characterised in terms o f their unobservable 
characteristics. On the basis o f appropriate assignment to treatment mechanisms, the compliers 
were interpreted as the subgroup o f either forced early job  movers or voluntary early job  movers. 
Moreover, the returns to early job  m obility were seen to differ significantly across the subgroups 
of always-takers and compliers.
C h ap ter 3 presented Rubin’s Causal Model as a framework and instrumental variables 
estimation as an appropriate m ethod for the identification and estimation of causal effects o f 
individual decisions such as the returns to  early job  m obility during transition and the returns 
to education. Based on the main identification results for causal inference reviewed in this is 
chapter, ch a p ter 4  presented em pirical results o f the causo/ returns to early job  m obility on the 
basis o f two different instruments: first, firm-level announced layoffs and, second, occupation- 
specific labour market opportunities. The resulting instrumental variables estimates suggested 
that returns do actually vary enorm ously in the population: while forced movers had to incur 
substantial losses from  changing their jo b  o f up to -60%  in terms o f earnings, voluntary movers 
might have gained up to -j-60% from  m oving. A  substantial part o f the differences in the returns 
to early job  m obility across different subgroups o f compliers could be explained by differences in 
employment probabilities throughout transition. In particular forced movers had difficulties in 
finding a new stable job  and were often adversely affected by either individual layoff or increased 
difficulties o f new companies later in the transition process.
Based on the observation that educational attainment levels depend crucially on the pro­
vision o f post-com pulsory schooling in  proximity to the place o f living and on an application 
o f instrumental variables methods to  an extension o f Rubin’s Causal Model, ch apter 5 has 
corroborated two by now widely accepted findings o f several US studies in the case o f Germany: 
first, simple OLS estimates o f the returns to  education tend to underestimate these returns, and 
second, the returns to education differ substantially across various subgroups in the population 
as well as across time. Individuals from  ‘poor family background* are found to respond most 
strongly to the provision o f post-com pulsory schooling in proximity to the place o f living. Their 
response is further most pronounced at low  schooling levels whereas the response o f individuals 
with ‘rich family background’ is m ost pronounced at higher schooling levels. Changes in the 
returns to education over time reflect the fact that, first, the fraction of compliers from a poor
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family background is decreasing while that of compilers from  a rich family background is in­
creasing, and second, the effect of school infrastructure on lower schooling levels is decreasing 
over time while that on higher schooling levels is increasing.
Both of the above presented em pirical results have im portant policy implications. The im­
portance o f the schooling infrastructure for educational attainment and the strong heterogeneity 
in returns to education have a clear bearing on the optimal allocation of schools. Given that 
the average margined returns to education are highest among individuals from a disadvantaged 
family background, improvements in the schooling infrastructure especially in rural areas could 
prove beneficial by incentivating these individuals to acquire more education and thus improve 
their long-run prospects in the labor market. It has to be noted, however, that policy conclu­
sions regarding the optimal level o f overall spending on ‘schooling infrastructure’ would require 
a full cost-benefit analysis and cannot be drawn from the above results.
Finally, the empirical evidence on strong income losses due to early job  m obility in transition 
among forced movers as opposed to  large gains among voluntary movers sheds light on the 
mobility incentives during transition and their impact on the speed of labour reallocation and 
human capital investment in transition. They also help in identifying ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
during transition and in understanding both individual and public opinions about the transition 
process. Future labour market policies need to recognise the imbalance in m obility incentives 
during transition as well as the starkly diverging experiences between the various subgroups 
on the labour market. Similarly to the note of caution above, the estimated ‘m icroeconomic’ 
returns to job  m obility do not provide any assessment o f the overall ‘macroeconomic’ effects of 
labour m obility throughout transition. Contrary to many straightforward theoretical results on 
these latter in terms of employment or the speed o f convergence in wages and living standards, 
empirical assessments of the ‘m acroeconom ic’ caused effects o f labour m obility in transition 
are still lacking. Indeed, the transferability of notions and concepts central to the analysis in 
this thesis - counterfactuals, quasi-experiments, compliance with assignment status, etc. - to 
a macroeconomic setting is not obvious. While clearly beyond the scope o f this study, other 
- in particular time-series related - concepts of causality might be more appropriate for their 
assessment.
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